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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the reasons for the persistence of industrial conflict 
under Queensland Labor governments between 1915 and 1957. In completing this 
analysis the thesis contrasts the Queensland case with the case of Sweden's Social 
Democratic governments (1932-1976) where industrial peace was established. The 
contrasting of these two cases points to this thesis's adoption of a comparative 
historical sociological approach which is concerned to develop macro-analytical 
frameworks capable of producing limited historical generalisations. In this case, 
some limited generalisations about why industrial peace may or may not be 
established where there is a labour government are proffered. 
The thesis is founded on a political economy approach which emphasises 
that where a system of political exchange dominates industrial relations under a 
labour government strikes will diminish. There are a number of conditions which 
are considered critical to such an outcome. Firstly, unions must be able and willing 
to commit themselves to a long-term strategy of political exchange. Political 
exchange occurs where unions exercise short-term restraint in return for long-term 
benefits which can be secured from labour governments. Secondly, labour 
governments must deliver sufficient rewards or benefits to workers and unions if 
their commitment to a long-term strategy of political exchange is to be secured. 
Finally, institutional arrangements must be established to encourage the resolution 
of distributional conflicts through a process of compromise. The thesis contends 
that three factors (the organisational and political character of the unions, the 
nature of the institutional arrangements established in response to societal crises 
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and the nature of the economic strategies pursued by labour governments) 
determined whether these conditions were met in the Queensland and Swedish 
cases and, consequently, whether industrial relations was dominated by a political 
exchange. 
The Swedish case is introduced as a control case. Therefore it is not 
subjected to as exhaustive an analysis as that given to the Queensland case. First, 
the Swedish union movement possessed the requisite organisational and political 
characteristics which made their commitment to a long-term strategy of exchange 
possible. The key elements were the development of a strong union federation 
dominated by unionists who were committed to a reformist strategy. Second, a 
generous, decommodified and universal welfare system and a societal corporatism 
were established in response to a societal crisis during the 1930s and 1940s. These 
arrangements ensured that the Swedish Social Democrats were able to deliver 
sufficient rewards to the workers and unions. The societal corporatist arrangements 
also resulted in distributional conflicts being resolved through a process of co-
operation and compromise. Finally, the Swedish Social Democrats' pursuit of a 
reformist economic growth strategy which benefited business as well as the 
workers was to stabilise the political exchange system. The Swedish Social 
Democrats did stray from this economic program for a brief period and, as a 
consequence, the system of political exchange was threatened. However, the 
capacity of the unions to develop and impose their own economic growth strategy 
on the Swedish Social Democrats was to stabilise the political exchange system. 
The Queensland case is subjected to a more detailed analysis. In this case a 
complex and fractured union structure developed which hindered the union 
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leadership's capacity to secure rank and file support for a political exchange 
strategy. The significant influence of a revolutionary unionism also hindered the 
development of union support for an exchange strategy with a labour government. 
Second, sectoral or industry based corporatist arrangements and a wage earners 
welfare state were established in response to a societal crisis which occurred in 
Australia at the beginning of the twentieth century. These institutional arrangements 
did not allow Queensland Labor to deliver to workers sufficient benefits to secure 
their commitment to a long-term exchange strategy. The sectoral corporatist 
arrangements also contributed to the development of an adversarial bargaining 
system rather than one based on co-operation and compromise. Finally, 
Queensland Labor initially pursued a redistributive economic strategy which 
benefited workers at the expense of business. This led business to impose an 
economic blockade on Queensland Labor. Labor responded by adopting a more 
conservative economic program which reassured business but failed to deliver 
sufficient rewards to the workers. Those unionists who were committed to a labour 
reformist strategy found it difficult to secure the ongoing support of workers and 
unions to a political exchange with Labor, as many believed it to be a bad bargain. 
Furthermore, the presence of an influential militant opposition in the unions made 
the task of those unionists committed to a reformist politics even more difficult. 
The thesis concludes by utilising this conceptual framework to explain why 
industrial harmony has been established under the present Federal Labor 
government (1983-) in Australia. It is maintained that the relevance of the 
conceptual framework to this case highlights its usefulness for future research into 
the likely establishment of industrial peace where labour governments are in power. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When labour governments are in power, it is said, workers and unions are 
likely to become less reliant on the strike to improve their lot. They can secure, 
through political action, what they previously had to fight for in the economic 
arena through collective acts of militancy (see Hibbs, 1978; Korpi and Shalev, 
1979, 1980; Shorter and Tilly, 1974). A number of these 'labour reformist' 
researchers have argued that, as a consequence, industrial peace will be established 
under labour governments (Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980; Shorter and Tilly, 1974). 
This claim is supported, they argue, by comparative research which shows 
that strikes declined under social democratic governments in Scandinavia. For 
instance, Korpi and Shalev (1979, 1980) note that the Swedish experience 
demonstrates that labour or social democratic governments are the harbingers of 
industrial peace. There was a shift in bargaining arrangements in the mid-1930s in 
Sweden which was "related to the coming to power of the Social Democratic 
government in the fall of 1932, at the height of the Great Depression" (Korpi and 
Shalev, 1979:171). Consequently, strike levels, which until the 1930s had been at 
internationally high levels, declined markedly and were to remain at internationally 
low levels through 44 years of uninterrupted Social Democratic government (1932 
to 1976) (see Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980; Statistical Appendix). 
This thesis does not accept the claim that labour governments are 
necessarily the harbingers of industrial peace. For instance, industrial harmony was 
not established under Labor governments (1915-1929, 1932-1957) in Queensland 
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(one of six states in Australia). Queensland's strike rate was the second highest in 
the country after the state of New South Wales (see Kelsall, 1959; Wooden and 
Creigh, 1983; Statistical Appendix). This contributed to Australia having an 
internationally high strike rate throughout most of the period from 1915 to 1957 
(see Statistical Appendix). Further, this period of Labor rule in Queensland was 
marked by a number of large and particularly bitter industrial disputes (see 
Murphy, 1983). There were major strikes in the railways, meatworks and shearing 
industry in the years 1917, 1919, 1925, 1927, 1946, 1948 and 1956 which 
contributed to Queensland's high strike rate (see Murphy, 1980, 1983a; Statistical 
Appendix). 
This thesis claims that strikes will diminish under a labour government 
where industrial relations is dominated by a political exchange. This argument is 
based on the proposition that the conflict between employers and their employees, 
which takes place in industry and the economy, often spills over into the political 
arena. Furthermore, it is argued that in some instances, the outcome of this conflict 
may even be determined primarily in the political arena (see Giles and Murray, 
1989; Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980). Where this occurs, industrial relations will be 
dominated by a political exchange, and so strikes can be expected to diminish (see 
Pizzomo, 1978). Thus, it is argued that the dramatic reduction in strikes which 
occurred under Sweden's Social Democratic government (1932-1976) resulted from 
the establishment of a political exchange which dominated industrial relations. In 
contrast, industrial relations was not dominated by a political exchange under 
Queensland Labor governments (1915-1929, 1932-1957) and, as a consequence, 
industrial conflict persisted at a high level. 
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The Queensland case, which is the main focus of attention in this thesis, is 
contrasted with the Swedish case. The thesis aims, by contrasting these two cases, 
to identify some of the factors which explain why industrial relations may or may 
not be dominated by a political exchange where there is a labour government and, 
as a consequence, whether or not strikes are likely to diminish. This chapter first 
considers the conceptual and methodological framework adopted to complete this 
task, and then gives an overview of the argument. 
THE CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Queensland case invalidates the labour reformist argument. This could 
appear to confirm the strongly held belief of some social science researchers that 
there is little value in attempting to develop "any valid macro-level explanatory 
generalisations at all" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:192). Such researchers argue for 
the adoption of a research strategy which is limited to interpreting the particularity 
or uniqueness of each case (see Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Ragin, 1987 for a 
discussion of this research strategy). This approach seeks to explore the unique 
features of individual cases which result in a diversity of outcomes. In the 
Queensland case, these researchers would find a rich body of historical research 
indicating that Queensland's unique economic and social development resulted in a 
distinctive brand of politics: rural fundamentalism. This form of politics, they 
would say, was responsible for the persistence of industrial conflict under 
Queensland Labor governments (see Costar, 1978; Cribb, 1984; Fitzgerald, 1984). 
This thesis rejects the interpretative historical sociological approach. Instead, 
it argues that it is possible to develop a conceptual framework capable of 
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accounting for the quite different strike outcomes in Queensland and Sweden 
during periods of labour government. This thesis accepts the claim that it is 
possible to identify those configurations which are favourable to, and those which 
are unfavourable to, a specific outcome (Skocpol and Somers, 1980). This 
methodological issue is further considered in Chapter 4. 
The conceptual framework proffered is also underpinned by certain 
theoretical propositions associated with the political economy approach to industrial 
relations (see Giles and Murray, 1989). Of central importance is the argument that 
bargaining over distributional issues may be dominated by political rather than 
economic factors. This proposition is founded on the contention that the 
organisation of production and distribution cannot be separated from the wider 
society and, in particular, the political process (see Giles and Murray, 1989; Korpi 
and Shalev, 1979, 1980). This approach argues that where political factors 
dominate the bargaining process, industrial relations will be dominated by a 
political exchange which, in turn, will lead to a significant reduction in strikes (see 
Pizzomo, 1978). However, where market or economic factors continue to be more 
significant than political factors, the bargaining process will be dominated by 
individual exchange or a system of collective bargaining and, particularly in the 
latter case, strikes can be expected to persist. Thus, in any given period, one of 
three different types of exchange relationship (a system of individual exchange; a 
system of collective bargaining; and a system of political exchange) is expected to 
dominate industrial relations. It is also the case that "in any concrete situation the 
three types of exchange relationship co-exist" (Pizzomo, 1978:283-284). 
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This thesis claims that strikes will diminish under a labour government 
where industrial relations is dominated by a political exchange. Critical to the 
development of a political exchange is a compromise involving the unions and the 
government (Pizzomo, 1978; Reshef, 1986). There are a number of conditions 
which are cmcial in determining whether a compromise is reached between the 
unions and labour governments. First, an ability and willingness on the part of the 
unions to commit themselves to a long term strategy of exchange. That is, an 
exchange where the unions exercise restraint in the short term, in retum for long 
term benefits which can be secured from labour governments (Pizzomo, 1978; 
Regini, 1984). For instance, union agreement to forego an immediate wage increase 
in retum for government action to improve benefits such as pensions and the 
introduction of a national health system. The unions' willingness and ability to 
commit themselves to a long term strategy of exchange is also dependent on 
governments being willing, interested and capable of delivering rewards or benefits 
which make worthwhile the unions' commitment to exercise restraint in the short 
term in retum for future benefits (Pizzomo, 1978; Regini, 1984). 
Labour govemments traditionally have been committed to guaranteeing to 
workers the sorts of benefits likely to secure union commitment to a long term 
strategy of exchange. They are committed to a labour reformist politics which is 
concerned with using control of state power within capitalist industrial society to 
improve the standard of living of workers. This, in tum, can be expected to lessen 
the need of workers and unions to rely on strike action to secure such 
improvements. Therefore the willingness or interest on the part of labour 
govemments to guarantee to workers worthwhile benefits, does not help account 
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for the different bargaining outcomes in the Queensland and Swedish cases. This 
condition can be expected to be more significant where a labour govemment is 
contrasted with a govemment dominated by a right wing party. Govemments which 
fall into the latter category traditionally have been less concemed with guaranteeing 
to unions and workers worthwhile benefits. 
However, the willingness of labour governments to deliver to workers 
sufficient rewards or benefits has not always been matched by an ability on the 
part of these governments to guarantee these rewards. Whether labour governments 
possess this ability is another condition which is cmcial in determining whether a 
compromise is reached between unions and labour govemments. Finally, 
institutional mechanisms which encourage distributional conflicts to be resolved 
through a process of compromise and consensus, rather than encouraging the key 
contending actors (employers, unions and workers) to adopt an adversarial 
approach that contributes to the persistence of industrial conflict are essential. 
A political exchange failed to dominate industrial relations under 
Queensland Labor govemments (1915-1929, 1932-1957), however it was to 
dominate under Sweden's Social Democratic govemments (1932-1976). These 
different outcomes were dependent on the necessary conditions noted above being 
achieved. In the two cases being studied, three complex factors determined whether 
the necessary conditions were established. First, the organisational and political 
character of the unions in these two cases was important in determining whether 
the unions were able and willing to commit to an exchange where they exercise 
restraint in the short term, in return for the longer term benefits which can be 
secured from government. Second, the institutional arrangements established in 
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response to societal crises in Australia and Sweden were critical as they helped 
determine whether the respective governments were able to guarantee to workers 
the benefits or rewards which would secure their commitment to a long term 
strategy of exchange. Furthermore, these institutional arrangements also determined 
whether distributional conflicts in these two cases were able to be resolved through 
co-operation and compromise, which in tum contributed to a process of political 
exchange. Third, the sorts of economic strategies pursued by Queensland's Labor 
govemments and Sweden's Social Democratic govenmients also helped determine 
whether industrial relations was dominated by a stable and lasting political 
exchange. The critical element which helped determine the different bargaining 
outcomes in these two cases was whether or not they benefited business interests as 
well as workers and their unions. 
The contention is that these three factors account for the different outcomes 
in the two cases. This points to the adoption of an analytical framework which 
focuses "on the variability of the conditions for political exchange" (Regini, 
1984:141) in this thesis. In other words, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of 
the complex set of conditions responsible for the establishment of a political 
exchange relationship which may dominate industrial relations in a given country. 
However, debate on the reasons for the establishment of a political exchange which 
dominates industrial relations under labour govemments has been dominated by 
two perspectives. These perspectives eschew the need to focus on the variability of 
the conditions for political exchange. Instead, they develop conceptual models 
which reduce explanation to key macro-level variables. These are the political 
power of the working class, or the rise of corporatism. 
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According to the political power of the working class approach, labour 
govemments are considered to be the key determinant of an industrial relations 
system that is dominated by political factors (see Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Korpi 
and Shalev, 1979, 1980). This perspective is rejected here on the grounds that it 
fails to account for the Queensland case. Furthermore, it is unable to account for a 
number of other cases (Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany) where a 
political exchange has dominated industrial relations, but where the working class 
did not exercise control over the polity. These cases suggest, then, that the 
determinants of a political exchange are more complex than the labour power 
argument allows. 
In a number of north European countries (Switzerland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands) where parties of the centre and right were in govemment industrial 
relations was dominated by a political exchange. Katzenstein (1985) has provided 
some important insights into why this occurred. Reshef (1986) has also analysed 
the nature of the political exchange which occurred under Israel's rightist Likud 
Govemment between 1977 and 1982. Since this thesis focuses on whether or not a 
political exchange is likely to dominate industrial relations under labour 
govemments, the reasons for the possible establishment of a political exchange 
where govemments are dominated by parties of the centre or right are not 
addressed. 
The second perspective claims that it is the corporatist arrangements 
(established in many capitalist industrial societies in the period from the 1930s 
onwards) which are responsible for the development of a political exchange where 
there are labour governments (see Fulcher, 1987; Panitch, 1979, 1981). These 
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corporatist arrangements led capital, labour and governments to engage in a 
compromise. This thesis acknowledges the importance of corporatist arrangements 
for the development of bargaining arrangements dominated by a political exchange. 
At the same time, it is argued that the determinants of political bargaining are more 
complex than this perspective allows. This thesis emphasises that the analytical 
task is one of identifying the variable conditions for a political exchange (Regini, 
1984), rather than developing conceptual models which reduce explanation to key 
macro-level variables such as the political power of the working class or the rise 
of corporatism. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is devoted to explaining why the 
three factors identified above (the organisational and political character of the 
unions, the nature of the institutional arrangements established in response to 
societal crises and the nature of the economic strategies pursued by labour 
govemments) are considered to be of key importance in helping account for the 
different bargaining outcomes in the two cases examined. In doing so, the key 
elements of the argument proffered in this thesis are briefly outlined. 
THE ARGUMENT 
A number of researchers have drawn attention to the importance of the 
unions' political and organisational character in determining whether they are able 
and willing to commit themselves to a long term strategy of exchange (Pizzomo, 
1978; Regini, 1983, 1984). It is claimed that these factors were of key importance 
in determining the quite different bargaining outcomes in the two cases considered 
in this thesis. 
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The organisational unity of the Swedish unions and, in particular, the fact 
that they were dominated by one strong union federation, the Landsorganisationen i 
Sverige (LO), contributed to their ability to commit themselves to a long term 
strategy of exchange. This organisational unity meant the union movement was 
able to resist pressure from individual unions and rank and file members to secure 
their demands through immediate action such as strikes. It is argued that the 
influence of socialist ideas during the union movement's formative period, the 
absence of major divisions in the union movement and the establishment of 
corporatist arrangements at the national level were the key factors contributing to 
an organisational character which enabled the Swedish unions to commit 
themselves to a political exchange strategy. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of unionists and unions were 
committed to a reformist strategy. This was one which emphasised that workers are 
most likely to secure benefits which improve their standard of living where labour 
govemments are in power. The unions were willing to commit themselves to a long 
term strategy of exchange with Sweden's Social Democratic govemments. Some 
Swedish unionists supported a more militant or revolutionary strategy. A strategy 
which opposed unions committing to a long-term strategy of exchange with labour 
govemments on the grounds that they do not secure any tangible rewards to 
workers. However, the militants lacked an organisational base in the unions which 
meant that they were not able to exert much influence on the union movement's 
strategies. Thus, the revolutionary opposition within the unions was not to hinder 
the Swedish union movement's commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. 
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The Queensland union movement had quite a different organisational and 
political character. This resulted in it being both unable, and also often unwilling, 
to commit itself to a political exchange strategy. In contrast with Sweden, attempts 
to establish an organisationally unified trade union movement in Queensland failed. 
Instead, a complex and fractured organisational structure developed which hindered 
the union leadership's capacity to secure rank and file support for a long term 
political exchange strategy. The key factors which, it is claimed, hindered the 
establishment of an organisationally unified union movement are the strong 
influence of craft ideas during the union movement's formative stages, regional and 
political divisions, and the development of corporatist arrangements at the sectoral 
or industry level in Australia rather than at the societal level. 
Furthermore, a revolutionary opposition developed within the unions which 
received significant support from among both the rank and file and, at various 
times, the leadership of major unions. Between 1915 and 1929 an influential 
syndicalist militancy developed in the north of the State. This militancy was also 
subscribed to by the leaders of the second largest and industrially most powerful 
union in the State, the Australian Railways Union (ARU). The strong influence of 
the syndicalist militancy was to result in many unionists losing interest in a long 
term strategy of exchange with labour govemments. In the post-World War II 
period, the central voice of unionism in the State, the Trades and Labor Council 
(TLC), was dominated by Communist Party trade unionists. The Communist Party 
was opposed to a long term exchange strategy with Queensland Labor. The 
influence of a revolutionary unionism was, therefore, to hinder the development of 
union support for a longer term strategy of exchange. 
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The unions' willingness and ability to commit themselves to a long term 
exchange strategy in these two cases was dependent on whether their governments 
were able to deliver sufficient rewards. It is claimed that Queensland Labor 
govemments were unable to deliver sufficient rewards to secure worker 
commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. In contrast, Swedish Social 
Democratic govemments were able to deliver the requisite rewards. It is maintained 
that the sorts of institutional arrangements established in response to societal crises 
in Australia and Sweden, and the sorts of economic policies pursued by 
Queensland's Labor govemments and Sweden's Social Democratic govemments, 
were of key importance in determining the extent to which these govemments were 
able to deliver to workers sufficient rewards or benefits. 
Historic compromises involving workers, unions, employers and govemment 
were established in response to major societal crises in the 1930s and 1940s in 
Sweden, along with six other north European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland). These compromises resulted 
in the establishment of lasting institutional arrangements which contributed to the 
development of political bargaining arrangements which dominated industrial 
relations and resulted in the diminution of strikes (see Katzenstein, 1985). This is, 
in part, because the institutional arrangements established resulted in the 
govemment being able to guarantee the sorts of benefits which secured the unions' 
commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. In Sweden, corporatist 
arrangements were established at the societal or national level which led to a broad 
range of issues being subject to the bargaining process. Consequently, labour 
market policies and a social wage were developed which meant that govemment 
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became more responsible for guaranteeing to workers long term benefits. A 
generous, highly decommodified and universalistic welfare regime was also 
established in response to this societal crisis in Sweden. This helped guarantee to 
workers the sorts of benefits from govemment likely to secure their commitment to 
an exchange strategy. 
An historic compromise was reached between capital and labour in 
Australia in the two decades spanning the beginning of the twentieth century. This 
compromise was established in response to a societal crisis which occurred in the 
1890s. However, the sorts of institutional arrangements established were quite 
different from those established in Sweden a generation later (see Castles, 1985, 
1987, 1988). Corporatist institutions were established at the sectoral or industry 
level rather than at the societal level (see Palmer, 1989). These corporatist 
arrangements resulted in a very limited range of issues being regulated. Wages and 
basic conditions of employment were covered, rather than the much broader range 
of issues which are the subject of regulation where corporatist arrangements are 
established at the societal level. Consequently, Queensland Labor govemments 
were only responsible for guaranteeing a very limited set of benefits or rewards to 
workers. This lessened the unions' interest in committing themselves to a long term 
strategy of exchange with those govemments. 
The system of compulsory arbitration, which represented an industry or 
sectoral level of corporatism, also underpinned the wage eamers welfare state that 
was established during the two decades spanning the tum of the twentieth century 
(Castles, 1985). It guaranteed wage security for the worker rather than social 
security for the citizen. This was achieved through a system of wage regulation that 
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guaranteed workers a living wage while a residual system of income maintenance 
provided insurance against poverty for all those outside the labour market. This 
was initially acceptable to workers and unions since it appeared to represent a 
reasonable defence against the economic fluctuations which, in the 1890s, had 
severely eroded their standard of living. However, from World War I onwards, 
wages were determined increasingly on the basis of industry's capacity to pay 
rather than social considerations such as the need to guarantee to workers a decent 
standard of living. This emphasised workers' dependence on the market rather than 
the political arena and led to them seeking to advance their interests through 
collective acts of militancy in the economic arena. 
A number of political exchange researchers (see Regini, 1984; Jacobi et al, 
1986) have noted the importance of economic conditions for the establishment of 
stable political exchange relations. This thesis contends that economic conditions 
are important in determining whether the labour govemments considered in this 
thesis were able to deliver to workers the sorts of rewards likely to secure their 
commitment to a long term exchange strategy. For instance, the state of the 
economy in each country impacted on the capacity of the institutional arrangements 
(established in response to societal crises) to deliver sufficient rewards. Australia's 
poor economic performance for much of the period under examination, contributed 
to the establishment of a living wage which failed to meet the workers' 
expectations. This led them to pursue their interests in the economic arena through 
an increased reliance on the strike. In contrast, the capacity of Sweden's Social 
Democratic govemments to preside over a generous welfare system, was in part the 
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result of that country's strong economic performance during the period under 
examination, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Deteriorating economic conditions can be expected to hinder the capacity of 
labour govemments to deliver the rewards which workers expect to secure from 
their commitment to a strategy of long term exchange (Regini, 1984, 1986). Labour 
govemments may be forced to "cut back the resources that can be allocated 
through political bargaining" (Regini, 1984:136) which, in tum, may force a change 
in priorities. In other words, labour governments may introduce economic and 
social policies which do not guarantee to workers sufficient benefits to secure 
commitment to a long term exchange strategy. This may then lead to the 
destabilisation of the political exchange process. There are a plethora of factors 
which can lead to a deterioration in economic conditions. These, in tum, may also 
threaten the conditions for a political exchange under labour govemments. 
Britain for example was subjected to a series of national economic crises in 
the post-World War II era. These crises resulted from a weak and under 
performing economy and its changing financial position within the intemational 
economic order. They help account for the failure of successive Labour 
govemments (1945-1951, 1964-1970, 1974-1979) to preside over the 
establishment of a political exchange which would dominate industrial relations 
(see Crouch, 1979; Fox, 1985; Panitch, 1976; Strinati, 1982). The crises in the 
intemational capitalist economic order, which occurred from the mid-1970s, also 
contributed to a dramatic deterioration in economic conditions under a British 
Labour Govemment (1974-1979). This, in consequence, hindered the establishment 
of a political exchange (see Crouch, 1979). Indeed, the intemational economic 
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crises since the 1970s were to contribute to the destabilisation of the political 
exchange relations established in many capitalist industrial countries during the 
economic boom times of the 1950s and 1960s (Jacobi et al, 1986). This crisis also 
contributed to the destabilisation of the political exchange which dominated 
industrial relations under successive Swedish Social Democratic govemments 
(1932-1976). 
However, where labour parties are elected to government following a 
dramatic deterioration in economic conditions, they may be able to establish the 
conditions for a political exchange with the unions. There was a dramatic 
deterioration in economic conditions associated with the great economic depression, 
which began in 1929, and lasted throughout much of the 1930s in most capitalist 
industrial countries. Following this economic downtum, Queensland's Labor 
govemments (1932-1957) and Sweden's Social Democratic govemments (1932-
1976) were to introduce policies aimed at lessening its impact on workers. 
However the poor economic conditions which prevailed hindered the capacity of 
these govemments to deliver considerable benefits to the unions. Nevertheless, 
Regini (1984, 1986) points out that unions may still be willing to accept "these less 
favourable 'terms of exchange'" (Regini, 1984:141). The unions have a weakened 
bargaining power in such situations which means they are less likely to secure 
gains in the economic arena through collective acts of militancy than can be 
secured in the political arena from labour govemments. This was certainly the case 
in both Queensland and Sweden during the 1930s. Consequently, Queensland's 
unions were willing to commit themselves to a political exchange under Labor 
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during the great depression of the 1930s. Therefore major crises in the intemational 
economic order and the associated deterioration in economic conditions do not help 
account for the different outcomes in the two cases being considered in this thesis. 
It should be noted that while a political exchange developed under Queensland 
Labor during the 1930s, for most of the period during which Queensland Labor 
was in power, particularly between 1915 and 1929 and between 1945 and 1957, a 
political exchange did not dominate industrial relations. 
Business interests may take action against labour govemments which leads 
to the destabilisation of the political exchange relationship. Measures taken have 
included the mobilisation of those social forces opposed to labour govemments as 
well as a strike of capital which contributes to a deterioration in economic 
conditions (Block, 1977, 1980). Labour governments' defensive response, which is 
concemed primarily with accommodating business interests, has brought about a 
change in economic and social policy priorities. Labour govemments' defensive 
response reflects their rejection of more radical socialist strategies which argue that 
labour govemments should respond to business attacks by seeking to break with 
the capitalist economic system (see Block, 1977, 1980). Importantly, these new 
policy priorities often do not guarantee to workers sufficient benefits to secure 
commitment to a long term exchange strategy. This may then lead to the 
destabilisation of the political exchange process. 
This thesis argues that the different outcomes in the two cases examined 
was determined, in part, by whether business interests were to take action which 
resulted in the govemment adopting new policy priorities which failed to deliver 
sufficient rewards to workers and thus destabilised the political exchange process. 
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There is a complex of factors which are likely to determine whether business takes 
such action (see Block, 1977, 1980). It is argued that of critical importance in 
determining the different outcomes in the two cases examined, is the extent to 
which the labour movement was able to develop an economic strategy which 
benefited business and workers. The actions of the unions were also important, 
particularly whether they developed a strong commitment to a strategy based 
primarily on securing long term economic and social benefits for their members 
and, also, whether they were able to develop an economic strategy and have it 
implemented by their respective govemments. 
Sweden's Social Democratic govemments pursued a reformist economic 
growth strategy for most of the period they were in power between 1932 and 1976. 
This helps explain why a political exchange was to dominate industrial relations in 
Sweden. The Swedish Social Democrats' commitment to such a strategy in the 
1930s, 1950s and 1960s delivered sufficient benefits to workers to secure their 
commitment. It also secured for business interests sufficient benefits to ensure that 
they did not take action that would lead to a deterioration in economic conditions. 
The Social Democrats avoided being forced to change their economic priorities 
which may have resulted in them not being able to guarantee to workers sufficient 
benefits. 
There was one exception during the second half of the 1940s when the 
Swedish Social Democrats pursued a traditional labour reformist redistributive 
strategy and also committed themselves to greater economic planning. This strategy 
delivered to workers the sorts of benefits likely to secure their commitment to a 
political exchange. However, the policies disadvantaged business interests which 
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then launched a counter-offensive against the Government. The counter- offensive 
placed the Swedish Social Democrats on the defensive and also coincided with a 
period of economic instability. They responded by changing their economic 
priorities with their new economic policies disadvantaging workers rather than 
business. This series of events could have undermined union support for a political 
exchange. However, it did not do so. 
Sweden's unions did not respond to this situation by abandoning their 
commitment to a political exchange and seeking to pursue their interests in the 
economic arena through collective acts of militancy. Rather, the firm commitment 
of the union movement to the development and implementation of economic and 
social policies which advantaged workers in the political arena, resulted in their 
continued interest in such a strategy. Sweden's unions succeeded in developing and 
imposing their own distinctive economic growth strategy, which benefited both 
workers and business on Social Democratic govemments in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This was to contribute to the stabilisation of the political exchange which had been 
initially established in the 1930s. 
In contrast, Queensland Labor govemments failed to develop a reformist 
economic growth strategy. Instead, during Labor's first decade in govemment it 
implemented a traditional redistributive economic strategy along with a program of 
nationalisation. This economic strategy benefited workers but disadvantaged 
business interests. Business launched a counter-offensive which brought about a 
sudden deterioration in economic conditions and, in particular, forced a dramatic 
and sudden cutback in the financial resources available to the Queensland 
govemment. Consequently, Labor was forced to cut back on some of the policies 
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which had secured strong worker and union support during its first years in 
govemment and which had led to the development of a partial political exchange. 
It should be emphasised that the organisational and political character of 
Queensland's unions, along with the nature of the institutional arrangements that 
had dominated bargaining under Queensland Labor, were to hinder the 
establishment of an industrial relations strategy dominated by a political exchange 
during the first decade of Labor government. 
The counter-offensive launched by business interests in the first half of the 
1920s also forced a more permanent and lasting change in the economic policy 
priorities of successive Queensland Labor govemments. For instance, Queensland 
Labor was concemed from the early 1920s onwards with the need to balance 
budgets through a strategy of pmdent fiscal management. It was also concemed 
with ensuring that Queensland's labour market, particularly the State's wages and 
working conditions, were competitive with those found elsewhere in Australia and 
overseas. This pointed to Labor's acceptance of the constraints imposed on 
govemment economic policy by capitalist interests. At the same time, its distmst of 
business interests and the capitalist system meant that Labor was unwilling to 
pursue an economic strategy aimed at securing capitalist investment in the 
economy. It is argued that it was this reticence to entice capitalist investment in 
Queensland during the 1920s and 1930s (rather than the stmctural character of the 
Queensland economy) that was the primary determinant of Queensland's poor 
economic performance under Labor, particularly in the second half of the 1940s 
and 1950s. Therefore the economic policies pursued by Queensland Labor from the 
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early 1920s to 1957 often failed to deliver sufficient benefits to secure workers' 
commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. 
The industrial wing of the labour movement did not respond to the change 
in Queensland Labor's economic policy priorities, during the first half of the 1920s, 
by seeking to impose on Labor a set of policies which would have resulted in the 
development of a labour reformist economic growth strategy. Instead, unionists 
who were committed to a labour reformist strategy, sought to defend the more 
conservative economic priorities of Queensland Labor on the grounds that the 
worst labour government was better than the best conservative govemment. They 
found it difficult to secure the ongoing support of workers and unions as many 
believed it to be a bad bargain. They increasingly failed to secure sufficient 
rewards to ensure a commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. The presence 
of an influential militant opposition which argued that the unions could not expect 
to benefit from their commitment to a political exchange with Queensland Labor, 
further undermined worker and union support for a long term strategy of exchange. 
Consequently, unions often were to rely on the strike weapon to secure 
improvements in their standard of living under Queensland Labor govemments, 
particularly during the 1920s and again in the second half of the 1940s. 
Finally, it is claimed that the different sorts of institutional arrangements 
established in response to historic compromises in Australia and Sweden also 
helped determine whether the bargaining process was to be dominated by a process 
of compromise which is critical if industrial relations is to be dominated by a 
political exchange. The different level at which corporatist arrangements were 
established in these two cases is of key importance. The corporatist arrangements 
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established at the societal level in Sweden led to the development of various 
bilateral and tripartite forums and agreements. These resulted in bargaining over 
distributional issues being dominated by a process of compromise involving 
govemment, unions and business interests. In contrast, the corporatist stmctures 
established at the industry or sectoral level in Australia, contributed to the 
development of a formal legalistic bargaining system which encouraged workers 
and their unions to adopt an adversarial approach, rather than one based on co-
operation and compromise. Furthermore, this corporatist structure resulted in 
Queensland Labor's role being confined to enforcing the rules of the game, rather 
than being directly involved in resolving conflicts over distributional issues through 
a process of compromise. The role of enforcer led Queensland Labor to discipline 
striking unionists which, in tum, embittered govemment-union relations and thus 
lessened the unions' interest in committing themselves to a political exchange 
strategy. 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Following this introductory chapter 
are three chapters which outline the analytical framework of the thesis and, in 
doing so, consider key theoretical and methodological issues. The first of these 
argues that industrial peace will develop where a political exchange relationship 
dominates industrial relations. The second chapter sets out in some detail the three 
factors which are able to account for the failure to establish a political exchange 
relationship under some labour govemments (as in Queensland) and for the 
successful establishment of a political exchange under other labour govemments (as 
23 
in Sweden). The third chapter outlines the key elements of the comparative 
historical sociological method adopted in this thesis. 
The fact that the Swedish case is introduced as a control case means that it 
is not subjected to as exhaustive an analysis as that given to Queensland. 
Discussion of the former is limited to Chapter 5 in which the implications of each 
of the three factors are discussed. In contrast, an entire chapter is devoted to each 
of these three factors for Queensland. Chapter 6 is about the organisational and 
political character of the Queensland union movement. Chapter 7 is devoted to the 
institutional arrangements which were established in response to a major societal 
crisis which Australia experienced in the 1890s, and Chapter 8 analyses the 
economic policies of Queensland Labor govemments and the response of the union 
movement to these policies. Finally, the conclusion argues that the analytical 
framework proffered in this thesis is able to assist in explaining why industrial 
peace has been established under Australia's current Federal Labor Govemment 
(1983-). 
The discussion now tums, in the next chapter, to the argument that a 
political exchange relationship will lead to industrial peace. 
CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL EXCHANGE: THE DETERMINANT OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE 
The analytical framework proffered to account for the substantially different 
industrial relations systems found during periods of long term labour govemments 
in Queensland, compared with Sweden, is underpinned by a political economy 
approach. This approach contends that bargaining arrangements are influenced not 
only by institutional arrangements associated with the development of industrial 
relations systems (as argued by the pluralist perspective which dominated thinking 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s) but also, importantly, by wider social processes. 
In particular, the political economy approach emphasises the way in which politics 
has a vital influence on the bargaining arrangements between business, labour and 
the state found in individual countries, and the associated development of industrial 
peace in these countries. This contention is based on the proposition that the social 
organisation of production and distribution is critical to the development of the 
various bargaining arrangements found in modem industrial capitalist countries 
(Giles and Murray, 1989). 
The political economy argument, that bargaining arrangements are 
influenced by politics, has led to the recognition that different types of bargaining 
arrangements are present in modem capitalist industrial societies. It is Pizzomo's 
(1978) work which represents perhaps the most significant attempt to develop a 
systematic theory aimed at explaining the influence of 'political factors' on the 
development of industrial relations. He argues that bargaining is not limited to 
systems of individual exchange or collective bargaining but, instead, also involves 
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a third type of exchange which takes place in the labour market in capitalist 
industrial countries. This is a political exchange. Pizzomo (1978) explains that 
where a political exchange relationship dominates bargaining, industrial peace is 
likely to prevail. 
Pizzomo's (1978) theoretical framework guides this thesis in its attempt to 
explain why industrial peace may or may not be established where there are labour 
govemments. In short, it is argued that peace will be established in situations 
where a political exchange relationship predominates in the industrial relations 
arena. However, before considering the key elements of Pizzomo's political 
exchange theory and the political economy approach on which it is founded, 
discussion about the key theoretical elements of the pluralist approach to industrial 
relations is required. This discussion is essential because the pluralist approach 
dominated thinking on industrial relations and on pattems of conflict particularly in 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
THE PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE 
The pluralist perspective argues that the decline of the long drawn out strike 
and the establishment of industrial harmony was associated with the development 
of a post-industrial society (see Dubin, 1954; Kerr, 1954, 1962; Dahrendorf, 1959; 
Dunlop, 1955; Ross and Hartman, 1960). This view was strongly influenced by a 
number of themes which dominated Post-War thinking in the social sciences. 
These themes included 'the end of ideology', 'embourgeoisement of the working 
class' and the contention that conflict was socially functional. The most important 
theme emanated from the argument put by Kerr and associates about the 'logic of 
26 
industrialism' (Korpi and Shalev, 1979; Jackson, 1987). They argue that there was a 
strong link between industrialisation and industrial conflict. 
During the early stage of industrialisation, the process of locating the labour 
force into the new stmcture resulted in considerable industrial unrest which often 
spilled over into the political arena (Dahrendorf, 1959). However, as 
industrialisation proceeded new institutional stmctures emerged which were 
associated with the establishment of collective bargaining and trade union and 
employer organisations, which were considered to be instmmental in allowing the 
regulation and inevitable elimination of industrial conflict. Such institutional 
stmctures also assisted in the minimisation of industrial conflict as they played a 
role in both integrating the working class into the socio-economic fabric of 
capitalist society and of checking the hitherto unilateral power of employers. 
The process of industrialisation during the late nineteenth and the first half 
of the twentieth centuries was considered to be so strong and pervasive that all 
industrial countries would soon be dominated by similar industrial relations 
systems. In short, strike activity would no longer be influenced by the peculiar 
social, economic and political arrangements of individual countries but, rather, by 
the new stmctures and institutions thrown up by the process of industrialisation. 
Pattems of industrial conflict would tend to converge (Jackson, 1987). 
The pluralist approach argues that certain social institutions constituted a 
new industrial relations sub system in post-industrial society which allowed for the 
"institutional isolation" of industrial conflict. Dahrendorf (1959) argued that: 
increasingly, the social relations of industry, including industrial 
conflict, do not dominate the whole of society but remain confined 
in their pattems and problems to the sphere of industry (Dahrendorf, 
1959:268). 
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Industrial and political conflict had become institutionally isolated in post-capitalist 
society and, as a consequence, less severe. The trade union movement had been 
transformed from a social movement with broad goals into limited-purpose 
associations primarily concemed with checking the power of employers in the 
employment arena. This process of institutional isolation meant that industrial 
conflict could no longer be considered an expression of conflict but, instead, was 
"in the nature of a well organised bargaining game between limited interest groups" 
(Korpi and Shalev, 1980:304). 
The existence of such institutions and the plurality of interests in what was 
considered to be a post-industrial society, ensured that power was no longer 
concentrated in the hands of capitalists but, instead, was diffused among the main 
bargaining groups in such a way that no party could dominate the others. This 
assumption ensured that some measure of social stability could be achieved and 
thus overt conflict would be avoided. The industrial relations arena had been 
transformed from one in which conflict was prevalent to one in which compromise 
and concession dominated and where a body of mles restrained the abuse of power 
and enabled all parties to achieve some gains. The persistence of industrial conflict 
was said to result largely from the malfunctioning of social institutions (Deery and 
Plowman, 1980; Korpi and Shalev, 1979). 
The most important empirical study to utilise the pluralist approach was that 
undertaken by Ross and Hartman (1960) when they examined changing pattems of 
conflict in advanced industrial countries. They argued that a number of factors 
tended to be positively correlated with a reduction in strike activity and the 
establishment of industrial peace. These factors included the stability and maturity 
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of trade union and employer organisations, the consolidation of bargaining 
stmctures, and the increased role of the state particularly in the establishment of 
dispute settlement policies and procedures. Labour political activity was also 
acknowledged to have a role in lowering strike rates because it was associated with 
the integration of the working class into industrial society and "the stabilisation of 
class relations" through political arrangements (Ross and Hartman, 1960:176). Ross 
and Hartman concluded from their study of 15 industrial countries that the strike 
was indeed 'withering away'. However, a close inspection of the empirical evidence 
which they mustered, reveals that this was not the case. Indeed, Ross and Hartman 
are forced to admit that while industrial conflict had withered away in a number of 
northem European countries, it had not declined to anywhere near the same extent 
in southem European, Asian and North American countries. 
The strike wave of the late 1960s and early 1970s which swept across 
advanced industrial countries (see Crouch et al, 1978), provided further proof that 
the so called 'post-industrial society', with its alleged industrial harmony, had 
failed to materialise. This development gave rise to a critical political economy 
approach to the study of industrial relations, to which the discussion now tums. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
The political economy approach to industrial relations, which developed in 
the 1970s and 1980s, continues in the tradition of the classical political economists 
of the nineteenth century (Giles and Murray, 1989). Central to this approach are 
basic propositions about the importance of the social organisation of production 
and distribution. These are considered to be the essential starting points when 
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attempting to account for the different labour relations systems and associated 
bargaining arrangements to be found in industrial societies. 
The political economy approach contends that industrial societies continue 
to have the capacity to generate major social conflicts. This is because of 
the inequality of power in capitalist societies, reflected in the 
subordination in the realm of work of the sellers of labour power to 
its buyers (Korpi and Shalev, 1979:169). 
In short, it is this inequality of power which has often generated major industrial 
conflicts. At the same time, however, this approach acknowledges that, "by the 
very nature of social production, there is also a significant degree of coordination 
and cooperation in the relationship" (Giles and Murray, 1989:10). Indeed, political 
economy researchers acknowledge that in some situations co-operative 
relationships may dominate and so industrial peace is likely to prevail. 
Moreover, the level of conflict to be found in a particular industrial 
relations system is determined by a complex set of factors. In particular, it is 
argued that broader social processes and stmctures, which "are an integral part of 
industrial relations" (Giles and Murray, 1989:8) play a key role in determining the 
sorts of bargaining outcomes and strike pattems. This assumption has led to the 
political economy approach challenging 
the traditional means of defining the "field" of industrial relations, 
that is, the tendency to carve out a separate "system" or "world" of 
industrial relations that is analytically separate from the "economy" 
or "politics" (Giles and Murray, 1989:13). 
Thus there is a rejection of the pluralist contention that a new industrial relations 
sub-system had developed which resulted in employer/union bargaining being 
separate from politics. Instead, political factors play a critical role in the 
development of industrial relations systems. The greater the role of political factors 
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in the bargaining which takes place over the distribution of the fmits of production, 
the less likely it is that workers will need to rely on the strike weapon. It is 
Pizzomo (1978) who has developed a theoretical framework identifying the role 
politics plays in the industrial relations arena and, in particular, how it might lead 
to the establishment of industrial peace. It is to his political exchange theory that 
this chapter now tums. 
PIZZORNO'S POLITICAL EXCHANGE THEORY 
Pizzomo (1978) states that most analysts refer only to two forms of 
exchange when they discuss the various types of bargaining in the labour market. 
The first is the result of a situation in which "individual actors, without 
combination or collusion, enter into a relationship which Beatrice Webb called 
individual exchange" (Pizzomo, 1978:277). The second results from employers and 
unions engaging in a process of collective bargaining. 
When real situations are studied a third distinct system of exchange can be 
identified, namely a political exchange. This third form of exchange occurs because 
factors other than those stemming from the relationship between 
employers and employees are at work. There may be legislative 
measures, long-term strategies of the unions within the political 
system, or the intervention and policies of govemments (Pizzomo, 
1978:278). 
Pizzomo identifies a number of key features of a political exchange which clearly 
distinguish it from a system of individual exchange or collective bargaining. 
Importantly for this study, these factors help explain why industrial peace will 
result where a political exchange dominates industrial relations. 
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How a system of political exchange operates 
In attempting to explain how a system of 'political exchange' operates, 
Pizzomo (1978) points to the example of a factory closing down. He notes that in 
such a situation the market power of the affected workers is nil since there is no 
demand for their services. However, he argues that workers may be able to take 
action which brings about a total or partial revision of management's decision. It is 
the political power, or political pressure, exercised by the union which makes this 
possible. Some gain is obtained in retum for something 'political'. The question is: 
what sort of exchange is taking place and what sort of goods is being traded? 
Pizzomo (1978) argues that: 
While in the atomistic market more gains were obtained in exchange 
for effort, and in collective bargaining in exchange for continuity of 
work, in the political market the resources given in exchange may be 
called consensus or support. An actor (generally the govemment) 
which has goods to give is ready to trade them in exchange for 
social consensus with an actor who can threaten to withdraw that 
consensus (or, which is more or less the same, to endanger order) 
unless he receives the goods he needs. In a situation of pure 
collective bargaining, industrial action means a threat to withdraw 
continuity of work. The exchange becomes political when the threat 
is withdrawal of the wider social consensus or social order 
(Pizzomo, 1978:279). 
According to Pizzomo's analytical framework, pattems of industrial conflict 
will alter where a political exchange relationship plays an important role in 
industrial relations. Indeed, where a political exchange system dominates the 
bargaining process, strikes can be expected to wither away. This occurs because the 
development of a bargaining system dominated by a political exchange depends on 
the unions' ability to guarantee social consensus. This, in tum, means the 
renouncing of strike activity and a commitment to a long term strategy of 
exchange. The adoption of such a course of action requires the unions to be 
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capable of engaging in a process of moderation or restraint: a foregoing of 
immediate wage gains that could be achieved through direct industrial action in the 
collective bargaining arena, in retum for certain future benefits which can be 
achieved in the political arena. 
Pizzomo explains how it is often difficult for the unions to commit 
themselves to a long term strategy of exchange because the benefits which can be 
secured from govemments (since they are of a long term nature) are often much 
harder to evaluate than those which can be obtained from collective bargaining. 
Indeed, "whether a good bargain or a bad bargain has been stmck on the political 
market is a hard thing for anyone to judge, let alone the ordinary rank and file" 
(Pizzomo, 1978:285). 
Where the rank and file believes that a bad bargain has been stmck it may 
well withdraw its support for a strategy of exchange. This may result in the union 
leadership being forced to become more aggressive if it is to avoid a crisis of 
representation or, altematively, the rank and file may initiate action of its own 
accord (Pizzomo, 1978). The political exchange relationship is destabilised and 
there is often "an increase in general conflictuality" (Pizzomo, 1978:292). 
According to Pizzomo the ability of the unions to overcome the difficulties 
associated with them committing to a long term exchange, is dependent on their 
being able to convince their members "that their own 'tme' interests are better 
served if they moderate their claims, or that the union organisation is strong 
enough to resist its members' pressure to obtain more immediately" (Pizzomo, 
1978:284). 
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The unions' interest in renouncing the strike weapon in favour of a political 
exchange is contingent also upon the availability of appropriate rewards. Pizzorno 
(1978) argues that the role of govemments is of particular importance in this regard 
since, in modem capitalist industrial society, they have become "the main stmcture 
in charge of the guarantee of long-term goals" (Pizzomo, 1978:286). In short: 
The individual finds in the social security system, in the health 
services, in unemployment benefits and the like the kind of 
assurance of future well-being that formerly he had to look for in 
his family, in his guild, in voluntary associations or in his own 
pmdence. This makes the state the obvious 'other side' in the bargain 
through which present restraint is traded for future security 
(Pizzomo, 1978:286). 
The predominance of a political exchange in a given industrial relations 
system also depends, therefore, on govemments guaranteeing to the unions various 
benefits or rewards (these usually being of a long term nature) in retum for the 
unions' commitment to exercising restraint in the short term: 
The state activities which generate a political market begin with such 
normative interventions on the labour market as general minimum 
wage laws, the fixing of maximum working hours, provision of 
pensions, unemployment and sickness benefits. Next come economic 
policies of full employment, social contracts of various kinds, etc 
(Pizzomo, 1978:286). 
This thesis concurs with Pizzomo's observation that the operation of a 
political exchange where there are labour govemments is dependent on certain 
conditions being present, the first condition being whether unions are capable of 
resisting the rank and file's demands to secure more immediate gains and/or 
whether unions have the capacity to convince the rank and file to moderate their 
claims. The second condition is an ability on the part of govemments to guarantee 
to unions various benefits or rewards which make worthwhile their commitment to 
a political exchange strategy. 
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This thesis agues that there is another condition which is critical. It is the 
development of institutional mechanisms which result in distributional conflicts 
being resolved through a process of compromise and consensus. This condition is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Changing patterns of conflict and the development of political exchange 
relationships 
Pizzomo maintains that it is the extent to which a political exchange 
impacts on industrial relations which helps explain differences in pattems of 
conflict both over time and between countries. He notes that in the period prior to 
World War I, "the types of industrial action (form of strikes, frequency, degree of 
participation) were very similar in all industrial countries" (Pizzomo, 1978:287). 
From the late nineteenth century through until World War I, strikes were 
linked to the development of collective bargaining and, in particular, its increasing 
predominance over individual exchange. At least this was the case in most 
industrial countries. However, from World War I onwards pattems of conflict 
began to diverge. This was linked to the development of political exchange. 
Political exchange supplemented collective bargaining almost from 
the beginning, but its most rapid development took place after the 
First World War and then again after the Second, though not to the 
same extent in all industrial countries (Pizzomo, 1978:286). 
The result was an increasing divergence in strike trends. In short, in a number of 
northem European countries such as Sweden and Norway, where a political 
exchange relationship predominated, the strike withered away. Whereas in the 
United States and Canada, where political factors continued to have little influence 
on industrial relations systems, "the form of industrial action has changed least" 
(Pizzomo, 1978:287). 
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Pizzomo's discussion of the development of political exchange relationships 
also briefly touches on some of the factors which help account for their 
establishment during the period from World War I onwards. He argues that it is 
"the nature of the action of the main actors on this market" (Pizzomo, 1978:286) 
which is primarily responsible. The creation of central union bodies, such as 
federations, have contributed to the unions' capacity to commit themselves to a 
political exchange. Govemments, in contrast, have introduced a plethora of welfare 
policies and been responsible for the establishment of corporatist institutions, all of 
which have benefited the workers and therefore secured their commitment to a long 
term strategy of exchange. The key factors in the two cases examined in this thesis 
which determine whether the unions were able to commit to a long term exchange 
and whether labour govemments were able to deliver sufficient rewards are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued the analytical usefulness of the political economy 
perspective which states that politics influences bargaining outcomes in modem 
capitalist industrial countries. Concomitantly, it rejects the pluralist contention that 
the process of industrialisation resulted in the development of a new industrial 
relations sub system, which meant that bargaining between employers and unions 
was separated from politics. More specifically, support is given to Pizzomo's 
(1978) contention that bargaining may be dominated by either industrial or political 
factors and that, where politics dominates, strikes will decline. Indeed, it is 
Pizzomo's propositions which provide the analytical framework for explaining why 
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industrial peace may be established under a labour govemment. In short, industrial 
peace will be established where bargaining is dominated by a political exchange. 
The chapter then discussed those conditions which might help explain why 
a political exchange system is likely to dominate bargaining. Pizzomo's claim that 
unions need to be able to act as effective negotiating agents capable of exercising 
restraint in the short term, in retum for longer term benefits, is accepted. Also 
accepted is his claim that govemments, as guarantors of the future security of the 
worker, increasingly have come to play a critical role in the establishment of a 
political exchange system. Pizzomo also briefly referred to some of the factors 
which have determined whether the conditions for a political exchange are met. 
They are factors such as the establishment of a strong union federation, growth of 
the welfare state and development of corporatist institutions. 
The next chapter focuses on identifying those factors which play a key role 
in determining why, on the one hand, political exchange relationships failed to 
predominate during a period of Labor govemments (1915-1929, 1932-1957) in 
Queensland, while on the other hand they were present during a period of Social 
Democratic govemment (1932-1957) in Sweden. A series of factors is proffered as 
an explanation which, it is claimed, determined whether the unions in each place 
were capable of acting as effective negotiating agents, whether the labour 
govemments in these two cases were able to guarantee to workers sufficient 
benefits or rewards and whether institutional arrangements were established which 
allowed distributional conflicts to be resolved on the basis of a compromise and 
consensus. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DETERMINANTS OF A POLITICAL EXCHANGE 
Many political economy researchers have recognised the need to pay 
attention to historical variability when developing their explanatory frameworks 
(Edwards, 1983; Giles and Murray, 1989; Regini, 1984). For instance, in relation to 
the development of industrial relations systems where political exchange 
relationships have dominated, Regini (1984) has argued for the development of an 
analytical framework which focuses on the variability of the conditions for political 
exchange. This chapter develops a conceptual framework that is based on such an 
approach. 
The conceptual framework outlined comprises three factors which, it is 
claimed, determine whether industrial relations was to be dominated by a political 
exchange relationship in the two cases examined in this thesis. The first proposition 
is that the unions' organisational and political character in the two cases played a 
key role in determining whether they were able to commit themselves to a long 
term strategy of exchange. The second proposition is that the sorts of institutional 
arrangements established in response to societal crises help determine whether a 
political exchange is established. It is claimed that the nature of these institutional 
arrangements can help determine whether govemments are able to deliver the sorts 
of rewards and benefits to the workers that are likely to secure their commitment to 
a long term exchange strategy. They can also determine whether conflict over 
distributional issues will be resolved through co-operation and compromise or 
through more adversarial means thereby encouraging the persistence of industrial 
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conflict. The third proposition relates to the sorts of economic policies 
implemented by labour govemments. The extent to which these economic strategies 
benefited both the workers and business interests was critically important in 
determining whether a stable long term political exchange was to be established 
under labour govemments in the two cases under consideration. 
This conceptual framework will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
The discussion first tums to a consideration of two of the more influential 
explanatory models proffered by political economy researchers to explain why 
political exchange relationships which dominate industrial relations, have been 
established in capitalist industrial countries where there have been labour 
govemments. The first explanatory model reduces explanation to the political 
power of the working class (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 
1980) and the second reduces explanation to the rise of corporatism (Fulcher, 1987; 
Panitch, 1979, 1981). 
A LABOUR POWER-BASED POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION 
In the 1970s a number of political economy researchers (Shorter and Tilly, 
1974; Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980) argued that the democratic class struggle and, 
in particular, working class control of the polity, were responsible for the 
transformation of bargaining arrangements and development of new exchange 
relationships in some advanced capitalist countries. In those countries where the 
working class secured control of the polity, political exchange relationships 
dominated and industrial peace ensued. However, in those countries where the 
working class had not secured control of the polity, industrial factors continued to 
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dominate and strikes persisted. This divergence in bargaining arrangements and in 
strike trends occurred from the 1930s onwards (Korpi and Shalev, 1980; Shorter 
and Tilly, 1974). 
Korpi and Shalev (1979, 1980) developed perhaps the most influential 
model associated with this approach. They claim where the working class 
through its organisations for collective action is able to achieve 
strong and stable control over the executive, the conflicts of interest 
between labour and capital increasingly will be fought out in the 
political arena and industrial conflict will decline (Korpi and Shalev, 
1980:308). 
In short, once the working class has its hands on the levers of power, it can ensure 
that the state intervenes to guarantee the future security of the working class in 
retum for restraint from unions. Thus it becomes possible for the working class to 
influence the distribution of the fruits of production via political means. 
This may be done through different types of policies affecting the 
labour market, employment, taxation, social insurance and housing. 
The centre of gravity of the distributive conflicts can thus be moved 
from the labour market into politics (Korpi, 1983:170). 
The strong and stable control of the polity by the working class is 
considered the key determinant of political exchange relations which dominate 
bargaining. There are two reasons for this. First, as already explained, working 
class control of the polity will result in the state introducing a set of economic and 
social policies that guarantee unions sufficient benefits to secure their commitment 
to a strategy of restraint. Second, it also indicates that the unions possess the 
organisational unity necessary to commit themselves to a strategy of restraint. In 
relation to the latter point, Korpi and Shalev (1979) explain that the organisational 
power the working class has a double significance: 
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On the one hand, they provide labour with the ability to grasp 
control of the govemment. On the other hand, they also imply an 
intemal discipline which makes possible the implementation of a 
new strategy of conflict (Korpi and Shalev, 1979:180). 
The contention that working class control of the polity is the key 
determinant of a political exchange which dominates bargaining arrangements, is 
based primarily on developments in Sweden. Specifically, it is based on the 
successful establishment of industrial peace over the 1932-1976 period when the 
working class exercised control of the polity. However, Korpi and Shalev (1979) 
also argue that their political power-based model is able to account for the 
bargaining arrangements to be found in 18 advanced capitalist countries during the 
twentieth century. In particular, it is able to explain why bargaining arrangements 
were dominated by industrial factors in the period up until the 1930s, namely 
because the working class had failed to gain control of the polity. This model is 
able to account also for the divergence in bargaining arrangements which occurred 
from the 1930s onwards. In a number of countries where the working class 
dominated the polity, bargaining arrangements were dominated by political factors 
and industrial peace developed. However, in those countries where the working 
class failed to exercise power, collective bargaining dominated and strikes 
persisted. 
Korpi and Shalev (1979) acknowledge that a third of the countries they 
considered cannot be accounted for in terms of their model. In particular, they 
identify a group of three countries - Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany -
which cast doubt on the proposition that the power resources of the working class 
determine the establishment of bargaining arrangements which are dominated by 
political factors. In these countries a relatively low level of working class 
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mobilisation is matched by an equally low level of industrial conflict and stable 
political exchange relationships. Thus, while they conclude that their model is able 
to provide a plausible account of the differential development of industrial conflict 
and associated bargaining arrangements in advanced industrial countries, the 
identification of a number of anomalies forces them to acknowledge: 
Because of the complicated processes at work and the unique 
characteristics of each country, as well as the variety of 
circumstances under which their class relations have developed over 
time, it is, of course, not possible to expect anything close to full 
agreement between the predictions of our model and actual 
developments (Korpi and Shalev, 1980:328). 
They are forced, in particular, to acknowledge how German, Swiss and Dutch 
experiences suggest "that the processes of political bargaining and compromise may 
operate to some extent even if labour has not acquired strong and stable control 
over political power" (Korpi and Shalev, 1980:328). In short, the development of 
political exchange relations may occur as a result of a complex of factors which 
are not incorporated into their power resources model. 
Reducing explanation of the development of bargaining arrangements 
dominated by a political exchange to the operation of the democratic class stmggle, 
and, in particular, working class control of the polity, would seem to be far from 
adequate. The fact that such an approach is unable to adequately account for those 
instances where political exchange relationships developed but where the working 
class did not exercise control of the polity, lends strong support to the charge that 
it is a far from useful analytical framework. Furthermore, this approach is unable to 
account for the Queensland case being examined, where the working class 
exercised control of the polity for a considerable period, 1915-1929, 1932-1957, 
but where a political exchange relationship did not exist. 
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In the Queensland case a political exchange failed to dominate bargaining 
anangements and strikes consequently persisted. The labour power model's failure 
to account for this case lends further weight to the charge that it is a far from 
adequate model for explaining the likely development of bargaining arrangements 
dominated by a political exchange. Therefore, there is a need to develop further 
explanations for the reasons why bargaining arrangements dominated by a political 
exchange may or may not develop in a particular case. The discussion now tums to 
considering whether the corporatist approach is more useful. 
A CORPORATIST POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION 
The other main political economy explanation is one based on 
understanding the impact of corporatism. A number of researchers (see Fulcher, 
1987; Panitch, 1979, 1981) have contended that the establishment of corporatist 
institutions at the societal or national level helps explain why industrial peace was 
established in a number of northem European countries such as Austria, Sweden 
and Norway under labour or social democratic govemments from the 1930s 
onwards. They argue that a number of characteristics of these corporatist 
arrangements were critical to peaceful outcomes in these countries. 
Corporatist arrangements which are established at the societal level in 
capitalist industrial society have been based on the development of a compromise, 
or 'social partnership', between government, unions and employers at the societal 
level. The three key players in society come to co-operate in managing the 
economy, controlling society and dividing up the national product. Fulcher (1987) 
explains that this is exactly what occurred under successive Social Democratic 
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govemments in Sweden. Consequently political bargaining was to develop and 
industrial peace was established under Sweden's Social Democratic govemments in 
the period from 1932 to 1976. 
Panitch (1979, 1981) notes also that where corporatist arrangements have 
been established (where there are labour or social democratic govemments) there 
have been promises of full employment, a national economic plan and extensive 
trade union input. In other words, these corporatist arrangements result in 
govemments being able to guarantee to workers and their unions the sorts of 
benefits which can be expected to secure their support for a long term exchange 
strategy. At the same time, however, Panitch emphasises that these sorts of 
agreements are reducible, inevitably, to incomes policies which aim to restrain 
wages and, in doing so, create conditions more favourable for capital accumulation. 
The fact that such arrangements are established in the interests of capital means 
that the working class inevitably has little choice but to resort to strikes if it is to 
effectively advance its interests in capitalist society. According to Panitch (1976, 
1979) this explains why the political exchange relationships established under 
successive British Labour govemments in the 1940s, 1960s and 1970s were so 
shortlived. 
This thesis acknowledges that the corporatist stmctures which developed in 
the period from the 1930s, and particularly after World War II, in many capitalist 
industrial countries (see Maier, 1984; Lehmbmch, 1984), did contribute to changing 
patterns of conflict and, in some instances, the establishment of industrial peace. 
However, the development of corporatism only provides a partial explanation of 
industrial peace in modern capitalist industrial societies. This thesis will 
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demonstrate that the establishment of industrial peace in Sweden was the result of 
a more complex set of factors than corporatist writers such as Fulcher (1987) 
suggest. The reasons for the failure to establish political exchange relationships 
which dominated bargaining arrangements under successive British Labour 
Govenmients are not considered in this thesis. However, it is contended that they 
were more complex than Panitch (1979, 1981) allows. 
The discussion now tums to consider the first of the three factors which, it 
is argued, determine whether a political exchange relationship was established in 
the Queensland and Swedish cases. The first factor relates to the unions' 
organisational and political character. 
THE UNIONS' ORGANISATIONAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTER 
It is the organisational character of the unions which often is most effective 
in determining whether unions are capable of committing themselves to a 
systematic long-term exchange strategy (Regini, 1984). The key feature is whether 
the unions possess the sorts of organisational characteristics which enable them to 
resist the rank and file's demands to secure more immediate short term gains, such 
as increases in wages and improved working conditions. At the same time, this 
thesis contends that unions' capacity to commit themselves to a long term strategy 
of exchange is not determined solely by their organisational character. It is also 
determined by the ideological character of the unions (see Pizzomo, 1978; Regini, 
1984). Ideologies can play a key role in determining whether the unions are willing 
and able to convince their members that their own 'tme' interests are best served by 
committing themselves to a long term strategy of exchange. 
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The discussion now tums to the determinants of the quite different organisational 
characters of the Swedish and Queensland trade union movements. These 
determinants will be used in latter chapters to explain why quite different 
bargaining arrangements dominated industrial relations in these two cases. 
The role of strong union federations 
Union movements which are dominated by a strong union federation have 
been most successful in resisting individual unions and the rank and file's demands 
to obtain more immediate short term gains in retum for the long term benefits 
which can be secured from a political exchange (see Headey, 1970; Higgins, 
1985a; Regini, 1984). The factors which are likely to determine whether an 
individual union movement will be dominated by a strong federation vary 
considerably both over time and from country to country. The following discussion 
focuses on those factors which are considered to have been critical in determining 
the quite different sorts of central union bodies that were established in the 
Queensland and Swedish cases. 
The process of union formation (which occurred in the period from the late 
nineteenth century to World War I in most industrial countries) played a 
particularly important role in determining whether strong union federations 
developed. It was during this formative period that the majority of labour 
movements, including the two examined in this thesis, sought to develop a greater 
degree of organisational cohesion. The spread of socialist ideas and the consequent 
commitment of many labour movement activists to the organisation of workers 
along class lines was the key determinant of this development. Labour movement 
activists committed to socialist ideas sought to establish strong union federations 
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that dominated individual unions. The success of these socialist ideas during this 
formative period explain why Sweden's union movement was dominated by a 
strong federation, the LO, which in tum contributed to the union movement being 
able to commit itself to a long-term strategy of exchange. 
However, in many cases the objective of establishing a strong union 
federation was not achieved during this formative period of union development. 
The influence of craft ideas, which in most industrial countries were especially 
strong during the formative stages of union development, hindered attempts to 
organise along class lines (Regini, 1983). Craft unionists opposed the development 
of strong federations which sought to limit the autonomy of individual unions, and 
favoured the establishment of central union bodies which would loosely co-
ordinate the demands of individual unions. Individual unions would continue to 
retain their autonomy and independence, as shown below. The strong influence of 
craft ideas during Queensland's formative period of union development helps 
explain why this State's unions failed to develop the sort of central union body that 
would have allowed them to effectively engage in a long term strategy of 
exchange. 
Korpi and Shalev (1979) also state that "cross-cutting cleavages, based for 
instance on splits along racial, ethnic, religious, or regional lines, will tend to 
constrain purely class-based organisation" (Korpi and Shalev, 1979:169). 
Furthermore, splits along political lines can hinder the development of a highly 
centralised union movement dominated by a strong federation (Korpi and Shalev, 
1979; Korpi, 1983). Finally, occupational differences, in particular splits between 
white and blue collar workers, have also militated against the establishment of 
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greater organisational unity. The presence of cleavages and splits based on some of 
these factors in Queensland and their absence in Sweden, helps account for the 
substantially different organisational outcomes in these two cases. 
The institutions established to regulate conflicts in the industrial relations 
arena have also had significant implications for the organisational development of 
unions in industrial countries. For instance, corporatist institutions established at the 
societal level from the 1930s onwards in many industrial countries encouraged the 
development and strengthening of strong union federations (Lehmbmch, 1984). The 
fact that corporatist institutions were established at the societal level in Sweden 
during the 1930s further helps explain why Sweden's union movement was to be 
dominated by a strong federation which, in tum, allowed the union movement to 
effectively commit itself to a long term strategy of exchange. However, corporatist 
institutions established at the sectoral or industry level do not encourage the 
development of a strong federation. Instead, they encourage the development of 
unions which represent only particular sectors or occupations in society (Palmer, 
1989). Corporatist institutions were established at the sectoral or industry level in 
Australia at the beginning of the twentieth century, and were to dominate 
throughout the period of Labor govemment in Queensland. This further helps 
explain why Queensland's union movement was not to be dominated by a strong 
union federation. 
Later chapters demonstrate how these different organisational forms led, on 
the one hand, to Queensland unions being unable to effectively commit themselves 
to a political exchange strategy and, on the other hand, to the unions' capacity to 
commit themselves to this strategy in Sweden. Differences in the ideological 
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character and, in particular, influence of the revolutionary opposition within the 
two union movements being examined were also important determinants. This 
question is now considered. 
Impact of a revolutionary opposition within the unions 
Revolutionary oppositions committed to syndicalist or marxist-leninist ideas 
developed in the majority of union movements during the twentieth century. These 
sought to win the unions over to a strategy which emphasised the importance of 
developing strike action, because they furthered the revolutionaries' longer term 
goal of overthrowing existing capitalist society. In short, industrial stmggles expose 
the class nature of society and thus the development of revolutionary consciousness 
in the working class. 
Revolutionaries in the unions have claimed that the state is controlled by 
capitalist interests, regardless of the political colour of govemments. This means 
that even where there is a labour government, its actions are said to advantage 
business rather than the unions. Consequently, revolutionary unionists usually 
oppose unions committing themselves to a political exchange relationship with 
labour govemments where they moderate their immediate claims in the hope they 
will secure longer term benefits. They argue instead that the rank and file's 
interests are best served if they pursue industrial action. In contrast, unionists 
committed to a labour reformist strategy can be expected to argue that labour 
govemments will deliver economic and social benefits to the working class which, 
in tum, make it unnecessary for the unions to resort to strike action to secure their 
members' interests. 
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The strength of the revolutionary opposition depends on it securing 
leadership positions in major unions, or in some instances union federations. The 
relative strength of the revolutionary opposition varies considerably over time and 
from country to country and determines whether individual trade union movements 
are likely to be able to commit themselves to a long term strategy of exchange 
where there is a labour govemment. The thesis argues that because the 
revolutionary opposition had a strong hold in Queensland unions, it was difficult 
for the unions to commit themselves to a long term strategy of exchange. In 
contrast, Sweden's unions were dominated by a reformist leadership opposed by 
only a weak revolutionary opposition, which meant the unions were able to commit 
themselves to a long-term strategy of exchange with Social Democratic 
govemments. 
There are also factors extemal to the unions which play an important role in 
determining whether a political exchange is likely to be established. The discussion 
now tums to consider how the institutional arrangements established in response to 
societal crises helped determine whether industrial relations would be dominated by 
a political exchange relationship in the two cases under consideration. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED IN RESPONSE TO 
SOCIETAL CRISES 
Economic and social crises (e.g. war, depression, post-war reconstruction 
and national economic crises) have led key actors in society to search for ways of 
routinising their exchange relationship in the industrial relations arena (Poole, 
1986; Giles and Murray, 1989). The actions taken by the key actors to meet the 
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challenges posed by societal crises have usually resulted in the establishment of 
new institutional anangements which help determine the sorts of exchange 
relationships that predominate in a given industrial relations system. 
The importance of the institutional arrangements established in response to 
such crises lies moreover in the fact that they usually become embedded within the 
society. Consequently they often have long term implications for the sorts of 
exchange relationships which are likely to dominate in a given country (Poole, 
1986; Krasner, 1984). There often is no tuming back once certain choices are made 
regarding the sorts of strategies to be pursued in response to societal crises. Indeed, 
once a path is taken, it tends to channel further developments (Krasner, 1984). 
Consequently, political parties, when elected to govemment, often find their ability 
to implement their own policy preferences shaped or, in some instances, severely 
constrained by the "institutional resources and arrangements existing within a given 
political system" (Krasner, 1984:228). 
For instance, the complex of institutional arrangements that were established 
in response to Australia's economic and social crisis of the 1890s (Macintyre and 
Mitchell, 1989) were to shape the policies and actions of Queensland Labor 
govemments between 1915 to 1957. Similarly, in Sweden, institutional 
arrangements, established in the 1930s and 1940s in response to a major economic 
depression and World War II (see Katzenstein, 1985), were to influence the actions 
of successive Social Democratic govemments between 1932 and 1976. In 
particular, they were to determine whether these govemments were able to 
guarantee to workers the sorts of benefits or rewards likely to secure their support 
for a long term exchange strategy. The following discussion also explains how the 
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sorts of institutional arrangements established in these two cases helped determine 
whether conflict over distributional issues was determined through a process of co-
operation and compromise, and whether as a consequence, they lessened the 
unions' reliance on the strike weapon. 
Before considering the sorts of institutional arrangements established in 
these two cases, the discussion first explains why it is only where historic 
compromises are established in response to societal crises that institutional 
arrangements which contribute to the development of an industrial relations system 
in which a political exchange dominates are likely to develop. 
Societal crises and historic compromises 
The institutional arrangements established in response to societal crises have 
varied considerably over time and from country to country. In some cases, the 
process has resulted in bargaining being dominated by economic or market factors. 
For instance, where conservative political forces and business interests have been 
able to shape the responses to societal crises, the result is usually the development 
of bargaining systems that are dominated by economic or market factors. This 
reflects the strong commitment to the market system of the conservative and 
business interests. Thus, during the 1980s, Britain's conservative Thatcher 
Govemment responded to the ongoing economic crisis by deregulating industrial 
relations and the existing institutions. This has resulted in the renewal of market 
based types of conflict resolution and a laissez faire industrial relations politics 
(Keller, 1990). 
Furthermore, even where business interests have been weakened by such 
crises, they still have often mounted stiff opposition to greater state intervention in 
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the industrial relations arena. During the 1930s, for instance, business interests in 
the United States were weakened by the great economic depression. Nevertheless, 
they were able to ensure that the societal response to this crisis was limited to that 
of institutionalising collective bargaining and the development of a limited welfare 
state (see Edwards, 1986; Skocpol, 1980). 
However, in some instances the response on the part of sections of business 
interests to major economic and social crises has been support for more 
interventionist solutions. This was certainly the response of influential sections of 
business interests in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s (Booth, 1982; Hyman, 
1986; Strinati, 1982). It was also the case in Australia at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and in Sweden during the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, this 
attitude on the part of business in the Australian and Swedish cases was one of a 
number of factors which contributed to the establishment of an historic 
compromise. 
Where, in response to societal crises, the leading interest groups perceive 
themselves as having some interests in common which results in an 'historic 
compromise' (see Castles, 1988; Katzenstein, 1985), it is possible that institutional 
arrangements may be established which contribute to the development of an 
industrial relations system dominated by political factors. There are a number of 
factors which make possible the development of a compromise (see Castles, 1988; 
Katzenstein, 1985; Maier, 1984). The first is whether there is vulnerability. 
Political or economic precariousness will encourage key actors to make 
compromises in order to reduce shared risks (Maier, 1984; Castles, 1988). Second, 
where business is divided on serious issues of policy, this may result in the 
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majority of those exercising effective power making compromises. However, this is 
dependent to some extent on a third factor, namely the strength of the working 
class. Where the working class is weak, mling interests are less likely to find 
themselves forced to enter into a compromise. The labour movement also needs to 
be firmly committed to a reformist outlook, otherwise it is not likely to be willing 
to commit itself to a strategy based on a compromise with capital. Finally, the 
state's ability to be strong enough to act as the guarantor of the agreement reached 
between the key actors may also be important. 
Historic compromises were established in response to societal crises in 
Australia and New Zealand in the 1890s (Castles, 1988). They were also 
established in a number of northem European countries, including Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Norway and Sweden, in the 1930s and 1940s (Katzenstein, 
1985). Furthermore, these historic compromises pointed to the development of a 
political exchange in each of these countries. In other words, these historic 
compromises led the key actors in society (organised labour and business interests) 
to support greater govemment intervention which was aimed at guaranteeing them 
their future properity in retum for their support or consensus (Castles, 1988; 
Katzenstein, 1985). However, as explained below, this process was not to 
contribute, in all of these countries, to the development of an industrial relations 
system dominated by a political exchange relationship. This can be attributed to the 
different institutional arrangements established in response to the compromises 
reached in each of these countries. 
In other words, it is claimed that historic compromises and the process of 
political exchange which results from such compromises, may not necessarily result 
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in the establishment of institutional arrangements which contribute to an industrial 
relations system dominated by political factors. The following discussion claims 
that it is the different types of corporatist institutions and welfare regimes 
established in response to these compromises in Australia in the 1890s, and 
Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s, which contributed to different sorts of exchange 
relationships dominating industrial relations in these countries under labour 
govemments. 
Corporatist forms of economic regulation 
The historic compromises that were established in Australia and Sweden led 
to the development of corporatist rather than liberal forms of economic regulation 
(see Katzenstein, 1985; Castles, 1988; Palmer, 1989). Corporatist institutions are 
more likely to result in bargaining between the key contending actors in societies 
being influenced by political factors than where liberal forms of economic 
regulation dominate, with their individual contracts of employment or the liberal 
collectivism of collective bargaining (Crouch, 1979; Maier, 1984; Palmer, 1983, 
1989). However, this thesis contends that the different levels at which corporatist 
institutions have been established in the two cases being examined (i.e. at the 
societal or national level in the Swedish case, and the industry or sectoral level in 
the Australian case) have contributed to the development of quite different 
exchange relationships. The following discussion identifies two reasons for this 
outcome. 
Firstly, differences in the level at which corporatist arrangements have been 
established have led to the development of different mechanisms for the resolution 
of disputes between the key contending actors in society. For instance, where 
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corporatist arrangements are established at the societal level, such as in Sweden in 
the 1930s and 1940s, the bargaining process occurs primarily through a complex of 
tripartite and/or bipartite fomms and agreements which involve the executive arm 
of govemment and the peak organisations of employers and unions (Singleton, 
1990). This bargaining process encourages the key contending actors to reach 
negotiated compromises in the political arena. In others words, it encourages the 
development of a political exchange. In contrast, the resolution of disputes through 
corporatist arrangements established at the sectoral or industry level in Australia at 
the tum of the twentieth century occurred via very different means. This did not 
happen through various tripartite and/or bipartite fomms and agreements involving 
the executive arm of govemment and the peak organisations of employers and 
unions. Instead, disputes between the key contending actors were to be resolved via 
the courts and judicial proceedings. This encouraged the contending parties to 
adopt adversarial postures and, in particular, often resulted in them resorting to 
industrial means, such as the strike (in the case of workers), to secure their 
objectives. The role of govemment was limited to enforcing the public interest, 
which often meant taking action to discipline the key contending actors. These 
actions heightened industrial tensions and, in particular, embittered govemment-
union relations. 
Secondly, differences in the level at which corporatist arrangements have 
been established resulted in different issues being subject to the corporatist 
bargaining process (Palmer, 1989). This, in tum, can determine whether 
govemments become more responsible for guaranteeing to workers various material 
benefits which can be expected to help secure their commitment to moderation in 
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the industrial relations arena. A broad range of issues, such as industrial 
restmcturing, labour market policy and the social wage are the subject of bargained 
agreements between key contending actors where corporatist arrangements are 
established at the societal level. Importantly, implementation of many of these 
policies, such as the social wage and labour market policies, is the responsibility of 
govemment. This ensures govemment becomes more responsible for guaranteeing 
to workers the sorts of material benefits that are likely to secure their commitment 
to a political exchange strategy. However, where corporatist arrangements are 
established at the sectoral or industry level, a much more limited range of issues is 
regulated. These usually include wages and basic conditions of employment which 
means that govemments are not able to guarantee workers the sorts of material 
benefits that might help secure their commitment to a long term strategy of 
exchange. 
The sorts of welfare regimes established in response to societal crises in 
Australia in the 1890s and in Sweden in the 1930s, also had significant 
implications for the sorts of exchange relationship that were to predominate in the 
industrial relations arena in these two cases. The discussion now tums to consider 
why this was the case. 
Types of welfare regime 
One significant consequence of societal crises has been the 
institutionalisation of new welfare regimes in many capitalist industrial countries 
(see Castles, 1985). Welfare regimes based on decommodifying, universalist 
programs are most likely to have seen the establishment of a political exchange 
relationship which dominates industrial relations. This is because a welfare regime 
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based on these principles will result in the worker becoming less reliant on the 
marketplace for the securing of income (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990). In other 
words, they are more dependent on govemment for securing income. The support 
of workers and unions for such a welfare system will also be contingent on it 
delivering to them more generous standards of living than those which they could 
expect to secure through market based strategies (Regini, 1984). For instance, 
Sweden's strong economic performance in the period under consideration was 
critical in making possible such an outcome. 
This thesis maintains that, in the 1930s and 1940s, a welfare regime was 
institutionalised in Sweden which delivered generous, decommodifying and 
universalist programs and which contributed to the establishment of a political 
exchange relationship that dominated industrial relations under successive Social 
Democratic govemments between 1932 and 1976. 
However, the likelihood of welfare regimes being established which were 
based on a universal commitment to the decommodification of labour and, 
associated with this, the promotion of a social income outside wage labour 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990) was, until the middle of the twentieth century, hindered 
by labour movements not having developed a blueprint for the achievement of such 
a goal - one based on the decommodification of labour and the establishment of 
universal programs (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This was, in part, the result of 
socialists accepting the liberal notion that welfare measures were synonymous with 
the provision of means tested benefits to those people unable, for a variety of 
reasons, "to derive a bare minimum of subsistence from the labour market and 
unable to support themselves from prior savings" (Castles, 1985:77). Consequently, 
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for a long time labour parties either defended or sought to have established welfare 
schemes which were characterised by a desire "to stave off poverty, not really to 
emancipate workers from market dependency" (Esping-Andersen, 1990:46). 
Furthermore, the fact that labour parties were strongly 'workerist' (i.e. primarily 
interested in defending the industrial working class) meant that they were 
concemed mainly with the establishment of schemes which benefited the workers. 
Consequently, "the social programs of the labour parties were almost universally of 
modest scope and quality" (Esping-Andersen, 1990:46). 
A welfare regime based on these principles was established in Australia at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. It was a welfare system which guaranteed 
workers a decent standard of living through a statutory system of wage regulation, 
while a residual and selectivist set of welfare measures supported those who fell 
outside the labour market. Furthermore, Australia experienced poor economic 
conditions from the 1890s through to World War II. Consequently, Australia's 
welfare regime failed to create the conditions for an industrial relations system 
dominated by a political exchange. 
The discussion now tums to a consideration of how the sorts of economic 
policies implemented by labour govemments can help determine whether a political 
exchange is likely to dominate industrial relations. It is argued that these programs 
need to benefit both workers and business interests if they are to contribute to the 
establishment of an industrial relations system based on political exchange. This 
thesis claims that the quite different economic polices pursued by Queensland's 
Labor govemments and Sweden's Social Democratic govemments were to 
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contribute to the quite different exchange relationships which were established in 
each case. 
THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF LABOUR GOVERNMENTS 
According to Korpi and Shalev (1979, 1980) the establishment of a political 
exchange which dominates industrial relations where there is a labour govemment, 
is based primarily on the commitment of labour govemments to implement 
economic policies which benefit workers. This thesis does not dispute this 
contention. However, it is maintained that if a stable political exchange is to 
dominate industrial relations where there is a labour govemment then this 
govemment will need to be able to implement economic policies which advantage 
business interests as well. If not, business can be expected to take action which 
leads to a deterioration in economic conditions. This in tum can be expected to 
force a change in the priorities of labour govemments. Moreover, in such 
situations, labour govemments often have been unable to continue delivering to 
workers the sorts of rewards likely to secure their commitment to a political 
exchange. As a consequence, the unions often have opted to pursue their interests 
in the economic arena through strike action. This leads to the destabilisation of the 
political exchange established between labour govemments and the unions. 
This thesis argues that the fact that this sequence of events unfolded in 
Queensland while it did not unfold in the Swedish case, helps explain the different 
bargaining outcomes in these two cases. The sorts of economic policies pursued by 
Queensland's Labor govemments and Sweden's Social Democratic govemments 
were of key importance in determining the different outcomes. The union response 
to the sort of economic policies implemented in these two cases was also important 
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in helping determine whether or not the political exchange process was 
destabilised. The discussion begins by considering the limits of a traditional labour 
reformist strategy for the establishment of a stable and lasting political exchange. 
Limits of a traditional labour reformist strategy 
For much of the twentieth century labour movements in most industrial 
countries have been committed to the introduction of economic policies concemed 
with wresting the existing economic wealth, and the means to increase this wealth, 
from business, rather than increasing the overall wealth of society. Labour 
govemments have been committed to the redistribution of the existing national 
product away from business towards the working class and poor. This usually has 
occurred through various labour market and taxation measures. Furthermore, the 
majority of labour movements have been committed to a program of state 
socialisation or nationalisation which has resulted in the establishment of 
govemment owned enterprises or industries. However, they have not been 
interested in introducing policies which would aid in the creation of new wealth to 
distribute. 
The mix of policies associated with a traditional labour reformist strategy 
guaranteed workers sufficient material benefits to secure their commitment to a 
long term strategy of exchange. However these programs of reform have 
disadvantaged business interests. Firstly, the redistribution of the national product 
from business to labour has reduced business's profit levels. Secondly, programs of 
state socialisation have at the very minimum lessened the opportunities for capital 
accumulation and in some cases threatened the very survival of particular business 
interests. 
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This mix of policies has therefore ignited considerable business opposition 
to labour govemments and has usually led to business interests launching a 
counter-offensive. They have a variety of weapons at their disposal which allow 
them to exert considerable influence over those labour govemments who are 
seeking to pursue reform programs that could damage business interests. These 
include influencing the press and various actions taken in the political arena. 
However, it is their capacity to bring about a decline in levels of economic activity 
that has perhaps been the most potent weapon utilised by business interests to 
effectively stymie programs of economic and social reform pursued by labour 
govemments (Block, 1977, 1980). This is because, where levels of economic 
activity decline, a govemment's capacity to implement their preferred economic and 
social policies is severely reduced. 
Queensland's Labor govemments and Sweden's Social Democratic 
govemments have at different times pursued traditional labour reformist 
redistributive economic strategies. In the Queensland case this has been combined 
with a program of state socialisation. These economic policies were met with a 
business counter-offensive that led to economic instability. However, it was only 
in the Queensland case that this process contributed to the destabilisation of the 
political exchange process and an increase in strikes. The discussion now tums to 
consider the reasons for these different outcomes. 
Labour reformist responses to business offensives 
Labour govemments often respond to the assault launched by business 
interests by retreating from their reform agenda. In particular, they abandon those 
policies which disadvantage or threaten business interests. Indeed, they often have 
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sought to reassure the intemational and business community, making clear it is 
their intention to pursue orthodox economic policies, and this results in the 
restoration of "business confidence" (Block, 1977). In their effort to reassure 
business, labour govemments often develop an overriding concem with balancing 
the budget and ensuring that the social and economic policies which they 
implement are sensitive to the national and intemational capitalist context in which 
they operate (Block, 1980). At the same time, distmst of business interests and a 
general opposition to the capitalist economic system has meant that labour 
govemments have remained unwilling to embrace policies encouraging economic 
efficiency and greater capital investment even though it is this approach which 
could be expected to lead to economic growth and allow a reformist labour 
govemment to make improvements in the standard of living of workers (Esping-
Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1978; Higgins, 1985b; Hodgson, 1982). 
Where labour govemments have retreated from their agenda of reform and 
opted, instead, to pursue a more conservative set of policies, there has been less 
willingness on the part of the unions to commit themselves to a political exchange 
strategy. There has been an increased willingness to engage in industrial conflict 
as key elements of the program of reform which promised considerable benefits to 
the workers have been abandoned. This thesis contends that this sequence of events 
helps explain why a political exchange relationship did not dominate industrial 
relations under labour govemments in Queensland. For much of the period between 
the early 1920s to 1957 Queensland Labor was to pursue a much more 
conservative economic agenda than it had pursued during its first years in 
govemment (the one exception being in the early to mid 1930s) and, as a 
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consequence, this was to contribute to the unions' reliance on the strike to improve 
their lot. 
In contrast, the difficulties which confronted Sweden's Social Democrats 
when they attempted to win govemment in the late 1920s on a traditional labour 
reformist economic program, led them to reassess their program. As a consequence 
they discarded some of the key elements of this traditional labour reformist policy 
by setting aside programs for nationalisation and seeking to overcome their 
preoccupation with redistributing existing wealth. Instead, they pursued a labour 
reformist economic growth strategy which is characterised by a commitment to the 
implementation of policies that create conditions for enhancing economic efficiency 
and productivity and, as a consequence, conditions for improving capitalist 
profitability. On the other hand, it also increases employment, improves the welfare 
system and leads to enhanced social and workers' rights (Regini, 1983; Higgins, 
1985b; Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1978; Hodgson, 1982). 
The sort of economic strategy implemented by Sweden results in the 
development of policies which allow both employers and unions to profit from 
increases in the total national product, even if their relative shares do not change 
substantially (Korpi, 1978). Importantly, the securing of some gains or benefits to 
both business interests and organised labour means that neither party takes action 
to undermine the conditions for the development of a industrial relations system 
dominated by a political exchange. The pursuit of such a strategy in Sweden in the 
late 1930s, 1950s and 1960s contributed to the establishment of a political 
exchange. However, the Swedish Social Democrats' pursuit of a more traditional 
labour reformist strategy in the second half of the 1940s was to provoke a major 
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counter-offensive by business interests. The govemment responded by adopting a 
more conservative set of priorities, including some that disadvantaged workers. 
This sequence of events nearly destabilised the political exchange relationship 
which had been established with the unions. However, in this instance the unions 
responded by developing and imposing on the Swedish Social Democrats a labour 
reformist economic growth strategy which contributed to the development of a 
lasting political exchange relationship. 
Union responses to the economic policies of labour governments 
Unionists who are committed to a labour reformist strategy often have 
sought to defend the more conservative policies adopted by labour govenmients in 
the type of situation described above on the grounds that a bad labour government 
is better than the best conservative govemment. However, the capacity of those 
unionists to secure ongoing rank and file commitment to a long term strategy of 
exchange has usually proved difficult as it is hard to convince the rank and file that 
they are securing greater benefits from a political exchange with a labour 
govemment than they could be securing through collective acts of militancy in the 
economic arena. Of course, in some instances, the prevailing economic conditions 
or the political altematives may be so dire that the unions and their members prefer 
to commit themselves to a political exchange rather than risk seeking to advance 
their interests in the economic arena. 
The presence of a revolutionary opposition within the unions makes the task 
of those unionists committed to a reformist politics even more difficult. In such 
situations, the revolutionary opposition traditionally has argued that workers should 
respond by pursuing their interests in the economic arena as they argue that the 
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concessions made by labour govemments to business interests demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the unions entering into a political exchange with labour 
govemments. In such situations, the revolutionary opposition within the unions will 
encourage the rank and file to pursue a militant industrial action policy aimed at 
achieving immediate demands while, at the same time, building the working class's 
revolutionary consciousness in readiness for the decisive day when the capitalist 
system will be overthrown. Moreover, those unionists who are committed to 
reformist politics usually have been forced to respond by also seeking to advance 
their members' interests in the economic arena or altematively face the risk of 
losing control of the union. This results in the destabilisation of the political 
exchange relationship. This thesis argues that this is what occuned in Queensland. 
However, increasingly, many union movements have recognised that the 
interests of their members can best be advanced through union activity which is 
primarily directed to the development and implementation of long term economic 
and social policies which benefit workers rather than industrial strategies which 
seek to secure workers' improvements in wages and working conditions. Many 
union movements have broken with the traditional division of labour in which the 
industrial wing of the labour movement concentrates on securing their members' 
immediate demands, while leaving the longer term economic and social concems of 
workers either to labour parties and labour govemments or, alternatively, the 
establishment of a new socialist society. 
This change in strategic direction has meant that they have been more 
willing to commit themselves to a political exchange with labour govemments. The 
Scandinavian union movements first emphasised the need for unions to develop a 
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concem with longer term economic issues such as the development of a more 
productive and efficient economy, rather than continuing to focus primarily on the 
distributive stmggle in the economic arena. Moreover, where the policy model 
developed by the unions is aimed at benefiting both business and organised labour, 
it may contribute to the stabilisation of a political exchange relationship that 
hitherto had been threatened by the concessions which labour govemments have 
made to business interests. This was to occur in Sweden in the 1940s and 1950s. 
The Swedish union movement responded to the concessions made by Sweden's 
Social Democratic govemments to business interests in the late 1940s by 
developing and eventually imposing an altemative economic and social policy 
model on the Swedish Social Democrats rather than seeking to pursue its interests 
through collective action in the economic arena. Furthermore, the policy model 
developed by the Swedish union movement contributed to the development of a 
labour reformist economic growth strategy and thus helped stabilise the political 
exchange relationship that the Swedish Social Democrats initially established with 
the unions in the 1930s. 
CONCLUSION 
The labour power and corporatist-based explanations of why political or 
industrial factors may dominate a particular industrial relations system are rejected. 
They are rejected on the grounds that they fail to adequately account for the 
diversity of bargaining outcomes in advanced industrial countries. This failure 
results from reducing explanation to certain key macro-level variables, such as the 
political power of the working class or the rise of corporatism. It is an approach 
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which has much in common with that adopted by the classical political economists 
of the nineteenth century who were not interested in discovering historical 
variability. Instead, they directed all their efforts at discovering the laws of society 
(Esping-Andersen, 1989). The problem with such an approach is that there is a 
tendency to develop theories which "are confirmed too easily without the necessary 
methodological rigour nor detailed historical or empirical analysis" (Giles and 
Munay, 1989:40). 
The predictive inaccuracies of such theorising has led to one commentator 
(Wheeler, 1984) drawing the radical conclusion that research into the macro level 
determinants of strike activity should be abandoned. Altematively, it has been 
suggested that there is need to make such theoretical perspectives more sensitive to 
historical evidence. Indeed, the overriding conclusion of some researchers is that 
these sorts of theoretical approaches need to be fused with a case study approach to 
the investigation of bargaining anangements and pattems of strike activity in 
advanced industrial countries (Edwards, 1983; Kaufman, 1984). The case study 
approach which this thesis adopts is discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter where the methodology utilised in this thesis is outlined. 
The remainder of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of the Queensland and 
Swedish cases which is based on the conceptual framework outlined in this chapter. 
It contends that there is a need to focus on the variability of the conditions for 
political exchange. More specifically, it has been argued that there are three key 
factors that are considered critical in determining whether or not a political 
exchange relationship will develop. These are: first, the organisational and political 
character of the trade unions; second, the institutional anangements established in 
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response to societal crises; and third, the sorts of economic programs pursued by 
labour govemments. These three factors are utilised in this thesis to explain, on the 
one hand, why political exchange relationships dominated bargaining and thus 
created the conditions for industrial peace under Sweden's Social Democratic 
govemments (1932-1976) while on the other hand, political exchange relationships 
failed to dominate, and industrial conflict persisted, under Queensland Labor 
govemments (1915-1929, 1932-1957). 
CHAPTER 4 
THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 
The inadequacies of the labour power and corporatist explanations suggest 
that further analysis needs to be undertaken to develop a theoretical model capable 
of accounting for the development of industrial relations systems dominated by 
political exchange relationships where there are labour govemments. This thesis 
adopts the view that a comparative historical sociology is able to contribute 
significantly to the difficult task of general theory building about societal dynamics 
and historical transformations (see Skocpol and Somers, 1980). Such an approach 
undertakes the detailed empirical analysis of an historical kind which is often 
needed to substantiate would-be "universal" theories. In short, the comparative 
historical method helps improve the depth and scope of explanations about 
developments in society. 
The commitment of comparative historical sociologists to detailed historical 
and empirical investigations reflects their view that "social stmctures, dynamic 
'laws', institutions, and pattems of behaviour tend not to be universal, but are rather 
historically specific to particular systems, epochs or periods" (Giles and Munay, 
1989:17). Consequently, researchers who take this approach proffer studies which 
ask "questions about social stmctures or processes understood to be concretely 
situated in space and time" (Skocpol, 1984a: 1). They ask questions about specific 
cases which partially support or deviate from existing theories; cases which they do 
not have sufficient knowledge of, or cases which represent a special set of 
circumstances that wanant intensive study (Bradshaw and Wallace, 1991). The 
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studies proffered by comparative historical sociologists therefore usually rest on an 
understanding or interpretation of specific cases (Ragin, 1987). 
This thesis is based on a detailed investigation of the Queensland case -
one which deviates from the labour power argument. The first major research task 
associated with this case study is identifying, through an analysis of secondary 
sources and primary materials, which particular elements of the Queensland context 
hindered a political exchange relationship from dominating industrial relations 
during a period of labour govemments. There emerged, from an analysis of the 
secondary sources and primary materials, a complex set of conditions which, it is 
argued, were responsible for this outcome. 
The next step was to develop an explanatory framework for analysing the 
case materials. Initially, the Queensland case material was drafted in a format 
which would have resulted in an explanatory account being proffered that did not 
seek to go beyond understanding or interpreting this particular case. However, this 
approach was later abandoned in favour of an explanatory account that gave 
precedence to the goal of causal generalisation. The aim was to produce some 
limited generalisations about the likely establishment of political exchange 
relationships which dominate industrial relations when there are labour 
govemments. 
This chapter begins by examining some of the major methodological 
differences in the comparative historical sociological field. The discussion outlines 
the key elements of an interpretative approach and then moves on to consider the 
key elements of an approach concemed with producing causal generalisations. The 
discussion then explains how the methods associated with a comparative historical 
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sociology were utilised to undertake the research work required to complete the 
thesis. 
AN INTERPRETATIVE OR CAUSAL-ANALYTIC APPROACH? 
Comparative historical sociologists emphasise the need to identify the 
complex combinations of events which are likely to produce a particular outcome 
(Ragin, 1987). Moreover, they argue that "cases should be viewed as 
configurations - as combinations of characteristics" (Ragin, 1987:3), rather than a 
collection of variables - a distinction which highlights the clear split that exists in 
the social sciences between two different research methods (Ragin, 1987). The split 
here is between a quantitative, variable-oriented approach, which views cases as 
collections of variables and produces broad generalisations, and a qualitative, case-
oriented approach, which tends towards more limited historical generalisations and 
is associated with a comparative historical sociology. At the same time, however, 
there exist within the comparative historical sociological field important 
methodological differences (Ragin, 1987; Skocpol and Somers, 1980). 
The contention that cases should be viewed as complex and as unique 
socio-historical configurations has resulted in some comparative historical 
sociologists arguing that their explanatory accounts cannot go beyond 
understanding or interpreting a case (Ragin, 1987; Skocpol and Somers, 1980). In 
short, they proffer studies which emphasise the particularity or uniqueness of each 
case which, in tum, "leads inevitably towards a kind of descriptive holism" that 
"precludes the development of explanatory arguments" (Skocpol and Somers, 
1980:192). In other words, studies are produced which are primarily concemed 
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with bringing out the rich detail of diverse societies and cultures. Moreover, it 
leads to the proffering of studies which "almost always include lengthy, unified 
case accounts, with events kept strictly in chronological order" (Skocpol and 
Somers, 1980:192). The consequence of this descriptive holism is that: 
Independent and dependent variables are never explicitly 
distinguished, and the chronological account, "telling the story", is 
allowed to suffice as the mode of conveying understanding of what 
happened and why (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:193). 
This focus on "telling of the story" reflects an unwillingness to seek to 
explicate the theoretical relevance of cases (Ragin, 1991). For instance, 
comparative historical researchers who adopt such an approach do not seek to 
tackle explanatory problems revealed by deviant cases. Skocpol and Somers (1980) 
explain that this, in tum, reflects a sceptical attitude towards "received social-
scientific theories" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:192) and consequent uncertainty as 
to "the prospects for developing any valid macro-level generalisations at all" 
(Skocpol and Somers, 1980:192). 
The consequence of this focus on the interpretative process is that little in 
the way of empirical generalisation is produced. However, there are many 
comparative historical sociologists who have produced case-oriented work which 
aims "to produce limited generalisations conceming the causes of theoretically 
defined categories of empirical phenomena" (Ragin, 1987:35). This in tum reflects 
these researchers' interest in taking up the challenge of "trying to make sense of the 
diversity across cases in a way that unites similarities and differences in a single, 
coherent framework" (Ragin, 1987:19). The process of explicating the theoretical 
significance of cases is a difficult task however. This is because "societies can not 
be broken apart at will into analytically manipulable variables: and history rarely, if 
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ever, provides exactly the cases needed for controlled comparisons" (Skocpol and 
Somers, 1980:193-194). 
Moreover, because macro-analytic comparative histories "are largely 
inductively established, comparative-historical causal arguments cannot be readily 
generalised beyond the cases actually discussed" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:194). 
Nevertheless, despite such difficulties, this approach has considerable value, since it 
may lead to new historical generalisations which would further our explanations of 
societal stmctures and their historical transformations. In short, a concem with 
causal generalisation results in "the validity of existing theoretical hypotheses" 
being tested, with the final goal being the development of "new causal 
generalisations to replace invalidated ones" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:182). There 
are a number of techniques that are usually utilised by researchers who aim to 
develop causal generalisations. 
A concem with explicating the theoretical significance of individual cases 
results in the empirical evidence being "manipulated according to the logic of the 
causal hypotheses being presented and tested" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:194). In 
short, the explanatory accounts proffered break apart geographic and temporal 
unities in an attempt to more fully understand various explanatory problems. The 
goal of explaining the theoretical significance of individual cases also tends to have 
as its object the identification of "configurations favourable and unfavourable to 
particular outcomes" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:182). The aim is to proffer an 
explanatory framework which is able to account for the diversity across cases. This 
concem has usually resulted in researchers utilising John Stuart Mills's "Method of 
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Agreement" or his "Method of Difference" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Ragin, 
1987). 
Mills's method of agreement is the simplest and most straightforward of the 
two methods. It seeks to identify all instances of a particular phenomenon and then 
sets out to establish which of the possible causal variables is constant in all cases 
(Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Ragin, 1987). The method of difference, which is 
considered to be a more powerful tool for determining the validity of causal 
associations, contrasts "cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the 
hypothesised causes are present to other ('negative') cases in which the 
phenomenon and the causes are both absent" (Skocpol and Somers, 1980:183). 
It is the method of difference which is used in this thesis to explain the 
particular phenomenon of whether a bargaining system will be dominated by a 
political exchange relationship where there are labour govenmients. This is 
demonstrated through contrasting a case where the phenomenon and the 
hypothesised causes are present (Sweden) and where the phenomenon and 
hypothesised causes are absent (Queensland). The discussion now tums to consider 
how these methodological tools were utilised to complete the thesis. 
THE QUEENSLAND CONTEXT: METHODOLOGY 
An analysis of the secondary sources 
The first task undertaken was explicating the complex of factors which led 
to the persistence of strikes in Queensland. This began with an analysis of a variety 
of secondary sources. Histories of the Australian and Queensland labour movement 
(see for example Childe, 1964; Fitzpatrick, 1940; Gollan, 1960; Turner, 1965; 
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Murphy, 1975) and, in particular, the record of Queensland Labor govemments 
were studied (see Murphy et al, 1980). In addition, general histories of 
Queensland's political, economic and social development, such as Fitzgerald's 
(1984), provide important background material which contributed to the contextual 
analysis of the Queensland case. 
Histories of major strikes which occuned during the period under 
examination were also analysed (see for example the collection of articles in 
Murphy, 1983). However, many of these articles were of limited value as they 
focused on "telling the story" of individual strikes. They did not unearth the 
complex of factors leading to the persistence of strikes in Queensland. Yet, they 
did provide some useful leads. For instance, they indicated the way in which the 
political and organisational character of trade unions and the nature of the system 
of compulsory arbitration established by Queensland Labor govemments had 
contributed to the persistence of industrial conflict. 
Only a handful of studies linked their analyses of strikes to the wider social 
context, or to other features of the case. These proved to be particularly valuable. 
Hunt's study (1979) was particularly useful as it discussed in detail the nature of 
the context contributing to the persistence of industrial conflict in north Queensland 
during the first four years of Labor govenmient (1915-1919). He considers a 
variety of industrial disputes during this period, two of the more significant being 
the northem railway strike of 1917 and the Townsville meatworkers' strike of 1919. 
Hunt's (1979) study provides contextual material which helps explain why 
the unions were not able to act as an effective negotiating agent with the Labor 
Govemment and, also, why Labor govemments were not able to deliver the 
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conditions for a political exchange. Specifically, he indicates that the organisational 
disunity of the unions, the presence of a revolutionary opposition within the unions, 
and the way in which industrial relations was institutionalised (namely through a 
system of compulsory arbitration established by Queensland Labor govemments) 
hindered the establishment of a political exchange. 
Studies undertaken by Higgins (1954, 1960), Cochrane (1984) and Cribb 
(1964) provided the basis for an analysis of developments in the 1920s. In 
particular, they greatly enhanced understanding of the complex of factors 
responsible for two of the most important industrial confrontations involving 
Queensland's trade unions and Labor govemments: the railway strike of 1925 and 
South Johnstone strike of 1927. 
Higgins's (1954, 1960) study highlights the importance of the dramatic 
changes to Queensland Labor's economic and social policy program during the first 
half of the 1920s for understanding these major industrial confrontations. 
Cochrane's (1984) detailed analysis of the reasons for this change in Labor's 
economic and social policy direction also enhances understanding of this periods 
importance in determining why a political exchange relationship was not to 
dominate industrial relations. 
Furthermore, Higgins's (1954, 1960) analysis indicates the way a 
revolutionary opposition within the trade unions became increasingly opposed to a 
political exchange strategy as a consequence of these changes in policy direction 
on the part of Labor govemments. Cribb's (1964) study underlines the importance 
of ideological divisions within the labour movement and in particular, the 
77 
development of a powerful revolutionary opposition, for the persistence of strikes 
during this period. 
Blackmur's (1986) study of industrial relations in the Hanlon era (1946-
1952) also contributes significantly to understanding the reasons for the persistence 
of industrial conflict and the consequent failure to establish a political exchange 
relationship (see also Blackmur, 1993). His work analyses the contextual elements 
which contributed to two major industrial confrontations during this period: the 
meatworkers strike of 1946 and railway strike of 1948. He draws attention to the 
influence of the organisational and political character of the union movement, 
emphasising the way it was shaped by developments in the period from the 1890s 
to the 1940s. He shows how the system of compulsory arbitration, established by 
Labor govemments in Queensland, contributed to the persistence of industrial 
conflict. Finally, he demonstrates how the economic and social policy program 
implemented by Labor govemments during the second half of the 1940s had 
significant implications for the sort of exchange relationship which dominated 
industrial relations. 
An analysis of these secondary sources showed that there were certain 
events, periods and places which were pivotal to an understanding of the reasons 
for the persistence of industrial conflict in Queensland during the long period of 
Labor govemments. Moreover, the importance of these events, periods and places 
was supported by the evidence derived from a detailed investigation of primary 
materials, to which the discussion now tums. 
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The role of primary investigations 
According to Skocpol (1984b) the research method which comparative 
historical sociologists adopt "will increasingly converge on the practice of starting 
with secondary analyses, but not stopping there" (Skocpol, 1984b:382). In short, it 
is likely that secondary research will be "supplemented by carefully selected 
primary investigations or reinvestigations" (Skocpol, 1984b:382). This approach 
was adopted to complete this thesis. The analysis of selected primary materials was 
used to supplement the findings from the analysis of secondary sources. 
Importantly, it enhanced the understanding of the contextual environment and, in 
particular, the importance of the factors identified by Hunt (1979), Higgins (1954, 
1960), Cochrane (1984), Cribb (1964) and Blackmur (1986). 
A number of major Queensland labour movement newspapers, as well as 
other significant labour movement documents, were analysed. The newspapers 
consulted included most issues of the Militant, which was later to become the 
Advocate (published by the ARU, Queensland branch) from 1917 to 1930, 1932 to 
1938 and 1944 to 1950; copies of the Worker (published by the Australian 
Worker's Union) in the periods from 1915 to 1929, 1932 to 1939 and 1946 to 
1956; most issues of the Workers Weekly (published by the Communist Party of 
Australia) from 1922 to 1935 and the Queensland Guardian (published by the 
Queensland branch of the Communist Party of Australia) between 1944 and 1954; 
and issues of the Daily Standard (an independent labour movement weekly) in the 
periods from 1916 to 1929 and 1932 to 1936. Analysis of these newspapers for 
these particular periods was determined in part by their availability (for instance 
the Daily Standard was to cease publication in 1936) and also the fact that, based 
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on an analysis of the secondary sources, these particular periods were considered 
critical in helping explain why a political exchange failed to develop. 
Significant labour movement documents analysed included the minutes of 
the monthly meetings of the TLC from 1922 to 1957; the minutes of the 
Queensland Trade Union Congresses (QTUC) held between 1910 and 1958; and 
the proceedings of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Queensland branch). Labor in 
Politics Conventions, which were held triennially, in the period between 1910 and 
1957. 
Other primary materials consulted included the Debates of the Queensland 
Parliament (QPD) and copies of the Brisbane Courier (which was to become the 
Courier-Mail) during major periods of industrial disputation. 
The analysis of the primary materials relating to Queensland both supported 
and enhanced the findings derived from an analysis of the secondary sources; 
namely that a complex set of factors hindered the establishment of a political 
exchange relationship that dominated industrial relations. The next task was the 
development of an explanatory account which highlighted the reasons for this 
particular outcome. 
THE EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 
Limits of an interpretative account 
Originally two chapters were drafted which sought to explicate the complex 
combination of factors contributing to the persistence of industrial conflict in 
Queensland during the period from 1915 to 1929. The first of these aimed to 
demonstrate how the organisational disunity of the unions, the strength of the 
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revolutionary opposition in the unions, and the system of compulsory arbitration 
established by Queensland Labor, contributed to the persistence of industrial 
conflict in the period from 1915 to 1920 and, in particular, the northem railway 
strike of 1917 and Townsville meatworkers strike of 1919. The second chapter 
aimed to explain how the two factors which were considered important in the 
period from 1915 to 1920, as well as a third new factor (changes in the economic 
and social policy direction of Queensland's Labor govemments) contributed to 
major strikes in 1925 and 1927. A third chapter was proposed that was to focus on 
explaining how the three factors mentioned contributed to the persistence of 
industrial conflict in the post-World War II. This third chapter was to focus, in 
particular, on the meatworkers' strike of 1946 and the railway strike of 1948. 
However, the problem with the proposed format was that too much 
emphasis was placed on the recounting of events. The material collected from the 
secondary sources and primary investigations was incorporated into a lengthy 
unified case account which focused on keeping the events in strict chronological 
order. The consequence was the proffering of an account which focused on "telling 
the story", rather than making explicit the contribution of the three factors 
mentioned above to the persistence of industrial conflict. They are, firstly, the 
organisational disunity of the unions and the strength of the revolutionary 
opposition in the unions; secondly, the system of compulsory arbitration established 
by Queensland Labor; and thirdly, changes in the economic policy direction of 
Queensland's Labor govemments. 
This particular format was abandoned as the thesis is primarily interested in 
developing an explanatory account which is able to help make sense of diversity 
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across cases. In short, the intention is to proffer some limited generalisations about 
the factors which are likely to determine whether a political exchange relationship 
(which dominated industrial relations) was established where there have been 
labour govemments. Consequently, the methods associated with a comparative 
historical sociological approach, which is concemed with identifying causal 
generalisations, has been adopted. 
The search for causal generalisations 
The process of developing causal generalisations from the analysis 
undertaken of Queensland was contingent on a number of intenelated tasks. 
Initially the empirical evidence collected had been presented in an interpretative 
format. However, the attempt to more fully explicate the theoretical significance of 
the conditions mentioned above required the breaking apart of case materials 
relating to the Queensland case. The empirical evidence had to be reananged 
"according to the logic of the causal hypotheses being presented and tested" 
(Skocpol and Somers, 1980:194). The result is that rather than writing 
three chapters which examined different periods during which Labor govemed 
(1915 to 1920, 1920 to 1929 and 1945 to 1950) three chapters have been written 
which focus on explicating the relevance of the three factors which explain the 
failure to establish a political exchange relationship in Queensland industrial 
relations. 
Thus, one chapter seeks to explain how the organisational disunity of the 
unions, along with the strength of a revolutionary opposition within these unions, 
had undermined the unions' ability to commit themselves to a political exchange 
relationship. A second chapter aims to explain how industrial relations, in being 
institutionalised through a system of compulsory arbitration, hindered govenmient's 
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ability to create the conditions for a political exchange with the unions. Finally, a 
third chapter focuses on changes in the economic policy of Queensland Labor 
govemments, as they failed to meet the unions' expectations and thus also helped 
undermine the conditions for a political exchange relationship. 
At the same time, the utilisation of the method of difference contributes to 
the further development and refinement of the causal hypotheses which were 
developed, initially, from an analysis of the Queensland case. The utilisation of the 
method of difference resulted in a decision being made to contrast the Queensland 
case with the Swedish case. 
The introduction to this thesis noted that it could be contended that a 
difference in the cases being contrasted, that is a state (Queensland) versus a nation 
(Sweden), might be responsible for the difference in outcomes. This contention is 
based on the view that, when undertaking comparative research, it is preferable to 
compare like with like: for instance, to compare nations with nations or regions 
with regions. However, this thesis's primary research interest is to attempt to 
further our understanding of the factors which determine whether a political 
exchange relationship will be established where there are labour govemments 
through the detailed investigation of a case which deviates from the labour power 
argument. The absence of cases where nations deviate from the labour power 
argument made it impossible to compare like with like. The discussion of the 
labour power argument in Chapter 3 noted that, where the working class has 
exercised strong and stable control over the polity for a long period of time at the 
national level, that is Sweden, Norway and Austria, a political exchange has 
dominated industrial relations. However, the Queensland case, where a labour 
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govemment exercised strong and stable control of the polity over a long period of 
time at the state or regional level, did deviate from the labour power argument, ft 
was decided that there would be value in undertaking a detailed investigation of 
this case in order to establish more fully the reasons why a political exchange 
might dominate industrial relations under a labour govemment. 
The fact that a political exchange dominated industrial relations under 
labour govemments at the national level (i.e. Sweden, Norway and Austria) but did 
not dominate industrial relations under a labour govemment at the state level 
(Queensland) might lend support to the argument that it is working class control of 
the polity at the national rather than state level over a long period of time which is 
the determinant of the establishment of a political exchange which dominates 
industrial relations. This fact might therefore be considered to provide support for 
the contention that it is a difference in the cases being contrasted, that is a state 
(Queensland) versus a nation (Sweden), which is responsible for the difference in 
outcomes. For instance, it might be claimed that, in the Queensland case, the 
failure to establish a political exchange which dominated industrial relations and 
the resultant persistence of strikes at high levels under Labor govemments was the 
result of national (rather than state) conditions over which only the federal 
govemment had political control. This thesis's decision to analyse the Queensland 
case, and then compare it with the Swedish case, might therefore be considered to 
be misplaced. This thesis rejects the contention that it was the difference in 
configurations (i.e. a state versus a nation) which was responsible for the difference 
in outcomes in these two cases. Instead, it argues that the three factors identified 
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through an analysis of the Queensland case are equally applicable to an analysis of 
the Swedish case. 
This thesis argues that, in the Queensland case, the absence of a strong 
central union body and the nature of Labor's economic program failed to create the 
conditions for a political exchange which dominated industrial relations. In 
contrast, it is noted that, in the Swedish case, the presence of a strong central union 
body and the nature of the Social Democrats' economic program contributed to the 
development of a political exchange relationship which dominated industrial 
relations. 
It might be claimed that the difference in outcomes in relation to these 
two factors highlights the importance of the difference in the configurations being 
compared. For instance, researchers might question the proposition that 
Queensland's union movement could be expected to develop a strong central union 
body which helped create the conditions for a political exchange with Labor on the 
grounds that, in most capitalist industrial countries, central union bodies have 
tended to develop at the national rather than regional or state level. The argument 
is that, since it was not possible for a strong central union body to develop in 
Queensland, it is difficult to see how the union movement in that state could have 
been expected to develop the requisite organisational characteristics that would 
have allowed the unions to commit themselves effectively to a long-term strategy 
of political exchange with a state Labor govemment. 
Furthermore, the argument that it was the nature of Queensland Labor's 
economic program which failed to create the conditions for a political exchange 
with the unions might also be contested on the grounds that it was not the nature 
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of Queensland Labor's economic program but, instead, the inability of govemments 
at the state or regional level to implement their own economic programs which was 
the key determinant of failure in this case. In short, the significant factor which, it 
might be argued, helps explain the difference in outcomes in relation to this factor 
is that, generally, the capacity of regional or state govemments to implement their 
own prefened economic program is much less than that of federal or national 
govemments. Thus, it could be claimed that even though Labor secured control of 
govemment in Queensland, control at this level of govemment did not allow Labor 
to implement an economic program which guaranteed to the unions and workers 
the sorts of benefits which might secure their commitment to a long-term strategy 
of political exchange. In contrast, it might be argued that the Swedish Social 
Democrats' control of govemment at the national level gave them a much greater 
capacity to implement their prefened economic program which, in tum, secured for 
unions and workers the types of benefits that gained their support for a long term 
strategy of political exchange. 
This thesis rejects the argument that, in relation to these two factors, the 
difference in outcomes was a result of the difference in configurations being 
compared. This argument is rejected on the grounds that Australia's six states, 
including Queensland, possessed considerable economic and social autonomy 
during the first half of the twentieth century following federation in 1901. This 
economic and social autonomy meant that central union bodies were established at 
the state rather than national level during the period between the 1880s and 1920s 
in Australia. Furthermore, the central union bodies which were established at the 
state level were of critical importance in determining whether the union movements 
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which developed in each of Australia's six states were able to commit themselves 
to a long-term strategy of political exchange where there were state Labor 
govemments. The fact that the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) was 
established as the national voice of unionism only in 1927, and was not to begin to 
develop into a strong central voice until the post-World War II era (see Griffin, 
1994; Pilkington, 1983), further highlights the importance of the process of union 
formation which occuned at the state rather than national level in Australia during 
the first half of the twentieth century. The thesis concludes (see Chapter 6) 
however that the central union bodies which were established in Queensland did 
not allow the unions to commit themselves effectively to a long-term strategy of 
political exchange. 
Queensland's considerable economic autonomy also allowed Labor to pursue 
its own economic program at the state level. There is a number of important 
indicators of the economic autonomy of Australia's state govenmients during the 
first half of the twentieth century. For instance in the period up until World War II 
it was Australia's state govemments rather than the federal government which 
collected income taxes. Further, during the period when Queensland Labor was 
seeking to establish its own state owned enterprises, between 1915 and 1925, the 
task of raising the finances that were needed to establish some of these enterprises 
was undertaken by state govemments. In short, Queensland Labor's capacity to 
implement its prefened economic program was similar to that of many national or 
federal governments. However, this thesis argues that, on one hand, the particular 
economic program pursued by Queensland Labor failed to crate the conditions for 
a stable political exchange with the unions (see Chapter 8) whereas the Swedish 
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Social Democrats' quite different economic program did create the conditions for a 
stable political exchange with the unions (see Chapter 5). 
This thesis contends that the difference in configurations is not a relevant 
consideration in relation to those other factors which, it is argued, contributed to 
the difference in outcomes, namely the institutional arrangements established in 
response to societal crises in Australia and Sweden and the political character of 
the unions. The institutional arrangements which were established in Australia at 
the national level, and replicated at the state level, in response to a societal crisis 
which occuned at the beginning of the twentieth century could be expected to 
hinder the capacity of both federal and state Labor governments to create the 
conditions for a political exchange. In short, in relation to this particular factor, it 
did not matter whether Labor govemed at the state or federal level. In contrast, this 
thesis argues that the quite different institutional anangements which were 
established in response to Sweden's societal crisis contributed to the Social 
Democrats' capacity to preside over the establishment of a political exchange which 
dominated industrial relations. 
Finally, the differences in the political character of the Queensland and 
Swedish unions and, in particular, the difference in the strength of the 
revolutionary oppositions in these two cases were not the result of differences in 
the configurations compared but, instead, the result of factors such as the different 
histories of the working class in Australia and Sweden. This in tum was the result 
of the quite different economic, political and social developments in these 
two countries. 
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The contrasting of a state (Queensland) and a nation (Sweden) is therefore 
not considered to hinder the comparative work undertaken in this thesis as the 
factors which this thesis demonstrates are responsible for the difference in 
outcomes can validly be applied to both cases, despite the difference in 
configurations. 
The Swedish case was chosen since it was one of only a few cases where 
strikes have withered away under labour govenmients following the establishment 
of a political exchange relationship (see Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980). This 
decision was influenced also by the fact that there exists a considerable literature 
which helps explain why Swedish Social Democratic govemments presided over 
the establishment of industrial peace and the consequent establishment of a 
bargaining system dominated by a political exchange. Some of the more significant 
secondary sources relating to the Swedish case refened to in this thesis include 
Fulcher (1988), Korpi (1978), Korpi and Shalev (1979, 1980), Higgins and Apple 
(1983), Higgins (1985a, 1985b), Katzenstein (1985) and Martin (1984). 
That the Swedish case was introduced for comparative purposes, so as to 
highlight the explanatory power of the analytical framework derived primarily from 
an analysis of the Queensland case, has meant that the Swedish case has not been 
examined in the same detail as the Queensland case. Moreover, there exists an 
extensive anay of secondary sources relating to the Swedish case which has meant 
that it was not necessary to undertake an investigation of primary materials. 
The analysis undertaken of the Swedish case aims to determine the extent to 
which the three factors identified initially through an analysis of the Queensland 
case were responsible for the different outcome in Sweden. That is differences in 
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the organisational character of the unions, and the role of the revolutionary 
opposition within the unions, the way in which industrial relations was 
institutionalised and the nature of the economic policies introduced. This process of 
comparison resulted in some refining of the causal hypotheses which initially had 
been proffered as a result of an analysis of Queensland. 
The hypotheses developed first from the analysis of the Queensland case, 
and then from the comparative analysis of the Swedish case, were outlined in detail 
in the previous chapter. The process of developing and refining these causal 
hypotheses, which resulted from utilising the method of difference, meant also that 
it was necessary to further analyse the secondary sources and the primary materials 
relating to the Queensland case. 
Another look at the secondary and primary case materials 
A plethora of secondary sources was consulted. They helped demonstrate 
how craft unionism (see Armstrong, 1975; Leggatt, 1983; Sullivan, 1973; Childe, 
1964; Gollan, 1960; Tumer, 1965), regional divisions (see Lewis, 1973, 1978), and 
the system of compulsory arbitration established in Australia at the begiiming of 
the twentieth century (see Deery and Plowman, 1980; Howard, 1977; Martin, 1971; 
Rimmer, 1981; Yerbury, 1971) had contributed to the organisational disunity of the 
unions. The analysis of the role of the revolutionary opposition within the 
Queensland unions drew on material not considered during the drafting of the 
original two chapters mentioned above. For instance, the works of Davidson (1969) 
and Fanell (1981), which are devoted to analysing the development of the 
revolutionary workers' movement in Australia, and the writings of Australian 
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Communist Party leaders of the time, such as Dixon (1935), Henry (1946) and 
Sharkey (1960) were utilised. 
Similarly, analyses of the negative consequences that Queensland Labor's 
system of compulsory arbitration had for the establishment of a political exchange 
relationship led to a variety of secondary sources being consulted. An analysis was 
made of secondary sources focusing on the origins and early development of 
Australia's distinctive system of conciliation and arbitration (see Castles, 1985, 
1988; Macarthy, 1967, 1969, 1970; Macintyre, 1983, 1986; Macintyre and 
Mitchell, 1989; Philipp, 1950; Rickard, 1976), as well as others which have 
criticised the nature of Australia's system of compulsory arbitration and, in 
particular, its failure to meet its primary objective, namely the creation of a new 
social order where industrial peace prevailed (see Hancock, 1962; Niland, 1978; 
Blandy etal, 1986). 
Furthermore, the analysis of the shortcomings of the system of compulsory 
arbitration established in Queensland was supported also by an analysis of various 
primary materials. These included the basic wage decisions of the Queensland 
Industrial Court (QIC) and those Debates of the Queensland Parliament (QPD) 
devoted to discussion of the need for, and changes to, the legislation governing 
Queensland's system of conciliation and arbitration. 
Finally, analysing the shift in Queensland Labor's economic policy direction 
of the 1920s drew on a variety of secondary sources including Bulbeck (1987), 
Lewis (1978) and Wiltshire (1980a, 1980b). These were elaborated from work on 
trying to understand the impact of an increasingly conservative policy direction 
(Higgins, 1954, 1960; Cochrane, 1984, 1989). Primary sources held by the 
Queensland State Archives, such as the conespondence and records of meetings 
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involving Labor Govemment Ministers and, in particular the Premier and the 
Minister for Labour, and union leaders, were also consulted. These materials helped 
explain how the increasingly conservative economic policies adopted in the 1930s 
and 1940s undermined the conditions for a political exchange relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The value of the comparative historical sociological method comes from its 
commitment to empirical and historical analyses of particular cases. In the present 
case it will help identify those factors which contributed to the Queensland 
outcome - an outcome which deviated from the predictions of the labour power 
thesis. 
However, the thesis does not seek to limit itself to the task of historical 
interpretation. An account of the Queensland case which suggests that the failure to 
establish a political exchange relationship was the result of features unique to 
Queensland is not proffered. Instead, an argument is formulated based on an 
analysis of the Queensland case, which is contrasted with the Swedish case. This 
analysis helps account for the different outcomes in these two cases and also 
highlights some of the factors which might be utilised to help explain whether or 
not industrial relations is likely to be dominated by a political exchange where 
there are labour govemments. 
The discussion now tums to how the framework outlined is able to explain 
why a political exchange relationship dominated industrial relations in Sweden 
during a period of Social Democratic govemments. The Queensland case will then 
be compared with this case. 
CHAPTER 5 
SWEDEN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
EXCHANGE: 1932-1976 
The Swedish case provides empirical support for the labour power argument 
that, where the working class exercises stable control over the polity, industrial 
peace will be established (see Korpi and Shalev, 1979, 1980). This chapter argues 
that the establishment of a political exchange relationship that dominated industrial 
relations in Sweden during a period of Social Democratic govemments (1932-
1976) was more complex than that which is allowed for by the labour power 
thesis; it is more than labour controlling the polity. The establishment of a political 
exchange relationship in Sweden was the result of the ideal factors identified in 
Chapter 3 being present. 
Certainly the political exchange relationship which dominated bargaining 
anangements in Sweden during the period of Social Democratic mle (1932-1976) 
was subjected to a process of destabilisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Korpi and Shalev, 1979). However, because the Swedish example is being used in 
this thesis for comparative purposes - compared with Queensland during the period 
of Labor governments (1915-1929, 1932-1957) when political exchange 
relationships failed to dominate industrial relations and strikes persisted - the 
process of destabilisation of political exchange relationships which began to occur 
in Sweden in the late 1960s and 1970s is not considered. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. First, it considers how the 
organisational and political character of Sweden's trade unions contributed to the 
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unions' willingness and ability to commit themselves to a political exchange. The 
following two sections consider how the institutional anangements established in 
response to an historic compromise developed in response to major societal crisis 
of the 1930s and 1940s, and how the economic and social program implemented by 
successive Swedish Social Democratic govemments also contributed to the 
establishment of a political exchange relationship. Each of these can now be 
considered. 
THE ORGANISATIONAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTER OF SWEDISH 
TRADE UNIONS 
The Swedish trade unions' organisational development in the 1880s and 
1890s was one of a transformation from a collection of local craft organisations to 
a national federation (Korpi, 1978; Fulcher, 1988). In 1898 Sweden's main union 
federation, the LO was founded. Over the following half century the LO's authority 
was to increase significantly. There were a number of factors critical to the 
establishment of the LO as an authoritative union federation. 
During the formative stages of the Swedish trade union movement's 
development, socialist ideas were critical in tipping the balance in favour of a class 
based, as opposed to a craft based, organisation. Moreover, the absence of any 
stmctural divisions also assisted. Finally, the establishment of corporatist 
anangements at the societal level contributed to the strengthening of the LO from 
the 1930s onwards. Consequently, the LO established itself as a strong federation 
that was able to exercise considerable control over individual unions. This, in tum. 
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contributed to the Swedish union movement being able to commit itself to a long 
term strategy of exchange. 
As explained below, the Swedish union movement was dominated by a 
reformist leadership which was rarely threatened by a trade union-based 
revolutionary opposition. Syndicalists and communists, although active in the union 
movement, were unable to establish an organisational base which allowed them to 
influence union strategies, strategies largely shaped by the reformist leadership of 
the LO and by other major unions, such as the Metalworkers Union. 
The Swedish trade union movement therefore possessed the organisational 
and political character which helped make possible the establishment of a political 
exchange relationship with Sweden's Social Democratic govemments. The 
discussion now tums to a more detailed consideration of those factors which 
contributed to the establishment of a strong federation which dominated a union 
movement that was firmly committed to a reformist strategy. 
The formation of an organisationally unified trade union movement 
Swedish trade unionism had "its origins in artisans' associations, led by 
craftsmen, and with predominantly liberal ideologies" (Meidner, 1980:344). Korpi 
notes that "of about 260 local unions existing in 1890 two-thirds were craft 
unions" (Korpi, 1978:60). Moreover, the continued domination of craft unionism 
could have been expected to inhibit the establishment of a strong federation that 
dominated the union movement. Craft unionists traditionally have favoured loose 
forms of central co-ordination, (e.g. trades and labour councils) which are 
concemed with guaranteeing maximum autonomy to individual unions. However, 
this was not to be the case. The Swedish LO was established in 1898 as a union 
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federation that provided "a means of coordination and mutual assistance" (Fulcher, 
1988:255). Moreover, its decision to establish a central strike fund two years later 
in 1900 further strengthened its coordinating role. This fund "inevitably involved 
the federation in the disputes of its member unions" (Fulcher, 1988:255). In other 
words, the LO was from the very begirming established as a federation which 
required financial sacrifices, class solidarity and discipline, rather than the more 
loose and less demanding framework of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
(see Fulcher, 1988), or the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) (see 
discussion in Chapter 9). There are a number of factors which were responsible for 
the LO's establishment as a strong federation that dominated the Swedish union 
movement. 
In the 1860s and 1870s, the organisation of workers into unions had been 
achieved primarily by liberal-led workers' associations. However, in the 1880s the 
founders of Swedish socialism began to challenge the liberal movement and 
"during the 1890s the non-political and liberal groups, which had been especially 
strong in some of the craft unions, lost out against the Social Democrats" (Korpi, 
1978:61). 
The socialists, in the organisational form of social democracy, were able to 
exercise a dominant influence on the process of union development during its 
formative stage. This resulted in the promotion of a class wide organisation 
by encouraging the building of open unions, by setting up local 
organising and coordinating committees, and by directing their 
efforts at labourers and factory workers in particular, thereby 
diminishing the gap between the organisation of the skilled and the 
unskilled (Fulcher, 1988:264). 
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Furthermore, it was the development of a distinctive type of union, a work-
material union (see below), which helped ensure that the gap between the unskilled 
and skilled did not develop, and, in the process, prevented the entrenching of 
stratification along skill lines. 
It was the influence of socialist ideas that "tipped the balance towards an 
open work-material union" (Fulcher, 1988:264) which was "critical to the 
transition from a craft/general to an industrial stmcture" (Fulcher, 1988:261). The 
work-material union was a distinctive type of union that was "not recognised by 
the conventional and universally applied craft/general/industrial typology" (Fulcher, 
1988:261). It organised all those who worked with a given material and "the 
Swedish Metalworkers' and Woodworkers' Unions were of this character" (Fulcher, 
1988:261). 
Thus, whilst the Swedish Metalworkers' Union was not to accept the 
principle of industrial unionism until 1909, its development as a work-material 
union "prevented the craft fragmentation of engineering unionism and, also, the 
organisation of unskilled metalworkers into a general union" (Fulcher, 1988:261-
262). Instead, the Metalworkers' Union's early development as a work-material 
union made possible its eventual emergence as a powerful industrial union. The 
importance of this type of union lay in the fact that it was able to act as a bridging 
stmcture which allowed Swedish unionism "to move from a divisive craft unionism 
to a unified and industrially organised federation" (Fulcher, 1988:262). 
In short, "the early Swedish union movement was balanced between the 
opposed principles of craft and class" (Fulcher, 1988:265). However, the influence 
of socialists was to tip the balance "towards organisation of an open, class-wide 
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and unified character" (Fulcher, 1988:265) and, in particular, the Swedish unions 
organisation into a strong class-wide federation, the LO. 
The success of socialist ideas in this case was so much greater because, 
whilst the movement was balanced between craft and class, craft unionism had not 
yet entrenched itself to the same degree that it had in Britain and Australia. (For a 
discussion of the reasons for the different outcomes in the British and Swedish 
cases see Fulcher, 1988). In these latter countries craft unionists had been able to 
establish their own prefened form of central co-ordination, (e.g. trades and labour 
councils). This form of central organisation was to hinder attempts made by 
socialists to develop class based forms of organisation in these countries. The next 
chapter explains how the commitment of craft unionists to the establishment of a 
trades and labour council in Queensland was to hinder the attempt by those 
unionists committed to the idea of organising along class lines, from establishing 
one strong union federation. 
The influence of socialists was therefore crucial to the developmental 
process in Sweden. However, this is not to say that various extemal influences did 
not have some influence. For instance, the racial and ethnic homogeneity of the 
working class, and the relative weakness of religion and consequent absence of 
major religious cleavages, meant that the Swedish union movement was able "to 
develop untroubled by factors that have significantly hindered union integration 
elsewhere" (Higgins, 1985a:366). The result was an organisationally unified 
movement with a far greater capacity to commit itself to a political exchange 
strategy than was achieved by union movements in countries such as Australia and 
Britain. 
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In the period from the 1930s through to the 1950s power was further 
centralised in the hands of the LO. The overwhelming majority of public sector 
unions was to join the LO in the 1930s (Korpi, 1978). Furthermore, the 
establishment of corporatist anangements at the societal level contributed 
significantly to the LO's enhanced coordinating role and the consequent 
centralisation of union power in its hands (Fulcher, 1988; Martin, 1984). The Basic 
Agreement reached between the unions and employers in 1938 was to form the 
comerstone of the corporatist anangements established in Sweden at the societal 
level. The success of the Basic Agreement depended on the LO's ability to secure 
the union movement's commitment to exercise restraint in the short term in retum 
for the longer term benefits associated with such an agreement. Consequently, the 
1933 standard mle was included in the LO's 1941 constitution (Fulcher, 1988; 
Martin, 1984). The standard mle was adopted by the LO General Council in 1933 
following a prolonged buildingworkers' strike. The standard mle gave the LO the 
right to have a final say in the making and termination of agreements and therefore 
was particularly important in allowing the LO to guarantee union commitment to 
an industrial peace agreement, that is the Basic Agreement. Finally, in the 1950s 
the role of the LO was further strengthened as a consequence of the 
institutionalisation of central wage negotiations (see Fulcher, 1988) which, in tum, 
was a consequence of the establishment of a societal corporatism. 
The fact that the LO leadership and that of other major unions (e.g. 
Metalworkers' Union) were dominated by trade unionists who subscribed to a 
reformist social democratic strategy further strengthened the Swedish union 
movement's ability to commit itself to a political exchange strategy. This strength 
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pointed, in tum, to the ineffectiveness of challenges from the revolutionary 
opposition in the union movement. The discussion now tums to the challenge made 
by the revolutionary opposition to the reformist leadership of Sweden's trade union 
movement. 
The revolutionary challenge 
The 1880s and 1890s witnessed the emergence of a social democratic 
movement in Sweden which was quickly able to take control of the rapidly 
developing union movement. The first chairman of the newly formed LO was a 
Social Democratic Party man, while the union branches were required to become 
collective members of the Social Democratic Party (Korpi, 1978). The union 
movement was therefore dominated from its very early stages by a social 
democratic leadership, a domination which lasted throughout the twentieth century. 
As would be expected, they have been strongly committed to the election of Social 
Democratic govemments, which the reformists argue would secure workers 
considerable economic and social benefits. These, in tum, would make worthwhile 
the unions' commitment to an industrial peace strategy. 
A revolutionary opposition did develop in the Swedish union movement 
and, at times, it sought to challenge the movement's reformist leadership. This 
opposition flourished towards the end of World War I and again towards the end of 
World War II and in the immediate post-war periods. Such surges in revolutionary 
activity were common to the majority of union movements in westem industrial 
countries, though their impacts varied widely. 
In many European countries, as well as in Australia, revolutionary 
syndicalist organisations and Communist Parties were able to build substantial 
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organisational bases within the trade union movement. This allowed them to put 
into effect their strategy of developing strike stmggles. The result was the 
undermining of the reformist leadership's ability to effectively commit unions to a 
political exchange relationship with any labour govemment voted into office. 
However, the experience of Swedish revolutionary groups in the period from World 
War I through to the immediate post-World War II years was quite different. Their 
effect on Sweden's trade union movement was minimal. 
The revolutionary action which occurred around World War I was inspired 
largely by syndicalist groups and resulted in the formation of a variety of 
oppositional organisations within the LO, including the Swedish Union Opposition. 
During this period (the 1910s) the revolutionary opposition scored its greatest 
successes in one of the most important unions, the powerful Metalworkers' Union. 
In 1919 it led a left opposition which won over the majority of delegates at the 
Union's annual congress. The most important consequence of this was that a 
number of revolutionaries attained leading positions in the Union. These men 
remained active in these positions over the next three decades. However, most of 
them retumed to the Social Democratic Party following various splits in the 
revolutionary workers' movement in the 1920s. This negated the influence the 
revolutionary opposition might have expected to exercise in the Metalworkers' 
Union (Korpi, 1978). 
The attempt by the Swedish Communist Party to organise itself inside the 
unions during the 1930s was relatively ineffectual. This was further hampered by 
its decision, in line with Comintem policy, to urge the members of its front 
organisation in the trade unions (the Committee for Union Unity) to pursue a 
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militant line. The dictate included an open attack on the leadership of the LO 
which provoked a frontal attack from the LO. The result was a splintering of the 
revolutionary opposition and the weakening of their influence in trade unions. 
However, the Communist Party was to achieve some organisational and 
political successes towards the end of World War II. At the 1944 Congress of the 
Metalworkers' Union it led a militant opposition which went close to achieving 
majority support (Korpi, 1978). In the following year the Metalworkers' Union was 
involved in an engineering strike which ranked second only to the general strike of 
1909 in terms of duration and worker involvement. While the strike was not 
instigated by the Communist Party, the militants in the Metalworkers' Union 
nevertheless sought to use it to press their strategy of developing strike stmggles. 
The aim was to win the rank and file to the stmggle for socialism and, in the 
process, expose the shortcomings of the reformist leadership of the union 
movement, in particular its commitment to a strategy of class collaboration. 
The engineering strike of 1945 represented a significant instance in which 
the industrial peace established under Sweden's Social Democratic govemments 
was broken. The activity of a revolutionary opposition, led by the Swedish 
Communist Party, contributed to the breaking of this industrial peace. However, 
this revolutionary opposition was unable to break the reformist leadership's hold on 
the union movement and consequently unable to sustain a challenge to the union 
movement's commitment to a peaceful exchange strategy. This, in tum, reflected 
the fact that the revolutionary groups established in the Swedish union movement 
failed to develop a significant organisational base within the union movement and. 
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in particular, failed to capture and hold on to any significant leadership positions 
within the union movement (Korpi, 1978). 
Equally important for the establishment of a political exchange were the 
institutional anangements established in response to a major societal crisis which 
occuned in Sweden during the 1930s. The discussion now tums to considering how 
this crisis, and the institutional anangements which it spawned, contributed to the 
establishment of a political exchange which came to dominate bargaining under 
Sweden's Social Democratic govemments of 1932-1976. 
AN HISTORIC COMPROMISE AND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF 
CONFLICT IN SWEDEN 
The effects of depression, fascism and war in the 1930s and 1940s resulted 
in the entrenching of a new and distinctive set of institutional anangements in 
Sweden (Katzenstein, 1985). A particularly strong set of democratic corporatist 
anangements was established at the societal level. These were based on a social 
partnership developed between business and labour which resulted in the 
establishment of a multiplicity of national agreements and tripartite fomms. These 
corporatist anangements also allowed the parties to bargain over a wider variety of 
issues than had hitherto been possible. This resulted in govemment being more 
responsible for guaranteeing long term benefits to workers which consequently 
meant that they were more willing to exercise restraint in the short term. Moreover, 
a generous welfare regime based on universalist programs was also established in 
the aftermath of this societal crisis. It secured for workers a decent standard of 
living and importantly made them less reliant on the market for their income. 
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These innovations were important in creating the conditions for the 
establishment of a political exchange relationship which dominated bargaining in 
the industrial relations arena through until the 1970s. This was made possible, 
moreover, by the key contending classes in society having entered into an historic 
compromise. The discussion will now tum, first, to considering the factors present 
which contributed to the establishment of this historic compromise, and second to 
the institutional anangements established in the 1930s and 1940s in Sweden. 
Sweden's historic compromise 
In the 1930s and 1940s a new set of institutional anangements was 
established in Sweden to routinise the exchange relationship between capital and 
labour and, in so doing, create the conditions for future social peace (Katzenstein, 
1985; Korpi, 1978). A number of factors was important in enabling this to happen. 
The small size of the Swedish economy was significant. Its vulnerability to 
fluctuations in the supranational capitalist economic order and, in particular, the 
increasing liberalisation of the intemational economy, brought contending parties 
together (Katzenstein, 1985). These parties' willingness to enter into a compromise 
was also partly the result of "the tense intemational situation in the late 1930s and 
the dangers of rising fascism within the country" (Korpi and Shalev, 1979:173). In 
short, while vulnerability to the supranational economy was of key importance, the 
very real threat of political instability also encouraged the parties to enter into a 
compromise. 
Another important contributing factor was the political and industrial 
strength of the Swedish labour movement. During the 1920s, the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party had periodically been elected to govemment. These were 
104 
shortlived minority govemments, although they pointed to the growing political 
influence of the Social Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the Swedish Social 
Democrats' election victory in 1932 marked the beginning of 44 years of 
unintemipted mle. This points to the considerable strength of the Swedish labour 
movement. During this period the Social Democratic Party was able to entrench 
itself as the dominant political force in society. 
The previous section considered in detail how an organisationally unified 
union movement had developed and how it contributed to the overall strength of 
the labour movement. The strength of the labour movement was matched by an 
equally strong commitment to reformism. In the following section, the firm 
commitment of both the political and industrial wings of the labour movement to 
reformist policies is discussed in detail. A strongly reformist labour movement had 
emerged. This helped contribute to the establishment of a compromise between the 
key actors in society. Divisions within the ranks of the mling interests in society 
further assisted the establishment of a compromise. 
Sweden's multinational, export-oriented firms were firmly committed to 
laissez-faire, anti-union policies. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s they continued 
to lend support to Sweden's bourgeois parties in their fight against the Social 
Democrats (Korpi, 1978). However, they were not supported in this militant fight 
by employers who focused on the home market and who were also the leaders of 
the main employer organisation in Sweden, the SAF. 
Employers in the home market industries believed that, since the Social 
Democrats dominated govemment, the wisest course was one in which industry 
groups maintained their political neutrality. Furthermore, during the 1930s the 
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Social Democrats secured the support of the small propertied agrarian interests 
which hitherto had been supporters of the bourgeois parties. This further 
emphasised the considerable divisions within the dominant mling class interests. 
In short, then, there existed in Sweden several factors which were necessary 
for the establishment of an historic compromise between the contending classes in 
society. These include economic vulnerability and political precariousness, 
divisions within the ranks of business, considerable working class strength and a 
commitment on the part of the labour movement to reformist politics. 
The establishment of an historic compromise may not necessarily herald the 
establishment of institutional anangements which contribute to the creation of 
political exchange relationships that dominate industrial relations. However, the 
historic compromise reached between the major contending classes in Sweden 
during the 1930s and 1940s did result in such an outcome. The following sections 
explain how Sweden's historic compromise resulted in the establishment of 
corporatist institutions and a welfare regime that contributed to the establishment of 
bargaining anangements dominated by a political exchange relationship. 
A democratic corporatism 
The economic crisis of the 1930s prompted labour and capital to enter into 
a social partnership that was embodied in the Saltsjobaden Agreement of 1938. 
Sweden's peak employer body, the SAF and peak blue collar union body, the LO, 
were the two signatories of an agreement which was to ensure that wage policy be 
kept in line with "the economic goals of full employment, rapid economic growth, 
reasonable price stability, more equal income distribution, and foreign payments 
balance" (Peterson, 1987:31). 
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In short, it represented a willingness on the part of major interests groups to 
subordinate their own short term special interests to a longer term collective 
rationality. The Saltsjobaden Agreement marked the beginning of an era in which 
the key contending actors in Swedish society reached a series of negotiated 
compromises which contributed, in tum, to the establishment of a political 
exchange relationship. 
The establishment of a variety of agreements and tripartite bodies in the 
1940s and 1950s further strengthened this process. In the 1940s these included the 
Industrial Welfare Agreement of 1942, the Vocational Training Apprentices 
Agreement of 1947, and the Time and Motion Studies Agreement of 1948 
(Hammarstrom, 1993). In the 1950s the process of wage negotiation was 
institutionalised through central wage negotiations. Central agreements became the 
norm between 1956 and 1982: 
Such central agreements include a peace obligation, whereby the 
employers agree to increase economic rewards in exchange for a 
guaranteed period of labour peace. Once an agreement is ratified, the 
detailed applications are worked out through industry-wide and local 
agreements. Any disputes must be refened to the central rather than 
settled by industrial action (Hammarstrom, 1993:205). 
The plethora of tripartite fomms and a bipartite incomes policy agreement were 
reached between the peak organisations of business and labour. These emphasised 
how the corporatist arrangements established at the societal level in Sweden in the 
1930s and 1940s led to the development of a bargaining system characterised by 
the reaching of negotiated compromises in the political arena. 
The democratic corporatist stmctures established from the 1930s onwards 
also resulted in a much larger range of issues becoming the subject of negotiation 
between capital and labour than hitherto had been possible. A much broader range 
107 
of issues was subject to the process of bargaining in Sweden than in Australia, for 
instance, where corporatist arrangements were established at the sectoral or industry 
level. The corporatist anangements established at the societal level contributed to 
the development of policies concemed with active intervention to promote 
industrial restmcturing, active labour market policies and generous income 
maintenance programmes for all citizens (Castles, 1988; Katzenstein, 1985). This 
resulted in govemment being more responsible for the securing of various benefits 
for the key actors in society. In particular, these corporatist arrangements 
guaranteed workers and their unions the sorts of rewards that made them willing to 
exercise restraint in the short term in the industrial relations arena. Furthermore, the 
broad range of policies contributed to the establishment of a dynamic growth 
oriented economy which, through a decommodifying and universalist welfare 
regime, was able to secure for workers generous outcomes. These, in tum, 
contributed to their willingness to commit themselves to a long term strategy of 
exchange. This welfare regime will now be considered. 
A generous universalist welfare regime 
When Sweden's Social Democratic Party came to power in the 1930s, social 
policy was "exceptionally retarded" (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984:185). 
However, the crises of the 1930s and 1940s made possible the establishment of a 
new welfare regime in Sweden. The working class played an important role in 
shaping this new regime. The Social Democrats' ability to mould the process of 
social policy was made easier because it did not have to contend with "a strong 
bourgeois legacy in social policy" and thus did not have to "clash with historically 
institutionalised interests" (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984:186). 
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Sweden's Social Democratic Party built a welfare regime which resulted in 
an increasingly large part of the worker's income being determined in the political 
arena rather than in the marketplace. This, in tum, reflected the fact that during the 
period from the 1930s to the 1950s Sweden's Social Democratic Party was at the 
forefront of the westem labour movement's move to embrace a "universalist 
solidarity in socialist social policy" (Esping-Andersen, 1990:46). A variety of 
welfare programs was established which were underpinned by this newly emerging 
universalist solidarity. This led, in tum, to the emancipation of workers from their 
former dependency on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990). 
One of the most important of the various welfare programs introduced by 
Sweden's Social Democratic govemments was the active labour market policy 
established in the 1950s. It contributed to the decommodification of labour and 
thus, in tum, reflected the universal character of these programs. They aimed to 
shift the labour force into more productive sectors while protecting individuals 
from the consequences of such restmcturing (e.g. by retraining programmes and 
dislocation allowances). Three major programs were established to deal with the 
employment-unemployment issue: 
First, it sponsors educational and training programs for those 
workers willing and capable of retraining, and it helps transfer these 
workers to new jobs. During retraining, workers are paid almost the 
same salary as in previous employment. Second, it helps provide 
sheltered employment (in the public sector, for example) for those 
workers who are hard to employ or re-educate; older workers in 
particular. Third, the AMS (Labour Market Board) includes a large 
programme dedicated to the rehabilitation of workers, such as the 
partially disabled, for certain kinds of sheltered employment (Regini 
and Esping-Andersen, 1980:112-113). 
This active labour market policy was successful in partly helping obviate the 
unions' need to protect workers' interests through direct industrial action; a course 
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which trade unions have had little choice but to follow in many countries where 
major firms or industries close down. 
In short, the development of a universalist welfare regime ensured that the 
income of workers was increasingly determined through political processes. The 
welfare regime which was established also resulted in workers securing generous 
material benefits. When the Swedish Social Democratic Party came to power in the 
1930s "social expenditure levels fell below most Westem countries" (Esping-
Andersen and Korpi, 1984:185), but by 1970, Sweden along with the other 
Scandinavian countries, led the West in terms of total social security expenditure. 
This dramatic change resulted in the elimination of the poverty which had been 
present in Swedish society before the Social Democrats came to power in the 
1930s. 
The generation of a dynamic growth oriented economy in the post-World 
War II era in Sweden was of key importance in making possible the elimination of 
poverty. There were a number of factors which contributed to Sweden's strong 
economic performance during this period. The complex of policy and institutional 
anangements established in response to economic and social crises in the 1930s 
and 1940s was of particular importance (Katzenstein, 1985). Sweden, along with 
six other north European countries, (Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Austria and Switzerland) developed an economic development strategy based on 
flexible adjustment to changes in the intemational economic order. This was to 
enhance Sweden's economic performance during the period under consideration 
(Katzenstein, 1985). Furthermore, Sweden's Social Democratic governments' 
reformist economic growth strategy, which is discussed in the next section, also 
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contributed to such an outcome. Finally, the state of the international capitalist 
economy in the 1950s and 1960s also contributed to the establishment of a 
generous welfare system (Shadur, 1984). 
The dramatic changes in income level and consequent improvement in 
standard of living experienced in Sweden during the period under consideration 
further contributed to the unions' willingness to renounce the strike in favour of a 
political exchange strategy. But the generosity of some of the welfare programs 
meant that they were sometimes strongly opposed by business interests. Despite 
business's opposition to some of the welfare measures introduced, Sweden's Social 
Democratic governments were committed to a reformist economic growth strategy 
which contributed to the creation of a more efficient and productive economy. This 
was generally to ensure that employers were assured of significant material 
benefits. This also helped ensure that throughout most of the period under 
consideration (the main exception being during the second half of the 1940s) 
business did not seek to destabilise the political exchange established between 
govemment and the unions. The nature of the economic policies is now considered, 
this represents the last of the three factors central to this thesis. 
THE ECONOMIC POLICIES IMPLEMENTED BY SWEDEN'S SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS (1932-1976) 
The program of reform implemented by Sweden's Social Democrats and 
other Scandinavian labour movements when in office (see Esping-Andersen, 1985) 
differed in important respects from those implemented by labour govemments in 
other modem industrial countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Britain. The 
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Swedish Social Democratic Party contended that the socialist objective could be 
best achieved through a strategy aimed at making the economy mn more efficiently 
rather than by the nationalisation of the means of production. This focus, in tum, 
resulted in the implementation of a set of policies that benefited both business and 
the unions and thus contributed to the establishment of a political exchange that 
dominated industrial relations. 
Sweden's Social Democrats set about entrenching a program based on these 
principles during the 1930s and the Second World War. However, their pursuit of a 
labour reformist program aimed at a more radical redistribution of the fmits of 
production in the post-World War II era, antagonised business interests. 
Consequently businesses were to launch a major counter offensive that threatened 
the political exchange relationship established between govemment and the unions. 
However, the Swedish trade union movement had developed its own political 
capacity and, more specifically, had adopted a production policy which contributed 
to the development of its own distinctive economic growth program - one it was to 
force on successive Social Democratic govemments during the 1950s and 1960s. 
This action on the part of the unions helped ensure that the political exchange 
relationship established in the 1930s was not destabilised. The discussion begins by 
examining the origins of the Swedish Social Democrats' economic growth strategy. 
The development of a labour reformist economic growth strategy 
In common with other labour parties, Sweden's Social Democratic Party 
initially adopted a program which emphasised the need to nationalise the means of 
production (Higgins, 1985b; Tilton, 1990). The implementation of such a program 
would have created the conditions for a negative sum type conflict with business 
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and this would therefore have undermined the Swedish Social Democratic 
govemments' capacity to preside over the establishment of a system of political 
exchange. 
However, this commitment to a program of large scale nationalisation was 
revised in the 1920s and early 1930s (Korpi, 1978; Pontusson, 1987; Tilton, 1990). 
There were a number of reasons for this. Political difficulties associated with 
proposals for socialisation were partly responsible (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 
1978; Tilton, 1990). The Social Democratic Party's defeat in the 1928 election, 
despite being in a strong position electorally, rested in no small part on the 
bourgeois parties' ability to raise the socialist spectre effectively. Political 
difficulties associated with some very modest attempts at socialisation in the early 
to mid 1930s further demonstrated the political risks associated with this type of 
action (Korpi, 1978; Tilton, 1990). 
Moreover, during the 1920s many of Sweden's leading socialist theorists 
came to question the proposition that it was the socialisation of the means of 
production which was the remedy for all the problems of capitalist production 
(Esping-Andersen, 1985; Higgins, 1985b; Korpi, 1978; Tilton, 1990). The result 
was the development of a new socialist economic strategy during the 1920s. This 
stressed that socialisation was only one instmment among many for the socialist 
transformation (Tilton, 1990). The leading party theoretician of the time, Emst 
Wigforss, argued that: 
in lieu of (or as a prelude to) socialisation - an ambiguity that may 
have been intentional - Social Democrats should propose a series of 
measures that would quietly but steadily erode capitalist domination 
of the economy (Tilton, 1990:60). 
113 
In short, Wigforss contended that "a gradual paring away of capitalist prerogatives, 
a creeping socialisation, should be pursued; for it was not formal rights of 
ownership, but actual power to control, that was decisive" (Tilton, 1990:60). 
Korpi (1978) explains this situation in the following way: 
The key to the new strategy was the use of public power, founded in 
organisational resources and exercised through the govemment, to 
encroach upon the power of capital. Through economic policies the 
business cycles would be evened out. The level of employment, of 
cmcial importance for the welfare of the working class, would be 
kept high through political means, and thereby partly withdrawn 
from the control of capital. State intervention would be used to 
induce stmctural changes in the economy in order to increase its 
efficiency (Korpi, 1978:82). 
The result was the development of an economic growth strategy which aimed: 
to increase the total national product so that a 'zero-sum' type of 
conflict between labour and capital could be turned into a 'positive-
sum' type conflict: both parties could thereby profit from the 
increase in the national product, even if their relative shares were not 
substantially changed (Korpi, 1978:83). 
While Sweden's Social Democratic govemments were guided by these principles, 
the implementation of such a strategy was not straightforward or easy. 
Implementation of a labour reformist economic growth strategy 
When first elected to office in 1932 Sweden's Social Democrats focused on 
the implementation of a crisis package that included government-sponsored public 
works, welfare reforms and the provision of public relief. "The program called for 
a budget deficit rather than increased taxation to cover additional public spending" 
(Esping Andersen, 1985:203). At the same time, however, the economic policy 
program which they implemented was strongly influenced by the principles 
outlined above, ft "contained no socialisation measures" (Esping Andersen, 
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1985:203) and emphasised its new commitment to "social intervention in economic 
life" (Higgins, 1985b:222). 
In the late 1930s, as the economic crisis associated with the depression 
began to fade, the Social Democratic Government was to focus more of its energies 
on the development and implementation of an economic growth strategy. In 1938 
the Govemment introduced a package of measures aimed at stimulating investment 
and involved "tax incentives and tax reductions highly favourable to profitable 
companies" (Fulcher, 1987:236). These new policy measures reflected a belief that 
the organised working class and private capitalists "should co-operate to achieve 
their common interest - increased efficiency in production" (Tilton, 1990:47). 
Indeed, Finance Minister Wigforss "proposed detailed discussion between 
govemment and business on methods for increasing capital formation, exploiting 
natural resources and new technology, promoting exports, and avoiding recessions" 
(Tilton, 1990:47). 
These policies were based on a new direction which emphasised 
the state's responsibility to promote economic efficiency, to make the 
economy mn "at full bore" in order to minimise unemployment and 
maximise social wealth. This new central goal of economic policy 
amounted to a rejection of express goals of laissez-faire 
management, sound finance, and "saving" at the expense of 
government spending and working class living standards (Higgins, 
1985b:228). 
However, the economic and social policies which Sweden's Social Democrats 
sought to implement in the immediate post-World War II period were to depart 
from these principles. In doing so, the political exchange relationship that had been 
established in the 1930s was subjected to a process of destabilisation. 
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Working class offensive and capitalist counter-offensive 
In 1944 the labour movement adopted an action-program for the coming 
post-war period. This represented "a continuation of the policies of the 1930s but 
on a higher level" (Korpi, 1978:87) and was based on World War II experiences. 
According to the Social Democrats, these experiences had demonstrated "that much 
higher levels of taxation were feasible and that economic planning could be 
effective" (Tilton, 1990:48). The efficiency of the economy was to be enhanced 
through stmctural changes and government intervention. While a set of 
comprehensive tax reforms was introduced which increased the progressivity of 
income taxation and substantially increased company tax, as well as wealth and 
inheritance taxes. These increases were to pay for a massive increase in spending 
on various welfare measures including pensions, health and housing allowances 
(Korpi, 1978). 
This program represented a significant attack on business interests which in 
tum were to launch a major counter-offensive which was known as the "movement 
against planning" (Higgins, 1985b). Business interests launched a "propaganda 
campaign along pure laissez-faire lines which condemned planning, and indeed 
much more modest initiatives, as the thin end of the totalitarian wedge" (Higgins, 
1985b:234). 
This counter-offensive did not succeed in its chief objective: the defeat of 
the Social Democrats at the 1948 election. Nevertheless, it did arouse violent anti-
socialist feelings that weakened "the political support for the Social Democratic 
Party, placing it in a defensive position" (Korpi, 1978:87). This, along with 
economic instability (Higgins and Apple, 1983; Korpi, 1978; Tilton, 1990), led the 
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Social Democrats to tum to the unions for concessions. Specifically, they sought 
union support for an effective wage freeze in 1948 and 1949, with union support 
being forthcoming. The requirement that the unions exercise some restraint did 
bring disharmony between the political and industrial wings of the labour 
movement, particularly as it came at a time when other social groups in society 
were benefiting from steep rises in prices and increasing profits. The fact that 
leading liberal politicians and economists were also arguing that "the goal of 
economic stability should be given a higher priority at the expense of full 
employment" (Korpi, 1978:87) further heightened the tensions in party union 
relations. 
It is possible that this disharmony could have led to the disintegration of the 
political exchange relationship established in the 1930s and during World War II. 
However, the unions' response was to advocate actions which averted such an 
outcome. In short, they proffered an anti-inflationary policy which "rejected both 
bare wage restraint and bourgeois attempts to 'redefine' full employment" (Higgins, 
1985b:236) and instead, "sought a solution in disciplining investment in the 
interests of higher productivity" (Higgins, 1985b:236). The union movement's 
economic policy encouraged a process of economic development that secured 
material benefits to both employers and unions, and thus contributed to the 
persistence of a political exchange relationship which had been temporarily 
threatened during the late 1940s. 
The discussion now considers why the unions were able to develop such an 
economic program and then outlines the key elements of the program. 
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Political unionism and an alternative reform program 
In the late 1940s the LO developed an economic program which "sought to 
close the inflation gap between supply and demand in a full employment economy 
by increasing supply, rather than by decreasing demand through an attack on 
working-class incomes" (Higgins, 1985b:236). 
This program was developed by two economists employed by the LO, 
Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. The Rehn-Meidner model, as it became known, 
was endorsed by an LO Congress of 1951 and was based on some of the key 
themes adopted by earlier LO congresses. These were the unions' commitment to a 
production policy and demand for a solidarity wage policy (Higgins and Apple, 
1983, Higgins, 1985a). 
The need for a wages policy based on solidarity was first raised at an LO 
Congress held in 1922. It was argued that there was 
a marked lack of socialist spirit in the movement's bargaining 
practices, which in effect exacerbated differences between skilled 
and unskilled workers, and between workers in export industries and 
their counterparts in home market industries (Higgins, 1985a:366). 
The LO Congress held in 1926 acknowledged that low wages were not merely a 
problem of distribution, but were also influenced by the level of productivity and 
industrial efficiency. This acknowledgment resulted in the trade unions adopting a 
production policy. 
These two strands of union policy contributed to the development of an 
economic policy which created conditions for a more efficient and productive 
economy. At the same time it ensured a fair outcome to labour and contributed to 
the development of a positive sum type outcome which allowed the key actors in 
society to commit themselves to a political exchange. 
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The Rein-Meidner policy model, which was influenced by these two 
strands of union policy, contended that full employment could not be achieved 
through general methods of monetary or fiscal policy. Instead, there was the 
realisation of a need to develop more selective measures. Three intenelated 
elements were proposed. First, there was an active labour market policy which 
included employment and mobility measures aimed at ensuring full employment, 
while at the same time accelerating stmctural change and productivity increases. 
Second, price increases were to be limited through increases in indirect taxation. 
Third, a solidaristic wages policy was adopted which stressed equal pay for equal 
work and "rejected the market principle of a firm's capacity to pay in favour of a 
high wage policy favouring the low paid" (Higgins and Apple, 1983:614). The 
combined effect of the solidaristic wages policy and active labour policy was the 
reinforcing of market pressures for enhanced economic efficiency. 
It was not until the late 1950s that the Social Democrats were to implement 
elements of the Rein-Meidner model: 
It took three substantial failures in 1948, 1951, and 1955 to shake 
the Social Democrats' faith in the efficacy of appealing to trade 
union moderation as the key to obtaining anti-inflationary wage 
settlements (Tilton, 1990:204-205). 
Moreover, employer opposition to wage equalisation ensured that major advances 
in this area did not occur until the 1960s. The Social Democrats' coalition partner 
until 1957, the Agrarians, opposed an active labour market policy. This meant that 
this initiative was not to expand significantly until 1957-1958 (Higgins and Apple, 
1983). Although implemented only gradually, this economic policy contributed to 
the creation of the conditions for a positive sum type outcome and the continuation 
of the political exchange that dominated bargaining anangements. 
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The Swedish union movement's capacity to develop policy programs which 
contributed to the development of a positive sum type outcome in the 1950s and 
1960s distinguished it from the majority of union movements in modern industrial 
countries. Most have failed to develop policies which have contributed to a positive 
sum type outcome in such situations. Instead, when confronted with a labour 
govemment implementing economic policies which represent an attack on working 
class living standards, unions have responded in one of two ways. They have either 
sought to defend the record of labour governments on the basis that they are better 
than conservative govemments, or they have pursued their interests via direct 
industrial action. 
The Swedish union movement pursued an alternative course of action. It 
proffered an economic growth program which created the conditions for a positive 
sum type outcome where, hopefully, everyone benefited and therefore contributed 
to the maintenance of political exchange relationships which dominated bargaining 
in the industrial relations arena. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate how the political exchange 
relationship that dominated industrial relations under Sweden's Social Democratic 
govemments between 1932 and 1976 was the result of the factors outlined in 
Chapter 3. Firstly, Sweden's trade unions were dominated by one strong union 
federation and they were also firmly committed to a reformist strategy. These 
factors allowed the unions to effectively commit themselves to a peaceful exchange 
strategy. This organisational and political character was a critical predisposing 
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factor for a system of political exchange emerging. Secondly, the democratic 
corporatist institutions established at the societal level and the generous highly 
decommodifying universal welfare programs which were established as a result of 
the historic compromise reached between capital and labour in the 1930s and 
1940s, encouraged the key actors to engage in a process of negotiated compromise 
in the political arena. It also resulted in govemment guaranteeing to workers the 
sorts of material benefits that secured their commitment to a long term strategy of 
exchange. Finally, the economic programs implemented by Sweden's Social 
Democratic governments were to materially benefit the key actors (labour and 
capital) and thus also contributed to the establishment of a stable political exchange 
relationship that dominated bargaining. 
The following three chapters will consider the three factors outlined in 
Chapter 3 (and used in this chapter to explain why political exchange relationships 
were established under Sweden's Social Democratic govemments) to explain why 
they were not established under the Queensland Labor govemments of 1915-1929 
and 1932-1957. The organisational and political character of the trade unions are 
first considered. The institutional anangements established as a result of an historic 
compromise and the economic policy programs implemented by Queensland Labor 
govemments are then discussed. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE ORGANISATIONAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTER 
OF QUEENSLAND TRADE UNIONS 
The South Johnstone strike of 1927 was one of the most bitter industrial 
conflicts to involve Queensland's trade union movement and a Labor govemment. 
In the strike's aftermath, those unionists committed to a reformist labourism argued 
that the organisational disunity of the union movement and, in particular, the 
absence of a strong central union organisation, had allowed a militant minority to 
draw the union movement into wasteful industrial conflict. They maintained that if 
such a situation was to be avoided in the future a strong central union organisation, 
namely a "Council of Control", needed to be established (ALP, 1928:36-47). 
However, the South Johnstone strike did not prove to be the catalyst for major 
change in the organisational character of the Queensland union movement. In 
particular, it did not lead to the establishment of a strong federation dominated by 
unionists committed to a labour reformist politics. Consequently, the Queensland 
union movement was unable to commit itself to a long-term strategy of exchange 
with Queensland Labor govemments. 
The organisational disunity of the Queensland trade union movement 
evident in 1927 was largely the result of an organisational character which emerged 
between the 1880s and 1920s. During this period much emphasis was placed on the 
need to establish a strong and inclusive form of central trade union organisation. 
Two attempts to establish such an organisation were the Australian Labour 
Federation (ALF) and One Big Union (OBU). However, both the ALF and OBU 
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failed to survive beyond their formative stages. Instead, it was the Brisbane (and 
later, Queensland) Trades and Labor Council (TLC) which was to emerge and 
survive as the central voice of unionism in Queensland (see Armstrong, 1975; 
Sullivan, 1973). The TLC was a loosely organised co-ordinating body which gave 
its affiliates maximum autonomy. Consequently, it was unable to resist its union 
affiliates' demands to obtain immediate improvements in wages and conditions 
through various means including industrial action. 
The union movement's inability to commit itself to a political exchange was 
attributable to a number of factors including the early and strong influence of craft 
unionism, regional divisions in Queensland and the establishment of a system of 
compulsory arbitration that represented a sectoral or industry based system of 
corporatism. Finally, the Brisbane TLC's capacity to act as the central voice of 
unionism was weakened by growing political divisions between the militants and 
moderate labourists in the union movement. These divisions led the largest union in 
the State, the Australian Workers' Union (AWU), which represented approximately 
one third of the State's unionists, to disaffiliate from the Brisbane TLC in 1939. 
Paralleling the efforts to establish a central organisation of trade unions, a 
revolutionary opposition emerged in the trade unions in the period from World 
War I to the immediate post-World War II era. Whereas the revolutionary 
opposition which developed in the Swedish unions was weak and ineffectual, the 
revolutionary opposition which developed in the Queensland union movement was 
strong and exercised considerable influence, ft was based on a syndicalist militancy 
in the north of the State and in the State's second largest and most powerful union, 
the Australian Railways Union (ARU), during the first period of unintermpted 
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Labor mle (1915-1929). The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) also exercised 
considerable influence through its leadership of the Queensland TLC in the second 
half of the 1940s. The influence of this revolutionary opposition within the unions 
contributed to the persistence of industrial conflict under Queensland Labor 
govemments. 
THE QUEENSLAND UNION MOVEMENT'S ORGANISATIONAL 
CHARACTER 
Experiments at closer unity 
In common with other trade union movements, such as those in Sweden and 
Britain (see Fulcher, 1988), the Australian union movement sought to develop 
greater organisational cohesion during its formative stages (Gollan, 1960). In the 
1880s the union movement in each of Australia's six colonies first began to 
consider proposals to establish a strong federation similar to Sweden's LO. An 
Intercolonial Trade Union Congress (ITUC) held in 1888 decided that a plan to 
federate all unions throughout the country should be drawn up along the lines 
enunciated by unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers (Gollan, 1960). These 
unions favoured inclusive forms of organisation based upon a highly centralised 
stmcture. This would give the central body far greater control over its affiliates, 
particularly in relation to industrial action, than the more loosely stmctured trades 
and labour councils which were favoured by the craft unions (Sullivan, 1973). This 
preference reflected the fact that for unskilled workers, "competition could only 
come from the unorganised, and strength would derive from the size and 
completeness of the unions" (Gollan, 1960:102). The unions of unskilled and semi-
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skilled workers were fired by the belief that there was a need for class rather than 
craft organisation if workers' interests were to be successfully advanced (Sullivan, 
1973). 
The result was a proposal to establish an Australian Labour Federation: 
The constitution of the Australian Labour Federation provided for a 
greater degree of unity of the trade union movement than had ever 
existed in any country. It was to include all unions, organised in a 
pyramidal stmcture, govemed by district, provincial and national 
councils. A degree of autonomy was to be retained by the 
constituent union, but decisions on all major issues were to be taken 
by the higher committees of the federation. Strikes, for example, 
were to be decided upon by the relevant committee, which would 
seek the opinion of the members in a district or province (Gollan, 
1960:107). 
The idea of an ALF was endorsed by an ITUC Congress held in 1891. However 
the establishment of such a federation was not effected at the national level nor in 
most colonies. This was primarily because of the opposition of craft unions. They 
were concemed that such a federation would give the constituent unions 
insufficient autonomy (Gollan, 1960). Thus, in most colonies, attempts to establish 
a class-based form of organisation were effectively stymied from the beginning by 
an already well established craft unionism opposed to proposals that would lessen 
their autonomy. The one exception was the position adopted by craft unionists in 
Queensland. 
The skilled craft unions which dominated the Brisbane TLC agreed to 
disband in favour of the idea of establishing a stronger and more inclusive 
organisation which would bring all workers together into one industrial 
organisation, the ALF. The willingness of the traditionally conservative craft unions 
in Brisbane to pursue this course of action reflected the unusual circumstances 
sunounding the labour surge of 1889 to 1890. First, unions in Queensland were 
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relatively new compared with the colonies of Victoria and New South Wales. 
Second, the conservative craft unions did not occupy a dominant position in the 
Queensland union movement because of the considerable importance of farming, 
grazing, mining and transport which employed predominantly semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour (Sullivan, 1973). 
The Queensland ALF was the sort of central organisation which would have 
assisted in making possible the union movement's commitment to a long term 
strategy of political exchange. However, it failed to fully establish itself and 
survived only until the beginning of 1914. It was only for two brief periods 
between 1890-1891 and 1911-1913 that the ALF was able to bring together "in 
the one organisation a significant number of the mainly urban craft unions with the 
mass unions of unskilled workers based largely in the inland and northem areas of 
Queensland" (Sullivan, 1973:270). Furthermore, in retaining union support, the 
ALF found it necessary to water down its original proposal for a strongly 
centralised union stmcture. Within a year of its inception, the original stmcture ( a 
highly centralised body with strong executive power) had been replaced by a 
geographically decentralised federation based on the autonomy of constituent 
unions. 
The ALF, then, failed in "its key mission of centralising trade union power 
and resources" (Sullivan, 1973:424). However, the unions of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers which had sought to establish the ALF, did not abandon their quest 
to establish a strong central union body. In the period from World War I to the 
early 1920s the unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers were to support the 
need for the amalgamation of all unions into the OBU, so that all unions could act 
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through one central union body (see the Worker, 21/10/1915, 23/1/1919, 26/1/1922, 
9/3/1922). In contrast, the majority of craft unions were opposed to the OBU and 
their opposition to the concept was to help undermine attempts to establish such an 
organisation. The divisions which began to emerge among those unions 
representing the unskilled and semi-skilled who worked in the mral and transport 
industries were of equal importance in undermining the proposal. These unions 
were all strong supporters of the OBU concept, but were unable to reach agreement 
on the most appropriate stmcture and policies for the OBU. These disagreements, 
in tum, reflected the development of major political divisions in the union 
movement at this juncture (see Childe, 1964; Tumer, 1965; Armstrong, 1975). 
Although the AWU strongly supported the concept of the OBU it was 
opposed to the attempt by other unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to 
establish the OBU on the basis of the principles enunciated by the Intemational 
Workers of the World (IWW). Whereas the IWW had a policy of encouraging 
direct action, the AWU had a policy of political action (i.e. action directed towards 
the election of and support for Labor govemments) and compulsory arbitration for 
a long time. The AWU argued that its policies were most suited to the needs and 
circumstances of Australian unionism (see the Worker, 15/5/1919, editorial). The 
growing political schism between the moderate labour reformist AWU and other 
more militant unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers such as the ARU and 
the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (AMIEU) caused the proposal to 
establish the OBU to founder. 
Consequently, the Brisbane TLC was re-established for the third time in 
1922 with the support of the craft unions and the unions of unskilled and semi-
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skilled workers. Its re-establishment marked the end of an era during which the 
unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers had attempted to establish a strong 
federation which would have dominated an integrated union movement. Instead, a 
complex and fractured union movement developed. A craft/industrial/general union 
stmcture emerged, while individual unions were organised into state-wide or 
nation-wide federations or amalgamations of kindred unions. Further, at the inter-
union level the dominant form of inter-union organisation was TLCs. TLCs were 
established in numerous regional centres throughout Queensland as well as the 
State's capital, Brisbane. Moreover, as already noted, these TLCs were established 
as loosely organised co-ordinating bodies which gave their affiliates maximum 
autonomy. Consequently, the union movement failed to develop the sort of 
organisational form which would have allowed it to commit itself to a long term 
strategy of exchange. The discussion now tums to consider some of the factors 
which were critical in hindering the establishment of an organisationally unified 
union movement dominated by a strong federation. The discussion first considers 
the impact of craft unionism on the Queensland labour movement. 
Craft unionism: implications for union organisation 
The first unions formed in colonial Australia were organised in the various 
capital cities and major provincial centres along craft or occupational lines. 
Queensland unionism was initially confined to small groups of skilled workers 
which were located in the colonial capital of Brisbane and in the nearby town of 
Ipswich (Leggatt, 1983). 
The early domination of craft and occupational unionism meant that their 
prefened form of central co-ordination (a loosely stmctured TLC allowing 
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maximum autonomy on the part of affiliates and a minimum of central control) 
was established between 1871 and 1885 in the metropolitan centres of five of the 
six colonies (the one exception being Westem Australia) (Pilkinton, 1983). As 
already mentioned a TLC was established in Queensland's colonial capital, 
Brisbane, in 1885. TLCs were therefore established in most colonies prior to the 
formation of the unskilled and semi-skilled unions which were to seek to establish 
a stronger more inclusive form of organisation based on the ALF. 
Craft unionists' preference for TLCs reflected the fact that the winning of 
improved wages and working conditions was based largely on the monopoly which 
craft unionists exercised over certain skills. This meant that they did not need to 
establish the sort of organisational unity required by semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. The union movements often pressed a collective viewpoint on a variety of 
broader industrial, economic and social issues which went beyond the special 
interests of trade. Consequently, craft unionists acknowledged that unions needed to 
establish a centre which could speak on behalf of all unions. For instance, the craft 
unions' adoption of a common policy, that of an eight hour day, united disparate 
unions that "hitherto had been sectional, separatist and intensely jealous of their 
individual independence" (Leggatt, 1983:6). 
This had resulted in the establishment of the Brisbane Trades Hall in 1873 
and in 1885 the Brisbane TLC which adopted the following objectives: the 
settlement of strikes by arbitration; the securing of an eight hour day; and obtaining 
an equitable share in representation in the colony (Sullivan, 1973). 
The Brisbane TLCs disbandment in 1889 led to three decades of 
experimentation with different forms of union co-ordination. The craft unions were 
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involved in this experimentation although they continued to favour a loosely 
stmctured TLC. Indeed, with the onset of industrial strife in the early 1890s, these 
unions quickly retreated from their involvement in the ALF and "into the mould of 
traditional craft unionism, being conservative, cautious and primarily concemed 
with the protection of "trade" interests" (Sullivan, 1973:175). This withdrawal was 
in part "a reaction against what was seen as the ALF's industrial militancy and 
unwise involvement in politics" (Sullivan, 1973:240). 
When the urban craft unions recovered from the effects of the industrial and 
economic upheavals of the 1890s, they prefened to re-establish the Brisbane TLC. 
This was done in 1904 only to see it disbanded again in 1910 to become the 
Metropolitan District Council (part of the ALF). However, with the disbandment of 
the ALF in 1914 many of the craft unions moved to link up with nation-wide craft 
associations. Moreover: 
once linked inter-state and receiving the improved benefits of 
nationwide organisation ... while at the same time enjoying a large 
amount of autonomy, many unions were not enticed into state-wide 
federations such as the ALF or amalgamations with the AWU or 
other centrally controlled unions (Armstrong, 1975:151). 
Instead, they prefened to establish a loosely stmctured co-ordinating body. The 
Brisbane TLC was consequently re-established for a third time in 1922 and 
"became accepted by an increasing number of unions as the central voice and 
organising agency for the Queensland industrial movement" (Armstrong, 1975:253). 
The Brisbane TLC's third re-establishment marked the end of an era during 
which the unions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers had attempted to establish 
a strong central union which would have dominated the union movement. The 
failure to do this through the ALF was in part the result of the actions of the craft 
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unions. Indeed, craft unionists helped ensure that the Brisbane, and later 
Queensland, TLC was to emerge as the dominant form of inter-union organisation. 
The TLC allowed its affiliates maximum autonomy and thus was unable to exercise 
the sort of control necessary to secure its affiliates' commitment to a political 
exchange strategy. The other important factor in the ALF's demise, and the 
persistence of a fractured organisational stmcture dominated by a central union 
body that sought to loosely co-ordinate the demands of individual unions, was the 
existence of regional divisions in Queensland. These will now be considered. 
Demands for regional autonomy 
In Australia, unions originally began as regional organisations which were 
usually confined to one state, one urban centre, or one region of the state (Rimmer, 
1981). At the same time, the impact of regionalism on union organisation varied 
considerably from state to state. 
Queensland undoubtedly has been the State whose development has been 
most greatly affected by regionalism (Lewis, 1973, 1978). It originally developed 
as three distinct regions, with differences between them persisting well into the 
twentieth century (Lewis, 1973). The provincial centres of Townsville and 
Rockhampton operated as the de facto capitals in the north and centre, respectively, 
while the State's capital, Brisbane, located in the south eastem comer, acted as the 
centre for the southem part of the State. These regional divisions had significant 
implications for the organisational development of the State's union movement. 
Sullivan (1973) maintains that only six months after its formation, the ALF 
was established as a decentralised organisation based on district councils of 
affiliated unions which were scattered throughout Queensland. Thus, the strong 
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regional divisions found in Queensland hindered the ALF's successful establishment 
as a central controlling body. Indeed, it even hindered the establishment of unions 
representing a single group of workers throughout the State. Hunt (1979) states that 
the decentralised and physically disjointed stmcture of the railway system, which 
tended to mn inland from the ports of Brisbane, Rockhampton and Townsville, was 
reflected in an anomalous organisation of railway unions: there were 
initially three autonomous Queensland Railway Employee's 
Associations (QREA's) based respectively in Brisbane, Rockhampton 
and Townsville (Hunt, 1979:116). 
Many other unions in Queensland experienced a similar developmental process to 
that of the rail unions. Provincial centres such as Rockhampton and Townsville 
developed as significant union centres with their own TLCs, and the district offices 
of most state unions were affiliated to their local TLCs. Moreover, district offices 
in centres such as Rockhampton and Townsville were often more loyal to the local 
TLC, and the other local union branches, than to their state office located in 
Brisbane. Furthermore, the district offices of major unions such as the AWU and 
AMIEU were often to develop their own tactics and strategies which were not 
endorsed by the various union executives located in Brisbane (Hunt, 1979). 
The "direct action radicalism" of Queensland's northem unionists, which 
contributed significantly to the persistence of industrial conflict in the north of the 
State (especially between 1915 and 1929) highlights the implications that regional 
divisions had for union action. This will be discussed in detail in the next section 
of this chapter. 
The strength of the regional divisions had considerable implications for the 
organisational development of the State's union movement. In particular, they 
militated against the establishment of an organisationally unified movement 
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dominated by a strong federation, such as the ALF. This made it difficult for the 
union leadership to resist the rank and file's pressure to obtain more immediate 
benefits than could be secured through their commitment to a long term exchange 
strategy. 
Discussion now tums to another factor which militated against the 
development of a organisationally united movement dominated by a strong 
federation. This is the system of compulsory arbitration which developed 
throughout Australia during the two decades spanning the tum of the century. 
Compulsory arbitration: implications for union organisation 
In the 1880s, the union movement in Australia was increasingly concemed 
with developing stronger, more inclusive forms of organisation. As already 
indicated, this reflected the growing influence of the newly formed unions of semi-
skilled and unskilled workers. The establishment of the ALF in Queensland 
represented the highwater mark of this organisational trend and coincided with a 
dramatic shift in union strategies. This shift was the result of the trade union 
movement's defeat in a series of major industrial confrontations, and the onset of a 
major economic depression. 
In the face of a rapidly declining union membership and increased levels of 
unemployment, the trade union movement looked to methods other than that of 
industrial action to secure its interests. Increasingly, political action and the election 
of working class representatives to the colonial parliaments, were considered 
important. But the development of a system of compulsory arbitration administered 
by the state, and sympathetic to the interests of the worker, was also critical. 
Compulsory arbitration, established both federally and in Queensland in the period 
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prior to Worid War I, had significant implications for the organisational 
development of the union movement in Queensland. 
Compulsory arbitration limited the process of negotiation to labour market 
issues. This affected workers in particular regions, industries and occupations 
(Palmer, 1989). Unions were not forced to co-ordinate the demands of the entire 
collectivity and thus were not pressured to establish a more integrated union 
movement. This was because the arbitration system guaranteed unions their 
survival by protecting them from both inter-union competition and market 
pressures as well as by placing "artificial barriers to restrict amalgamation or other 
forms of stmctural change" (Rimmer, 1981:328). This meant compulsory arbitration 
actively militated against the development of a more co-ordinated and integrated 
union movement. It did this by ensuring that "registered unions (had) a virtual 
monopoly of organisational and bargaining rights over the field they cover" 
(Martin, 1971:170). As a consequence, this protected them from competition for 
members by new or encroaching unions. Furthermore, the arbitration "machinery 
has been established to ensure that even the weakest union may compel an 
employer to meet it on an equal footing (theoretically) before an arbitration 
tribunal" (Yerbury, 1971:124). 
The institutional bargaining stmctures which developed in Australia from 
the 1890s onwards actually helped entrench a fragmented and small scale unionism 
which had been developing prior to the 1890s (Isaac and Ford, 1971; Howard, 
1977; Rimmer, 1981; Deery and Plowman, 1980). Indeed, under the arbitration 
system the number of unions quickly grew from 198 in 1901 to 382 in 1921. In 
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short, the system lessened the unions' need to develop stronger more inclusive 
forms of organisation. For instance: 
the doctrine of comparative wage justice and the practice of flow-
ons through which tribunals have passed on gains made by one 
union almost automatically to members of another have meant that 
the less powerful sections of the union movement have not been 
greatly disadvantaged by their lack of bargaining ability (Deery and 
Plowman, 1980:211). 
The development of a system of compulsory arbitration allowed unions to pursue 
their industrial objectives without relying on the support of other sections of the 
union movement. This did not encourage the search for greater industrial unity and 
was therefore another important factor contributing to the development of an 
organisationally fractured union movement. 
Another contributing factor was the development of the powerful 
bushworkers' union, the AWU, which was to establish itself as a rival centre of 
union power to that of the Brisbane TLC. The AWU's role will now be considered. 
A powerful bushworkers' union: a competing centre of union power 
A large mral workforce engaged in primary industries remote from the 
cities and in commercial and manufacturing centres had developed in Queensland 
during the nineteenth century, as it had elsewhere in Australia (Tumer, 1965). This 
mral proletariat, along with workers in the transport industries, played a key role in 
the development of the ALF in Queensland. While they were eventually 
unsuccessful in their attempts at establishing a strong central union organisation 
capable of unifying the Queensland union movement, mral workers nevertheless 
were to succeed in establishing a powerful bushworkers' union. The amalgamation 
of the two largest mral unions in the State, the AWU and the Amalgamated 
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Workers Association in 1913, resulted in the vast majority of workers in the 
northem and westem districts of mral Queensland becoming members of one 
powerful, centrally controlled, union organisation that represented approximately 
one third of the State's unionists (see Childe, 1964; Hunt, 1979). 
Furthermore, as already explained, the AWU supported the need for the 
further amalgamation of all unions into the OBU. However, the establishment of 
the OBU foundered on the growing political division between those unions of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers such as the ARU and AMIEU (which were 
committed to a militant revolutionary political stance) and the AWU (which was 
committed to a moderate labour reformist political strategy). The AWU's firm 
commitment to these policies also was to lead eventually to its disaffiliation from 
the Brisbane TLC. 
The AWU disaffiliated from the Brisbane TLC for a brief period in the late 
1920s and again between 1939 and 1956. It did so in response to its concems 
about the way in which the TLC was being dominated increasingly by militant 
unionists who were committed to revolutionary syndicalist and communist 
ideologies which were opposed to the AWU's policies of support for arbitration and 
political action. (In a latter section of this chapter it is explained that, from the late 
1930s onwards, the leadership positions of the Brisbane TLC were to be held by 
Communist Party trade unionists.) 
As the AWU represented a third of Queensland's unionists, its decision to 
disaffiliate from the Brisbane TLC had significant ramifications for the 
organisational character of the Queensland union movement. The size of the AWU 
meant that it was able to establish itself as a rival centre of union power. 
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Consequently, its disaffiliation resulted in the entrenching of two competing centres 
of union power: the AWU and Brisbane TLC (which became the Queensland TLC 
in 1947). This in tum contributed to the development of an organisationally 
fractured union movement lacking the ability to effectively commit itself to a long 
term strategy of exchange. The discussion now considers how a militant 
revolutionary unionism further militated against the union movement being able to 
commit itself to a political exchange strategy. 
THE UNIONS' POLITICAL CHARACTER: THE IMPACT OF A MILITANT 
REVOLUTIONARY UNIONISM 
The strategies pursued by the Australian union movement in the period up 
until World War I were influenced primarily by labourism (Hagan, 1981). Central 
to the labourist approach was a belief that it was possible to bring about change 
within the existing framework of society. There was no need to develop a radical 
and coherent program which aimed to reconstmct society, nor a need to resort to 
revolutionary violence and action. Instead, the labourist tradition accepted that the 
workings of political democracy of the parliamentary variety offered a practicable 
means by which the organised working class could achieve its own aims and 
objectives. In particular, the election of labour govemments would ensure that 
workers' economic and political objectives could be achieved and, as a 
consequence, the unions could be expected to become less reliant on the strike 
weapon. 
During the first half of the twentieth century the majority of unions and 
unionists remained committed to this labourist political tradition. However, more 
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militant strategies inspired by various revolutionary ideas were able to gain a 
foothold in the period from World War I to immediately post-Worid War II. This 
militant revolutionary trade union politics developed, in part, in response to the 
shortcomings of the labourist project. 
It was during World War I that "Labour Govemments first disappointed and 
then emaged trade unionists by failing to protect wage standards and conditions of 
work from wartime pressures" (Hagan, 1981:442). 
It also was partly the result of the development of an intemational 
revolutionary workers' movement which was spuned on by the success of the 
workers' revolution that took place in Russia in 1917 (Fanell, 1981). The 
beneficiaries of this militant politics in Australia were those organisations which 
followed the revolutionary tradition; initially the IWW and then the CPA. 
In Queensland, militant unionists exercised considerable influence over the 
strategies pursued by the unions in the period from World War I to the late 1940s. 
There are three aspects of this activity which, it is argued, were important in 
militating against the union movement's ability to commit itself to a political 
exchange strategy in Queensland. 
First, the development of a 'direct action radicalism' in north Queensland 
was influenced by syndicalist and communist ideas. They contributed to the 
persistence of major industrial confrontations, particularly during Labor's first 
period of unintermpted mle from 1915 to 1929. Second, the syndicalist leadership 
of the ARU contributed to the persistence of industrial conflict during this period, 
and in particular, the breakdown of attempts to establish a political exchange with 
Labor. Finally, in the second half of the 1940s the Communist Party leadership of 
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the Queensland TLC militated against the establishment of a political exchange 
relationship with Queensland Labor. These three aspects will each be considered in 
more detail. 
A "Direct Action Radicalism" in north Queensland 
From 1915 to 1929, northem Queensland experienced major disputes in the 
railways, on the wharves, and in the meat, sugar and mining industries (Hunt, 
1979). This was due to a form of "direct action radicalism" peculiar to the north, 
and it has been argued that this represented an amalgam of two regional 
peculiarities (Bolton, 1970). First, it was because of the isolation of north 
Queensland communities both from one another and the main centres of population 
in the south, in particular, Brisbane where the leadership of the State's union 
movement was located. The associated intense local loyalties, which such distance 
and isolation bred, contributed to a self reliance and independence of spirit which 
led to a sort of "ineverent" radicalism (Moles, 1980). Second, employment in the 
north was mainly seasonal and inegular for workers in the meat, sugar and mining 
industries, while employment in transport was dependent on the seasonal nature of 
the overall economy (Hunt, 1979). Furthermore, as the workforce was 
predominantly unskilled, itinerant and often semi-nomadic it fostered a 
"conditioned recklessness" and "undisciplined vehemence" (Moles, 1980) which 
resulted in a willingness to take militant action. 
The militant direct action radicalism of workers in these industries was 
inspired by the radical ideological philosophy preached by the 'Wobbly' organisers 
of the IWW. According to the IWW the emancipation of the working class had to 
139 
be achieved through various forms of direct industrial action such as sabotage, the 
'go slow' and strikes. It was argued that the strike 
was a concrete expression of solidarity and the spirit of comradeship 
in the stmggle which it engendered, setting as it did the master class 
and the working class in opposite camps in open physical 
antagonisms, embodied and symbolised the unseen stmggle of the 
classes, promoted the class consciousness of the proletariat, and so 
promoted the revolution (Childe, 1964:139). 
While support for the IWW's direct action syndicalism tended to flourish 
"whenever and wherever economic conditions caused discontent" (Hunt, 1979:295), 
it was to achieve a substantial and consistent degree of support in the north of 
Queensland, "especially among the Townsville meatworkers and the Cloncuny 
miners" (Hunt, 1979:295). For the meatworkers and miners in the north-west 
harsh working and living conditions and a tradition of militancy 
were the context in which IWW slogans and elements of IWW 
philosophy were eagerly seized upon as auxiliary weapons in the 
battle to win higher wages and better conditions from employers 
(Hunt, 1979:296). 
The meatworkers and miners frequently resorted to go slow strikes and 
lightning stoppages. These tactics were to contribute to the persistence of strikes. 
The emphasis placed on union solidarity in industrial stmggles and the consequent 
invoking of blackbans also contributed to the persistence and, in particular, 
enlargening of industrial disputes. Union blackbans often caused the escalation of 
localised disputes into major regional and even statewide strikes that led to 
govemment intervention aimed at restoring law and order and disciplining 
unionists. The South Johnstone strike of 1927 was a prime example of the way in 
which the invoking of a blackban led to an escalation of disputes into major 
showdowns involving the State's union movement and Queensland's Labor 
Govemment (Hunt, 1983). 
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This "direct action radicalism" made it difficult for the state executives of 
unions located in Brisbane to exercise control over the industrial strategies of their 
respective union memberships. The union leadership also found it difficult to 
secure their members' support for the settling of industrial grievances through 
arbitration. For instance, the AWU which was the union most politically aligned to 
the Labor Govemment and the strongest supporter of arbitration, encountered 
difficulties when attempting to secure the commitment of its members in north 
Queensland to a peaceful exchange strategy with Labor. AWU members in the 
northem mining, pastoral and sugar industries, along with general labourers (such 
as sanitary workers), continued to engage in strike action under Labor govemments 
during World War I and throughout the 1920s. This was despite the AWU 
leadership's attempts to exorcise this militant influence (Hunt, 1979). 
The AWU leadership had to contend with a situation where its membership 
in the northem and westem regions of the State was composed of unskilled and 
itinerant workers who often expressed greater loyalty to their occupational group 
and region, rather than to their state based union. Furthermore, these workers 
remained open to the influences of the more militant tactics and ideas which, in the 
isolated and homogeneous communities of north Queensland, often seemed to offer 
the best solutions to their immediate problems (Costar, 1983; Kennedy, 1983; 
Menghetti, 1981, 1983). Thus, even in the most politically aligned and arbitration-
oriented union in the State (the AWU) a cleavage between a militant minority and 
the moderate mass emerged during Labor's early years of govemment. 
The cleavage in the AWU subsequently undermined the union leadership's 
ability to present a concerted policy of support to the Labor govemment which its 
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leaders prefened. For instance, the action of rank and file members of the AWU at 
the South Johnstone sugar strike in 1927 resulted in one of the most divisive and 
bitter industrial conflicts in the 1915 to 1929 period. This clearly demonstrates how 
the influence of a militant revolutionary politics made it difficult for the AWU 
leadership to actually insert its members in north Queensland into a long term 
strategy of exchange. 
Other unions had similar experiences to the AWU. The militant direct 
action radicalism of workers in the north of the State even created problems for 
unions such as the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) and the AMIEU which 
had a militant State leadership. The northem membership of these two unions 
sometimes disregarded the directives of the union's state or federal executives and, 
instead, pursued their own objectives, often through direct industrial action. 
For instance, strikes by waterside workers in the northem ports of Mackay 
and Townsville in 1916 and 1917 were the result of their unwillingness to accept 
national awards which interfered with local waterside customs, despite the fact that 
the national award was accepted by the federal WWF executive (Hunt, 1979:256-
259). Meatworkers in the north often took industrial action in defiance of their 
state executive which complained that such action undermined its own authority 
and, in particular, its capacity to establish a co-ordinated bargaining strategy. 
Moreover, attempts on the part of the state executive to curb the militancy of the 
northem meatworkers was difficult as militancy had gained them extra concessions 
from individual employers: 
Each capitulation and concession by the employers encouraged the 
militants to make further demands - often to the chagrin of the 
AMIEU state executive, which was concemed by the sectional 
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autonomy and contempt for union authority shown by the northem 
boards of control (Hunt, 1979:261). 
It was the militancy amongst meatworkers in the north which contributed to one of 
the major industrial disputes of the 1915 to 1929 period, the Townsville 
meatworkers strike of 1919 (Cutler, 1973; Hunt, 1979). 
The syndicalist influence in the second largest and arguably most 
industrially powerful union in the State, the ARU, was to further undermine the 
conditions for a political exchange with Labor in the 1920s. This will now be 
considered. 
The syndicalist leadership of the ARU 
Initially the railway workers and their leaders were active in labour politics 
and worked to see the election of working class representatives to parliament 
(Cribb, 1980). The ARU (then known as the Queensland Railway Employees 
Association) affiliated with the Labor Party in 1915, while in March 1916, Tim 
Moroney, (general secretary of the ARU), became the ARU's delegate to the 
Central Political Executive (CPE) of the Queensland Labor Party. 
The ARU leadership was to argue increasingly, however, that labourism 
offered little benefit to workers and that any benefits secured to workers in existing 
capitalist society could only be achieved through the mobilisation of the workers 
and the taking of direct industrial action, ft was this political outlook of the 
leadership of the ARU which was to contribute to one of the most significant 
strikes involving the govemment and unions in the period between 1915 and 1929, 
the railway strike of 1925. 
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The ideological beliefs of the leaders of the ARU, Tim Moroney and 
George Rymer (President) had a considerable impact on the union's strategy. 
Furthermore, since the ARU was a union which possessed considerable industrial 
muscle (because of the strategic importance of rail to a large and decentralised 
primary producing state such as Queensland), the ideological views of its leaders 
had considerable implications for the union movement as a whole. 
Cribb (1980) argues that their views can best be described as socialist with 
strong syndicalist overtones: 
Much influenced by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
movement, and supporters of the concepts of industrial unionism, 
direct industrial action and workers' control of industry, the political 
philosophy of the ARU leadership was firmly rooted in a belief in 
the recognition of the class stmggle (Cribb, 1980:383). 
These views were held by a significant minority in the union movement during the 
second decade of the twentieth century and, as already indicated above, contributed 
to the 'direct action radicalism' that characterised unionism in the north of 
Queensland. Rymer and Moroney's firm commitment to this political philosophy 
was to develop in response to a number of Queensland Labor's actions in the 
period from 1917 through to 1922. 
Queensland Labor's actions during the northem railway strike of 1917 and 
the Townsville meatworkers' strike of 1919 contributed to their disillusionment 
with labourism. They believed that a govemment elected by the working class 
should govem in the interests of the workers, and thus be of benefit to them in 
their stmggles with employers. This perspective was at odds with a labourist 
strategy which sought, through the establishment of a system of compulsory 
arbitration, to secure industrial peace between employers and unions and in 
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particular emphasised that it was not the role of govemment to take sides in 
industrial disputes. A more detailed discussion of the nature of the compulsory 
arbitration system established by Queensland Labor is taken up in the following 
chapter. 
The northem railway strike of 1917 was settled to the satisfaction of the 
majority of unionists. However, a meeting of 800 railway workers in Townsville 
voted not to accept the settlement. In the following days the Labor Govemment 
issued an ultimatum that the workers retum to work or face dismissal. This action 
was interpreted by many unionists as evidence of the anti-working class and anti-
trade union nature of the Govemment. The then secretary of the combined strike 
committee in Townsville, George Rymer, "later claimed that the Townsville 
experience gave reason to distmst all Labour Govemments" (Kennedy, 1973:127). 
Labor's actions in the Townsville meatworkers strike of 1919 were to further 
entrench the growing distmst that many unionists had for Labor govemments. 
According to the ARU leadership. Labor's decision to suspend railway 
workers during the Townsville meatworkers strike of 1919 represented a complete 
betrayal of the working class: 
It is a damnable outrage upon solidarity and upon labour. It is the 
most scandalous any Labor Govemment could be guilty of. It 
savours of a gross betrayal of the most sacred bond of working class 
solidarity - the bond of mateship and loyalty to their union 
{Militant, 1/9/1919). 
In summing up Labor Premier Ryan's actions, the ARU noted that he had a 
creditable and courageous record behind him. However, his declaration that the 
'Government must govern' seemed to be the flimsiest of excuses for the anti-
working class actions of his govemment (Hunt, 1979). 
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Labor's actions in the Townsville meatworkers strike convinced militant 
unionists such as Moroney and Rymer that Labor had "abnegated its 
responsibilities to the labour movement" (Hunt, 1979:409). fts apparent lack of 
sympathy for unionists suggested that there was little difference between a Labor 
Govemment and a National Party Govemment (Armstrong, 1975). 
Finally, Queensland Labor's response to the economic blockade imposed 
upon it by financial interests in London in the period from 1920 to 1924 and, in 
particular, its decision to seek a reduction in the basic wage of government 
employees in 1922, confirmed to Moroney and Rymer the fundamental 
shortcomings of a labourist strategy which relied on political action and believed 
that the machinery of the State could be utilised to emancipate the working class. 
The impact of this economic blockade and its implications for the establishment of 
a stable political exchange between Labor and the unions is considered in more 
detail in Chapter 8. 
Labor's decision to seek a reduction in the basic wage of its own employees 
in 1922, led the Brisbane TLC to establish a committee of twenty-nine unions -
the Govemment Employees' Anti-Reduction Committee. This committee sought to 
have the govemment reverse its decision in relation to the basic wage. The militant 
leadership of the ARU dominated the committee and spearheaded a vigorous 
industrial campaign which culminated in the statewide railway strike of August 
1925. This strike represented a significant victory for the militant leadership of the 
ARU. ft was settled following Labor's commitment to legislate for the restoration 
of the basic wage to its pre 1922 level (Smith, 1983). 
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The ARU's victory over Labor in 1925 helped embitter relations between 
the militant wing of the union movement and Labor. In particular, it directly 
contributed to one of the most bitter industrial stmggles involving Labor and the 
unions, the South Johnstone strike. During this strike Labor took the opportunity 
to even the score with the militant leaders of the ARU. It took the unprecedented 
action of locking out the State's railway workers and, in tum, forcing the ARU 
leadership's capitulation (Higgins, 1954, 1960). 
The syndicalist leadership of the ARU, along with the direct action 
radicalism of unionists in the north of the State, were to hinder the establishment a 
stable political exchange between Labor and the unions in the period between 1915 
and 1929. However, the influence of syndicalism and the IWW was to wane in the 
1930s and 1940s although this did not lead to a decline in the influence of a 
revolutionary militant unionism in Queensland. Instead, Communist Party trade 
unionists emerged in the 1930s and World War II as the leaders of a powerful 
militant revolutionary opposition within the trade union movement. The discussion 
now tums to a consideration of the communists' impact on the Queensland union 
movement's strategy. 
The communist challenge 
According to the CPA the McCormack Labor Govemment's locking out of 
Queensland's railway workers in 1927 graphically demonstrated the shortcomings 
of Labor govemments and a labour reformist strategy in capitalist society. Indeed, 
it resulted in the Communist Intemational issuing a 'Queensland Resolution' in 
1928 (see the Workers Weekly, 24/8/1928) which argued that, despite Queensland 
Labor having been in power for a period of thirteen years, capitalism was stronger 
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than ever. The CPA concluded in the late 1920s and early 1930s that the 
fundamental challenge with which it was confronted was one of winning over 
workers and the union movement to a militant policy (Cram, 1935; Dixon, 1935; 
Davidson, 1969). 
The winning of unions and unionists to this policy, and thus a greater 
reliance on the strike weapon, would (it was said) win the workers their more 
immediate economic demands but also, more importantly, contribute to the 
development of a greater revolutionary consciousness amongst unionists. As 
Australian Communist Party General Secretary Sharkey argued, "strikes develop 
the labour movement, organise and unite workers and win the intermediate social 
strata to the side of the revolution" (Sharkey, 1960:26). 
The winning of the masses to the side of the revolution would be achieved 
through the politicisation of strikes in which the nature of the existing class society 
is revealed, the role of the capitalist state is revealed, and the shortcomings of 
Labor govemments and reformist union leaders exposed. The successful 
politicisation of strikes would lead, it was thought, to the creation of the conditions 
where the masses would go over to the side of the CPA. The strike weapon 
therefore was considered to be pivotal to the overall success of the political 
strategy pursued by the CPA (Davidson, 1969). However, the capacity of 
Communist Party trade unionists to put this militant strike policy into effect in 
Queensland was tempered from the early 1930s to 1957 by a complex of factors. 
These included the prevailing economic and social conditions, the organisational 
strength of the CPA in the unions, and changes in the Party's own political line. 
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During the early to mid 1930s the CPA encouraged communist unionists to 
press for a general strike whenever an industrial dispute occuned (Davidson, 1969). 
However, the union movement's bitter experience in a number of industrial 
stmggles in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the impact of the Depression 
(which weakened the union's organisational strength [see Jensen, 1971] and 
bargaining position in the labour market) was to dampen its enthusiasm for 
industrial action. The election of a Labor govemment in Queensland in 1932 also 
led the majority of moderate unionists to prefer a strategy of political exchange 
rather than seek to pursue their interests in the economic arena through collective 
acts of militancy (Costar, 1980). Consequently, Communist Party agitation did not 
result in the development of a major strike stmggle during the first half of the 
1930s. Furthermore, the CPA's organisational weakness within the unions at this 
juncture meant that it was not in a position to impose a militant policy on the 
union movement. 
Changes in the CPA's political line in the mid 1930s lessened its 
willingness to pursue a militant policy. In 1936, the CPA, along with the 
communist movement in other capitalist industrial countries, decided to build a 
united front with other progressive elements in the labour movement. The adoption 
of this more moderate political stance led it to argue that "continually calling for 
strikes when they are not necessary is no achievement and only leads to isolation" 
(quoted in Davidson, 1969:88). 
During the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact between 1940 and 1941 
communist trade union leaders were "compelled to adopt policies of more 
aggressive strike action" (Davidson, 1969:90). This position was reversed in 1941 
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following the CPA's decision to support the Allies in the war against fascism. From 
1941 until the end of the Second World War, communist trade union leaders were 
told that "greater production was necessary and hence greater labor discipline, 
continuity of work, and cooperation with employers" (Davidson, 1969:90-91). 
The majority of communist trade union leaders committed themselves to 
this policy, though some were to encourage the taking of strike action (Davidson, 
1969). The CPA's commitment to a cautious industrial relations policy continued in 
the year immediately following the end of World War II. 
In 1946 the Party leadership was concemed that employers were drawing 
the union movement into industrial disputes that were poorly conducted and thus 
undermined the position of the union movement (Davidson, 1969; Sheridan, 1989). 
It considered, for instance, that the Queensland meat workers strike of 1946 was 
fought over the wrong issue: it was "tactically immature and potentially damaging 
to the political interests of the labour movement" (Blackmur, 1993:86). In short, 
while agreeing that the meat companies' right to hire and fire should be challenged, 
the CPA believed that a strike of massive proportions was not wananted. Instead, it 
argued that the meat strike should have been confined to the factory concerned, 
with the union movement aiming for a quick settlement. Queensland Communist 
Party leader Jack Henry was critical of the AMIEU leadership's hopes for a general 
strike and its belief that "they could win quickly and easily" (Henry, 1946:4). 
The CPA's concems also reflected its belief that the strike weapon may 
work against its political objectives where the unions provided poor leadership and 
the strike was fought over the wrong issues. As General Secretary Sharkey argued. 
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if strikes are to be a revolutionary weapon then they need to be "properly led and 
conducted and properly timed" (Sharkey, 1960:26). 
Thus, in the period from 1930 to 1946, a complex of factors meant that the 
CPA's commitment to a militant policy did not have a noticeable impact on 
industrial relations. However, in the period from 1946 to 1949, this militant policy 
was to have a considerable impact on industrial relations in Queensland and 
elsewhere in Australia (Blackmur, 1993; Davidson, 1969; Sheridan, 1989). This is 
not to suggest that the industrial stmggles of this period were the result of a 
communist plot. Instead, they were the result of a complex set of industrial, 
economic, social and political factors, of which the militant policy pursued by 
Communist Party trade union leaders was one significant ingredient (Sheridan, 
1989; Blackmur, 1993). 
The CPA believed that the Queensland meat strike, along with the Victorian 
transport strike of 1946, marked the beginning of a period during which short, well 
organised, offensive, strikes over major economic issues could win the masses over 
to its side. These strikes pointed to the working class's willingness to stmggle 
(Blackmur, 1993). The CPA leadership believed that the upsurge in strikes which 
began in late 1945, and intensified in 1946, created conditions under which the 
CPA could establish itself as the political representative of the Australian working 
class. The Communist Party "confidently expected to replace the Labor Party, with 
its history of compromise with, and concessions to capitalism, as the party of the 
people" (Blackmur, 1993:182). This was to be achieved through the Party's role of 
actively developing and leading the strike wave. From late 1946 onwards the CPA 
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consequently began to actively pursue a militant policy with the aim of fostering 
industrial conflict. 
The CPA's pursuit of a militant policy was assured of greater success than it 
had been in the first half of the 1930s because of its significantly enhanced 
position within the union movement which peaked towards the end of World War 
II (Davidson, 1969). ft exercised important leadership positions at both the national 
and state level and exercised control of many of the more important unions in the 
country. Moreover, the CPA exercised considerably more influence in the 
Queensland union movement than in most other states. In 1942 the CPA in 
Queensland won the majority of key positions in the Queensland TLC and retained 
them through until 1957. In contrast, the CPA failed to win control of any other 
state capital TLC. Queensland's Communist trade unionists were thus well placed 
to influence developments in the post-World War II era when conditions appeared 
more conducive to the pursuit of the class stmggle. Consequently, during the 
second half of the 1940s Communist Party trade unionists' pursuit of militant 
industrial tactics contributed significantly to undermining the labour reformists' 
industrial peace objectives. 
In Queensland, throughout 1947, the CPA believed that a major conflict was 
likely to occur in the railways and that this would create the opportunity for the 
militant unions. Communists in the leadership aimed to play a decisive role in a 
major strike that would help win the masses over to the CPA. This is not to say 
that the Party was responsible for fomenting or engineering the dispute and nor 
was it to "control or capture the subsequent strike action" (Blackmur, 1993:203). 
However, those Communist Party trade unionists who held many leadership 
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positions in the various unions involved in the 1948 Railway strike played a major 
part in the development of a particularly long and bitter industrial stmggle 
involving a Queensland Labor govemment and the TLC unions. They believed that 
through this stmggle, the shortcomings of the capitalist system and reformist Labor 
govemments would be exposed. 
The Party's pursuit of this militant policy was brought to an effective end in 
the following year with the defeat of the coal miners strike in New South Wales. 
The CPA formally abandoned its policy of aggressive militancy in 1951 and 
instead, retumed to a policy of moderation in trade union activity. In particular, it 
gave up its "policies of large stoppages, retuming to the tactics of one day 
stoppages" (Davidson, 1969:139). 
The CPA was to play a significant part in union affairs throughout much of 
the period during which Labor mled in Queensland. However, the militant trade 
unionism that it was committed to throughout most of this period was to be put 
into effect for only a very brief period from late 1946 through to 1949. 
Nevertheless, it had a considerable impact. It undermined Labor's attempts to 
establish industrial peace in the immediate post-war period. The bittemess which 
the railway strike of 1948 engendered in the Queensland labour movement also 
militated against the establishment of a stable political exchange between the 
industrial and political wings of the labour movement during the 1950s. In the 
post-Worid War II era, the CPA leadership in the trade unions continued the 
militant tradition established primarily by syndicalists in the period from World 
War I to the late 1920s. 
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CONCLUSION 
Unlike their counterparts in Sweden, Queensland's unions failed to develop 
an organisationally unified movement dominated by a strong union confederation. 
Instead, there developed a union movement organised along craft, general and 
industrial lines and dominated by two competing centres of union power. These 
were the Queensland TLC, which loosely coordinated the actions of approximately 
two thirds of the union movement, and the AWU, which represented the other third 
of the trade union movement. This organisational character developed due to a 
variety of factors including the influence of craft unionism, the impact of regional 
divisions, the impact of compulsory arbitration and political divisions. 
Furthermore, an influential revolutionary opposition within the trade union 
movement also developed. It was based on a syndicalist militancy in the north of 
the State and in the State's second largest and most powerful union, the ARU, 
during the first period of unintermpted Labor mle (1915-1929). The CPA 
exercised considerable influence through its leadership of the Queensland TLC in 
the second half of the 1940s. All these organisational and political characteristics 
meant that the trade union movement in Queensland found itself unable to commit 
itself to a peaceful exchange strategy. 
The discussion now tums to a consideration of how the institutional 
anangements established in response to a historic compromise, and formulated in 
the two decades spanning the tum of the twentieth century in Australia, also failed 
to contribute to the establishment of a political exchange relationship that 
dominated bargaining in the industrial relations arena under Queensland Labor. 
CHAPTER 7 
AN INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANT OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE? 
QUEENSLAND'S SYSTEM OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
Queensland Labor govemments have periodically asserted that the system of 
conciliation and arbitration which they established led to the development of 
industrial peace (see for instance the Worker, 21/9/1922; QPD, 1946:1880-1881). 
However, the empirical evidence relating to strikes indicates that this was not the 
case. This chapter claims that strikes persisted in Queensland under Labor, in part, 
because compulsory arbitration failed to contribute to the establishment of a 
political exchange relationship that dominated industrial relations. There are 
two aspects of the system of compulsory arbitration which contributed to the 
continued reliance of workers and unions on the strike weapon. 
First, the systems of compulsory arbitration established throughout 
Australia, including in Queensland under Labor, represented a sectoral or industry-
based form of corporatism. There are two elements of this sectoral corporatist 
system which hindered the establishment of a political exchange which could 
dominate industrial relations under Queensland Labor. First, it encouraged workers 
and their unions to adopt an adversarial approach, rather than one based on co-
operation and compromise, and thus contributed to the persistence of industrial 
conflict. Moreover, this bargaining system resulted in the govemment being 
confined to the role of enforcing the mles of the game. This tended to embitter 
govemment-union relations and thus lessened the unions' commitment to a 
peaceful exchange strategy. Also, these corporatist anangements resulted in a very 
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limited range of issues being regulated, that is wages and basic conditions of 
employment. This stood in stark contrast to the much broader range of issues, such 
as the promotion of industrial restmcturing, the development of labour market 
policies and a social wage whereby corporatist anangements are established at the 
societal level. This in tum contributed to Queensland's Labor govemments being 
unable to guarantee to workers the sorts of benefits which could have been 
expected to secure their commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. 
Second, the system of compulsory arbitration formed the comerstone of the 
welfare regime established during the two decades spanning the tum of the 
twentieth century in Australia. It guaranteed wage security for the worker rather 
than social security for the citizen. This was to be achieved through a system of 
wage regulation that guaranteed workers a living wage while a residual system of 
income maintenance provided insurance against poverty for all those outside the 
labour market. Initially this system of wage regulation formed the basis of a 
political bargain established between employers and unions. The commitment of 
the labour movement to the system of compulsory arbitration reflected its belief 
that it would guarantee to workers the same high standard of living which they had 
been assured of immediately prior to the depression of the 1890s. However, in the 
period from World War I onwards, the level at which the living wage was set 
failed to satisfy many unions. There were two main factors which help explain why 
this was the case. 
First, the living wage was determined increasingly on the basis of industry's 
capacity to pay rather than social considerations, particularly the need to secure to 
workers a decent standard of living in a prosperous capitalist industrial country. 
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This in tum emphasised how workers were dependent on the market rather than 
govemment for their income, and thus led them to pursue their interests in the 
economic rather than the political arena. Second, Australia's poor economic 
performance between the 1890s and World War II meant that the wage eamers' 
welfare state was unable to deliver generous real wage outcomes which might have 
been expected to help secure Queensland workers' commitment to a peaceful 
exchange strategy. 
This chapter begins by explaining how the systems of compulsory 
arbitration, which developed at the national level and in each of Australia's six 
states occuned in response to the bitter industrial skirmishes and severe economic 
crisis of the early 1890s. The discussion notes that there were a number of factors 
present at this time of societal crisis which made possible the achievement of this 
historic compromise. These included Australia's economic vulnerability, the 
existence of a well developed and strongly reformist labour movement, divisions 
within the ranks of capital and a tradition of state intervention. The discussion now 
tums to considering how this historic compromise came about at the beginning of 
the twentieth century in Australia. 
AUSTRALIA'S HISTORIC COMPROMISE 
The severe economic depression and bitter industrial skirmishes of the early 
1890s led to the establishment of an historic compromise between the key actors in 
society (organised labour, employers and govemment). Conditions similar to those 
found in Sweden a generation later were found in Australia in the 1890s (see 
Macarthy, 1967, 1968a, 1968b, 1970; Rickard, 1976; Macintyre, 1983; Edwards, 
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1986; Castles, 1988; Macintyre and Mitchell, 1989). This section briefly outlines 
the nature of these conditions and then goes on to consider the institutional 
anangements established to counter these conditions. 
The vulnerability of the economy became obvious to all sectors of 
Australian society during a period of particularly depressed economic times which 
lasted through the 1890s and into the early years of the twentieth century. Castles 
(1988) explains that: 
no major effort of discernment was required to perceive the 
exogenous origins of what had gone wrong with the economy. Prices 
of primary export commodities dropped like a stone and pastoralists 
and farmers went to the wall in droves. Overseas capital for 
residential constmction dried up and so did residential constmction 
(Castles, 1988:92). 
The strength of the labour movement and its commitment to a reformist outlook, 
divisions in the ranks of the mling interests, and the highly interventionist nature of 
the state were additional factors which encouraged the development of a 
compromise between labour and capital. 
During the 1880s, the labour movement developed considerable industrial 
strength (see Fitzpatrick, 1940; Gollan, 1960; Spence, 1909; Tumer, 1965). This 
strength allowed it to launch a series of major strikes in 1890 and 1891 against 
capitalist interests intent on entrenching a policy of freedom of contract. The union 
movement suffered a number of major defeats in these industrial confrontations 
(see Gollan, 1960; Spence, 1909; Sullivan, 1983; Sullivan and Sullivan, 1983). 
Despite these defeats, however, it was to act swiftly, and with astounding success, 
to protect and advance its interests by resorting to increased activity in the political 
arena. This was to encourage the development of a compromise. 
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During the early 1890s Labor parties were established in each of the six 
colonies and soon developed into significant political actors (see Burgmann, 1985; 
McMullin, 1991; Murphy et al, 1970; Murphy, 1975; Nairn, 1973; Rickard, 1976; 
Tumer, 1965; Spence, 1909). The growing political strength of the labour 
movement was underlined by the fact that Australians elected the world's first 
Labor govemment, which briefly took office in Queensland in 1899. Australia was 
also the first country in the world to be mled by a majority Labor govemment (in 
1910). The reasons for the strength of the labour movement at this relatively early 
juncture, when compared with the development of labour movements in other 
westem nations, can be traced to its modem economic stmcture and also the fact 
that it was the first fully representative democracy in the modem sense (Castles, 
1988). 
The labour movement was also firmly committed to a reformist political 
ideology (Philipp, 1950; Spence, 1909; Rickard, 1976). Consequently, its defeat in 
the industrial stmggles of the early 1890s did not result in it arguing for the radical 
reconstmction of society. Rather it argued for the working class to win state power 
within existing capitalist society and in doing so it could introduce pragmatic 
reforms, such as the establishment of a system of conciliation and arbitration, 
which benefited the worker. In short. Labor's leaders believed that while the 
employers had defeated the unions in the industrial battles of the early 1890s, they 
had, by their provocative actions aroused workers. Moreover, through their superior 
numbers they would allow Labor "to mle shortly over shipowners as well as 
shearers" (Spence, 1909:90). In short, the labour movement believed that in the 
future the working class would, through its superior numbers, "elect their chosen 
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representatives who will make laws for the welfare of the people: and class mismle 
and misgovemment, with all its attendant injustice and misery, will become a thing 
of the past" (Spence, 1909:110). The establishment of an historic compromise was 
also made possible by the divisions within the ranks of capital. 
Employers emerged from the events of the early 1890s with their industrial 
strength considerably enhanced. However, this was not matched by a similar unity 
of its political and economic interests (see Macarthy, 1968a, 1968b, 1970; 
Macintyre, 1983, 1989; Rickard, 1976). There was a split in capital's ranks on the 
issue of state intervention in the sphere of industrial relations. Employers in the 
export sector were opposed to any form of govemment regulation which would 
increase the cost of labour. Another group of employers, consisting largely of 
manufacturers, favoured state intervention for reasons of tariff protection and price 
regulation. Manufacturers were willing to enter into an alliance with Labor, in 
which they gained tariff protection and price regulation, while in retum supporting 
Labor's demands for state intervention in the sphere of industrial relations. The 
development of this "unholy alliance" between labour and manufacturers was to 
lend strong political support to the development of a new protectionist order in 
which the establishment of an institutionalised system of industrial relations played 
a pivotal role. 
Finally, the industrial warfare of the 1890s opened the way for increased 
state intervention in the regulation of industrial affairs (Macarthy, 1967; Rickard, 
1976; Macintyre and Mitchell, 1989). There were public calls for govemments to 
intervene and establish mechanisms to settle industrial disputes (Bray and Rimmer, 
1989; Macintyre, 1983). The fact that a well established tradition of state 
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intervention existed, particularly in relation to the regulation of the labour market 
(see Quinlan, 1987; Kitay, 1989), meant that govemments possessed the 
appropriate authority and resources to act (Edwards, 1986). 
It has often been observed that the state has played an unusually 
important role in Australian history, from the comprehensive 
management of the convict colonies to the extensive economic 
activity of colonial govemments in the later nineteenth century, and 
arbitration and welfare activity in the twentieth (Council and Irving, 
1980:31-32). 
Govemment intervention in Australia has been much more significant, and often 
the govenmient has been a more autonomous actor than in North America or 
Europe (Butlin et al, 1982:3-4). 
There were, therefore, a series of factors which contributed to the 
establishment of an historic compromise at the beginning of the twentieth century 
in Australia. The reaching of this historic compromise resulted in a process of 
political exchange involving the key actors in society. The process of political 
exchange led to the establishment of four closely intenelated institutional and 
policy anangements. Two of these institutional and policy anangements - tariff 
protection for manufacturers and a system of compulsory arbitration which 
guaranteed the worker a living wage - were at the heart of the political bargain 
established at the tum of the twentieth century. It was the Excise Tariff 
(Agricultural Machinery) Act of 1906 which "stipulated that the Australian 
employer would receive the benefit of protection only if he paid his workers 'fair 
and reasonable' wages" (Macintyre, 1983:107), which was to be the occasion for 
Australia's historic compromise (Castles, 1988). The Harvester judgement of 1907 
used the application, by a Victorian manufacturer of agricultural equipment, for the 
benefits provided under the 1906 legislation to establish a minimum living wage. 
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The two other institutional and policy anangements which developed out of this 
historic compromise were a white Australia policy which sought to control 
immigration, and a residual system of income maintenance which provided 
insurance against poverty for all those outside the labour market (Castles, 1988). 
Compulsory arbitration was considered critical to the establishment of a 
new social order dominated by industrial peace (Higgins, 1922). However, 
compulsory arbitration was not to succeed in creating industrial harmony. The 
following discussion first explains that compulsory arbitration represented a 
sectoral or industry based form of corporatism which militated against the 
establishment of a political exchange which dominated industrial relations under 
successive Queensland Labor govemments between 1915 and 1957. The reasons 
why the welfare anangements associated with the system of compulsory arbitration 
failed to result in industrial relations being dominated by a political exchange, are 
then considered. 
A SYSTEM OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: A SECTORAL-
CORPORATIST BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
In the period from the 1840s to the 1890s the industrial relations system 
evolving in Australia was similar to that developing in Britain and the United 
States. In short, a liberal-based system of collective bargaining was developing. 
The laissez-faire belief that hours and wages should be set by a competitive labour 
market dominated. Forms of state intervention which aimed to protect employees 
from exploitation in the workplace or provide mechanisms for the settling disputes, 
were strongly opposed (Bray and Rimmer, 1989; Fitzpatrick, 1940; Gollan, 1960; 
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Macarthy, 1967, 1970). Employers and employees were particularly strongly 
opposed to the idea of compulsory arbitration (see Macintyre, 1983; Macarthy, 
1970; Philipp, 1950; Rickard, 1976). Employers and unions developed ways of 
dealing with each other either by direct negotiation or occasionally by resorting to 
voluntary conciliation (Macarthy, 1967). 
However, the industrial warfare of the 1890s opened the way for increased 
state intervention in the regulation of industrial affairs. It was argued that the state 
should intervene to limit the undesirable effects of a laissez-faire doctrine which, 
in the field of industrial relations had led to a debilitating "industrial war". 
According to Powers (one of Queensland's influential liberal parliamentarians 
during the 1890s) "either capital will starve labour, or labour, by producing strikes, 
will enforce what it thinks just" and as a consequence "obtain conditions under 
which the employers may not be able to cany on" (QPD, 1894:1108). 
Consequently, Liberal politicians, with the support of Labor, were to introduce 
legislative reforms which resulted in the establishment of conciliation and 
arbitration tribunals which formed the basis of a sectoral-corporatist bargaining 
stmcttire (Palmer, 1989). 
With corporatist anangements being established at the sectoral, rather than 
national level, there was the failure to establish a political exchange relationship of 
industrial relations during Labor's period of mle in Queensland. There were two 
reasons for this. First, because the establishment of corporatist anangements at this 
level led to the development of a bargaining system where disputes were resolved 
through the courts and judicial proceedings. This led to the development of an 
adversarial rather than consensus based system of industrial relations. Furthermore, 
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the role of govemment was confined to that of enforcing the mles of the game. 
This meant that Queensland Labor often took action which embittered govemment-
union relations and consequently contributed to the persistence of industrial 
conflict. Second, the corporatist anangements established resulted in a very limited 
range of issues being regulated, that is wages and basic conditions of employment, 
rather than the much broader range of issues which are subject to the process of 
regulation when corporatist anangements are established at the societal level. 
Consequently, Queensland Labor govemments were not to guarantee to workers the 
sorts of benefits or rewards that could have been expected to help secure their 
commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. 
A formal legalistic bargaining system 
The democratic corporatist anangements established in Sweden in the 1930s 
and 1940s contributed to the development of a bargaining system which 
encouraged govemment, unions and employers to engage in a process of 
negotiation and compromise through various tripartite fomms established at the 
societal level. In other words, the system of bargaining that was established was 
founded on an ongoing process of political exchange. In contrast, the corporatist 
anangements established at the sectoral or industry level in Australia led to the 
establishment of a quite different bargaining system. A formal legalistic system of 
compulsory arbitration was established. This system encouraged competition 
between the major actors in the industrial relations arena and, in particular, the 
adoption of a 'winner take all' approach that contributed to the persistence of 
industrial conflict. 
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The establishment of such a bargaining system reflected the influence of the 
dominant liberal ideas of the time (Campbell, 1976; Rowse, 1978). These claimed 
that the preservation of govemment's impartiality in the sphere of industrial 
relations was essential if social peace was to be established. The proposed solution 
was one of wrapping up the problem of industrial strife "in the brown paper of 
bureaucracy" (Rickard, 1976:286) and handing it over to the courts. A willingness 
to hand the problem to the courts was supported by a belief that judges, who were 
thought to be above suspicion of bias towards either party, could reach impartial 
decisions on a variety of industrial matters. In other words preserving the executive 
arm of govenmient's impartiality meant that the bargaining process was influenced 
by judicial rather than political factors. Consequently, these developed a formal 
legalistic system of industrial relations which encouraged the key actors to adopt an 
adversarial posture that exacerbated conflicts of interests and, in so doing, 
contributed to the persistence of strikes. Atkinson (1920) neatly summed up the 
problems of this system when he noted that: 
The most serious effect of arbitration is ... the development on each 
side of a highly organised system of strategy, in which the leaders 
conduct manoeuvres with the greatest skill, their sole object being 
the gaining of points and victories for their own side. As in a court 
of law, the side which can convince the chairman of the board is 
sure to win, for almost invariably the voting is of a solid party 
character. Thus the very basis of the wages board system seems to 
be wrong, for it looks no further than the stereotyping of an 
industrial situation in which neither side co-operates with the other, 
and the divergence of their interests is emphasised . . . . How can we 
expect industrial peace from a form of industrial strategy that never 
contemplates the transformation of the contending armies into a co-
operative association? (Atkinson, 1920:167-68). 
Many commentators (see Hancock, 1971; Isaac, 1971; Niland, 1978; Blandy et al, 
1986) have since noted that one of the key failings of the arbitration system is its 
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tendency to discourage constmctive co-operation and compromise between the 
major actors. Indeed, they have noted how systems of free collective bargaining 
established in other countries resulted in the development of a greater degree of 
concession and compromise and, as a result, created conditions which are more 
conducive to conflict resolution. In contrast, a system of arbitration, through its 
reliance on the mle of law, encourages the main participants "to adopt antagonistic 
postures that unduly exaggerate the natural level of conflict" (Niland, 1978:7). 
In summary, the system of compulsory arbitration encourages the key actors 
to pursue a variety of tactics, including direct industrial action where necessary, to 
maximise their interests. For instance, while workers in Queensland acknowledged 
the benefits of the system of arbitration established by Labor 
this did not mean that they abandoned other means of settling job 
grievances. On the contrary, most unions regarded arbitration awards 
mainly as a legally enforceable minimum standard of wages and 
working conditions ... . Trade unions seldom renounced, as 
compulsory arbitration implied they should, the right to strike in 
order to secure better conditions (Hunt, 1979:241). 
The strike was relied on to press union claims where they believed that their 
interests were being disadvantaged by the arbitration system and the actions of 
employers. For instance, it is maintained in a later section of this chapter that 
increasing worker and union dissatisfaction with the industrial tribunals' decisions 
in relation to the living wage led to the unions' increased reliance on the strike 
weapon. 
Unions utilised the brief industrial stoppage with great effect to demonstrate 
the seriousness of their case to the Arbitration Court. The strike was often used as 
an effective means of drawing the court's attention to a grievance, and ensuring a 
quick tribunal hearing (Niland, 1978). Moreover, even those unions which have 
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been strong supporters of conciliation and arbitration, such as the AWU in 
Queensland, sometimes pursued their members' interests through direct industrial 
action with the explicit aim of forcing favourable action from the Industrial Court. 
In 1956, for example, the AWU's dissatisfaction with a mling of the Queensland 
Industrial Court resulted in it taking industrial action which lasted for several 
months and eventually forced the Industrial Court to hand down an interim award 
which settled the strike (McMurchy, 1983). 
The unions' reliance on industrial action to press their claims ran contrary to 
the mles underpinning the system of compulsory arbitration. This was often to 
bring the unions into conflict with govemments as they were responsible for 
upholding the mles of the game rather than seeking to negotiate compromises 
between the contending armies in the industrial relations arena. 
Consequently, Queensland Labor was to take action aimed at disciplining 
striking unionists during the Townsville meatworkers' strike of 1919. The previous 
chapter noted that these actions brought Queensland Labor into conflict with the 
militants in the union movement and consequently helped embitter govenmient-
union relations (see Armstrong, 1975; Cutler, 1973; Hunt, 1979, 1983; Kennedy, 
1973; Murphy, 1983). ft was Queensland Labor's heavy handed intervention in the 
South Johnstone strike of 1927 which significantly embittered govemment-union 
relations. 
Queensland Labor dismissed 18,000 striking railway employees following a 
protracted industrial dispute at South Johnstone in 1927. The Govemment 
determined that these striking unionists would only be re-employed if they signed 
an undertaking to abide by the instmctions of the Railway Commissioner. After 
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ten days of severe industrial dislocation Labor Premier McCormack was able to 
announce that the railway unions had signed the undertaking and as a consequence 
there would be no trouble in the railways in the future (Brisbane Courier, 
12/9/1927). Queensland Labor's action in the South Johnstone strike severely 
undermined the union movement's confidence in Labor (see Cribb, 1964, 1980; 
Kennedy, 1983; Higgins, 1954, 1960). It was to push a growing number of unions 
to question the usefulness of supporting Queensland Labor and, in particular, 
committing themselves to a peaceful exchange with Labor (see ALP, 1928:36-47). 
In a number of industrial disputes in the post-World War II era, in 
particular, the railway strike of 1948 (see Blackmur, 1983, 1986, 1993; Cribb, 
1980; Sheridan, 1989) and the shearers strike of 1956 (see McMurchy, 1983), 
Queensland Labor took heavy handed action aimed at punishing striking unionists. 
For instance, during the 1948 railway strike, it was to proclaim a state of 
emergency under Section 22 of the Transport Act and an Order-in-Council 
prohibiting picketing and the counselling of strike action (Cribb, 1980). These 
actions on the part of Queensland Labor were to further embitter govemment-
union relations and, as a consequence, undermined the unions' willingness to 
commit themselves to a peaceful exchange strategy. 
In summary, the establishment of a formal legalistic bargaining system 
which encouraged the parties to adopt a 'winner take all' approach, contributed to 
the persistence of industrial conflict rather than the development of an industrial 
relations system dominated by a political exchange relationship. Moreover, the role 
govemment played, that is one of policing the system in the public interest, was to 
embitter govemment-union relations and thus lessened the unions' interests in 
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committing themselves to a peaceful exchange strategy. Furthermore, it is argued in 
the next section that because corporatist anangements were established at the 
sectoral or industry level, govemment was not able to guarantee to workers the 
sorts of benefits which could have been expected to secure their support for a 
political exchange strategy. 
A limited role for government 
The historic compromise established at the beginning of the twentieth 
century in Australia led to the development of a broad package of policies. 
However 
the corporatist decision-making machinery that was established as a 
result of the bargain did not have that range. The tribunals were 
established at a meso-level (or industry or sectoral level) and 
developed an award stmcture that served to limit the decision 
making to labour market issues affecting sectors of the labour force 
(Palmer, 1989:328). 
In other words, the system of compulsory arbitration did not result in a broad range 
of issues being regulated. Various issues such as labour market policy, social 
welfare and the social wage were not incorporated into the bargaining process. 
Instead, compulsory arbitration limited "regulation to real wages and basic 
conditions of employment" (Palmer, 1989:328). Consequently, govemment was not 
responsible for guaranteeing to workers the sorts of benefits which might have 
secured their commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. 
This system was influenced, as already mentioned, by the dominant liberal 
ideas of the time. These ideas contended that developments in the economy, and 
the labour market in particular, should generally remain separate from the political 
arena. Justice McCawley, the first President of the Industrial Court established by 
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Queensland Labor in 1916, outlined in some detail the reasons why govemment 
intervention should be limited. He contended that it was entirely proper for the 
Queensland Parliament to lay down the maximum wage and prescribe equal pay 
for equal work as such matters had "received the benediction of the League of 
Nations and hence may be regarded as having passed out of the region of party 
politics or of acute industrial controversy" (McCawley, 1924:509). However, he 
questioned the wisdom of further intervention by the Legislature. In doing so he 
outlined a number of reasons against further intervention: 
(1) Parliament is not suitably constituted for the exercise of this 
specialised function; (2) a party political matter will be made of 
what hitherto had been regarded as in the nature of a judicial 
function; (3) wages may vary with the swing of the political 
pendulum. Political gains may be transitory, may be reversed by 
succeeding parliaments, and may jeopardise the whole system of 
arbitration (McCawley, 1924:509). 
In other words govenmient should remain aloof from the bargaining which takes 
place in society over the distribution of the fmits of production. 
Queensland Labor govemments were to subscribe to this approach (see 
comments by Labor Premier Theodore in the Daily Standard, 6/12/1922). Thus, 
while they introduced legislation which set maximum working hours and other 
basic conditions, the sectoral corporatist system of compulsory arbitration did not 
contemplate govemment intervention aimed at guaranteeing the workers' future 
security. This has only tended to occur where corporatist anangements have been 
established at the societal level. Instead, the bargaining which took place at the 
sectoral or industry level was limited to a few issues such as wages and basic 
conditions of employment. Consequently, Queensland Labor govemments were not 
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able to guarantee to workers the sorts of benefits which might have been expected 
to secure their commitment to a long term strategy of exchange. 
The system of compulsory arbitration also formed the comerstone of a 
welfare system that failed to contribute to the establishment of a political exchange 
which could have dominated industrial relations. The discussion now tums to 
explain why this was the case. 
A WAGE EARNERS' WELFARE STATE 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Australia and New Zealand gained 
reputations as welfare pioneers (Castles, 1985). Australia's reputation was based 
primarily on the system of compulsory arbitration established in the period between 
the early 1890s and World War I. This sought not only to settle disputes between 
capital and labour but, equally importantly, to guarantee the future security of 
workers which, it was generally acknowledged, was cmcial if class tensions were 
to be reduced and industrial peace secured (Macintyre and Mitchell, 1989; Rickard, 
1976). The guaranteeing of workers' future security was to be achieved through the 
setting of a living wage. 
The second President of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Court, Justice Higgins, pointed out when setting the rate for the living wage in his 
Harvester judgement of 1907, that the establishment of such a wage was essential 
to the success of a system given the task of securing social peace. "One cannot 
conceive of industrial peace unless the employee has secured to him wages 
sufficient for the essentials of human existence" (Higgins, 1922:6). 
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Justice Higgins contended that a fair and reasonable wage must be based 
upon "the normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living 
in a civilised community" (Higgins, 1922:4). It was based on the living 
requirements necessary to keep a working man, his wife and three children in a 
condition of fmgal comfort. Moreover, the living or basic wage (i.e. the minimum 
payable for unskilled labour) formed the basis of a wage awards system which 
guaranteed workers a decent standard of living. The wage awards consisted of a 
basic wage "plus margins for skill, and the real value of the 'living' wage notionally 
guaranteed by indexation of the basic wage component to changes in the consumer 
price index" (Castles, 1988:99). 
A welfare system developed based on wage security for the worker, which 
was to be secured through a system of compulsory arbitration, rather than social 
security for the citizen. "It sought to ensure that adult males were able to satisfy 
their needs in the market, principally by means of state arbitration determining 
wage levels on a needs basis" (Macintyre, 1986:4). 
A system of wage regulation which took human need into account was quite 
radical in an era when private profit was the key determinant of wage setting in 
most modem industrial countries. The other elements of this welfare system 
included benefits such as old age and invalidity pensions which were subject to 
means tests and provided flat-rate benefits, and thus were examples of a residual 
and selectivist social policy. The aim was "to substitute state charity for private 
charity in circumstances where the latter could not meet emergent needs" (Castles, 
1985:16). 
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Furthermore, because "the criterion of inclusion was status as a wage earner 
rather than status as a citizen" (Castles, 1985:86), there were some rather large 
holes to be found in the welfare safety net. For instance, those on the basic wage 
who were hit by temporary unemployment, sickness, or had moderately large 
families, often fell below the poverty line. The Australian wage eamers' welfare 
system therefore had its limitations. 
Nevertheless, there remained at the same time: 
a genuine contrast between the overall social policy profiles of these 
countries and that of the United States, insofar as the existence of a 
statutory wage regulation system in the former continued to provide 
a national minimum level of needs-fulfilment below which the vast 
majority of wage-eamers could not fall (Castles, 1985:103). 
A welfare system which sought to defend the working man's existing standard of 
living, while providing a modicum of relief for the less fortunate initially was 
strongly supported by workers and their unions (Spence, 1909). Indeed, as has 
already been noted, the needs based living wage set by Justice Higgins in his 
Harvester judgement of 1907 formed the basis of a political bargain reached 
between unions and employers in the two decades spanning the tum of the 
twentieth century. Furthermore, the system of wage eamer security established at 
the beginning of the twentieth century was to determine welfare outcomes for a 
long time in Australia (Castles, 1985, 1988). 
Indeed, it was only in the 1970s that this welfare system gradually began to 
be replaced by one based on the principles of decommodification and to a lesser 
extent universality (see Macintyre, 1986). These recent changes have contributed to 
the development of a social wage which, it is argued in the conclusion to this 
thesis, has contributed to the establishment of industrial harmony under a federal 
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Labor govemment (1983-). However, the wage earners' welfare system which 
dominated during the period of Queensland Labor govemments considered in this 
thesis was unable to create the conditions for a political exchange which dominated 
industrial relations. There are a number of factors which help explain why this was 
the case. 
First, in the post-World War I era Australia's industrial tribunals were to 
place greater emphasis on industry's capacity to pay, rather than social justice 
considerations, when determining the rate for the living wage. This in tum 
demonstrated how workers income was dependent on market outcomes and thus 
contributed to their continued reliance on collective acts of militancy to secure 
improvements in their income. Second, Australia's dismal economic performance in 
the period from the 1890s through to World War II hindered industrial tribunals' 
capacity to deliver sizeable increases in real wages (Forster, 1989). Consequently, 
Queensland unions were to pursue their members' interests through direct industrial 
action. 
However, before considering in more detail why this wage eamers' welfare 
state failed to result in industrial relations being dominated by a political exchange, 
the discussion first tums to consider why workers and their unions initially 
supported this system. 
Origins of a wage earners' welfare state 
The welfare system established at the beginning of the twentieth century 
was shaped by the union movement's belief that it was not necessary to overtum 
the capitalist system. Rather, the union movement sought to secure the working 
man's position within the existing framework of society (Castles, 1985). Labour 
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movement support for policies which primarily aimed to defend existing living 
standards and economic and social relativities, rather than pin its hopes to a more 
radical program, was the result of the relatively high standard of living which 
Australian workers experienced prior to the 1890s and, also, the ideas which the 
working class subscribed to. 
The working class's adoption of a defensive posture at the beginning of the 
twentieth century seemed to make sense (Castles, 1987, 1988). Australia was the 
richest country in the world. This affluence extended to the working class: as a 
result, trade union leaders, rather than pushing for major reforms of the system, 
were willing to largely defend a system which had secured workers a higher 
standard of living than that of workers in other countries (Castles, 1987, 1988). 
More specifically, the union movement supported the living wage set by Higgins in 
1907, as it represented a retum to the standard of the pre 1890s depression days 
and thus would help guarantee to workers a reasonable standard of living. 
Labour movement support for the establishment of a wage eamers' welfare 
state also reflected its belief that "the market was susceptible to ethical constraint, 
that it could satisfy social needs if economic morality was enforced" (Macintyre, 
1986:5). 
These beliefs were associated with hopes for the re-invocation of a pre-
industrial moral economy which had existed under the patemalist legislation of the 
feudal state. While the influence of this moral economy had shmnk by the end of 
the nineteenth century, the idea of a living wage and the union label pointed to the 
existence of a redefined moral economy which contended that the worker should be 
guaranteed some economic justice while not challenging the existing capitalist 
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economic relations (Macintyre, 1983; Fisher, 1986). The unions argued that this 
was to be achieved through a system of compulsory arbitration. 
It was acknowledged by the union movement that this form of industrial 
regulation would not do away with the competitive economic system, nor secure to 
the workers their full share of production. However, it would at least bring about 
industrial peace since it "stops the sweater and provides a living wage" (Spence, 
1909:312). In other words, it represented a real advance for workers who, hitherto, 
had been reliant on collective acts of militancy in the economic arena to secure 
improvements in their standard of living. The following discussion indicates that 
Australia's system of wage eamer security failed to contribute to the establishment 
of an industrial relations system that was dominated by a political exchange 
relationship. The discussion first argues that the industrial tribunals were 
increasingly to determine wages on the basis of industry's capacity to pay rather 
than social considerations and thus resulted in the continued reliance of workers on 
the market. Moreover, this contributed to workers pursuing their interests in the 
economic arena and hindered the establishment of a political exchange. 
Industry's capacity to pay and its impact on wage earners 
From the very beginning Australia's industrial tribunals had been concemed 
with the need to set wages which met the needs of workers while also taking into 
account various economic criteria which determined industry's capacity to pay 
(Hawke, 1967; Macarthy, 1969). However, the task of developing wage fixing 
principles which appropriately balanced social justice considerations and the 
"sombre orthodoxy of political economy" (Rickard, 1976:214) proved particulariy 
difficult. 
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Towards the end of World War I a number of governments in Australia 
established inquiries to consider the most appropriate principles for determining the 
basic wage. The decision on the part of a number of govemments to establish 
independent inquiries into the most appropriate wage setting principles, emphasised 
the strongly held belief that the distribution of the fiiiits of production was a matter 
which should not be resolved through negotiation involving govemment, unions 
and employers. Instead, the matter of determining the most appropriate wages was 
one which should be determined by industrial tribunals, independent Royal 
Commissions or Economic Commissions. These inquiries were established in an 
attempt to rehabilitate arbitration in the eyes of employees and stem the rising tide 
of industrial discontent. This discontent was triggered by a period of unsettled 
economic conditions dominated by inflation and high unemployment (Forster, 
1980; Hawke, 1967) which led many unionists to express their concem about the 
living or basic wage set by Higgins in 1907. They claimed that it was failing to 
protect the living standards of employees. 
The most important inquiry established was the Royal Commission 
appointed by the Federal Govemment in 1920. This Royal Commission led the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court to decide to introduce a system 
of quarterly cost-of-living adjustments which sought to protect the minimum 
living wage from the inflationary conditions which, towards the end of World War 
I and immediately after, had eroded the real value of the living wage (Hawke, 
1967; Forster, 1980). However, the Royal Commission's more far reaching 
conclusion was that the basic wage would need to be increased from £3 17s Od, 
based on the Harvester standard, to £5 16s 6d, if the average worker was to be 
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assured a reasonable standard of comfort. This recommendation was not adopted by 
the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court because of concems that 
such an increase could not be sustained by the market. The Chairman of the Royal 
Commission, A.B. Piddington, noted that such a dramatic increase in the basic 
wage would min the manufacturing industry "unless the tariff was very 
substantially increased" (quoted in QIC, 1921:138). 
Consequently, from the 1920s onwards, industry's capacity to pay became 
the key determinant of the setting of the basic wage (Hawke, 1967). This 
emphasised the fact that workers were dependent on the market rather than 
govemment to secure improvements in their income. For instance, when setting a 
basic wage for the first time in 1921, the Queensland Industrial Court 
acknowledged the key importance of industry's capacity to pay (QIC, 1921:140). 
The Court argued that should it declare a major increase in wages this would 
possibly lead to the closing down of many industries and, as a result, lead to 
unemployment. The Court noted that it would "naturally hesitate to take any such 
action at a time when there is great depression owing to the fall in prices of all 
exportable primary products" (QIC, 1921:140). 
Thus, the Queensland Industrial Court placed a great deal of emphasis on 
those economic criteria which determined industry's capacity to pay. Three main 
factors - interstate competition, productivity and level of unemployment - guided 
the Industrial Court's decision in this case and other basic wage cases over the 
following decades. The Queensland Industrial Court set a rate of £4 5s Od. 
However, it decided in the following year in the face of a worsening economic 
situation, to reduce the basic wage to £4 Os. Od. 
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The trade union movement was dissatisfied with the Queensland Industrial 
Court's failure to set the basic wage recommended by the Federal Royal 
Commission in 1921 (see the Worker, 10/2/1921). Furthermore, its decision of 
1922 to reduce the living wage fuelled further umest amongst Queensland workers 
and their unions (see discussion in Chapters 6 and 8). In an attempt to end the 
controversy sunounding the setting of the basic wage, the President of the 
Queensland Industrial Court, McCawley, appointed an Economic Commission to 
inquire into whether the Queensland Industrial Court should depart from the 
standard it had adopted in 1921. In its attempt to work out the principle of wage 
adjustment to national real income, the Economic Commission rejected the idea of 
directing all the advantages of increased prosperity to the wage eamer. The 
Commission believed this would tend to discourage better management. Instead, it 
concluded that an index of capacity to pay should be the principal guide, with 
reference also being made to such matters as productive efficiency, unemployment, 
and rates of wages in neighbouring states (see Economic Commission on the Basic 
Wage, Report, 1925). 
The Economic Commission's findings were handed down at the same time 
as the Queensland Industrial Court decided not to award an increase in the basic 
wage (QIC, 1925:438-439). The Worker's (14/5/1925) editorial commented that the 
unions had been expecting to secure a substantial increase in the basic wage as a 
consequence of the work undertaken by the Federal Royal Commission and 
Queensland Economic Commission. The union movement believed that the findings 
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of these Commissions would demonstrate the merits of arguments for a substantial 
increase in the basic wage. There was "great shock" (the Worker, 14/5/1925) 
therefore when the decision was made to disallow any increase. The railway unions 
responded by taking industrial action in August 1925 which eventually forced the 
Queensland Govemment to restore the basic wage to its 1921 rate. In other words, 
faced with a system of wage regulation which workers believed did not guarantee 
them reasonable rewards, they were to take industrial action aimed at rectifying 
this position. 
Queensland Labor's response to this union dissatisfaction and, in particular, 
a week long statewide railway strike, was one which acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the system of wage regulation. Queensland Labor argued that if 
industrial umest was to be eliminated, a more satisfactory method for determining 
the basic wage than the customary "fodder basis", established by Justice Higgins in 
1907, had to be established. McCormack, who was to be Queensland Labor's next 
Premier, argued that workers were entitled to more than a wage which only kept 
body and soul together. They were entitled to a full wage. He argued that: 
if this tribunal can get this information more scientifically, so that 
industry will not be endangered, so that the distribution of weaUh 
will be made in such a way that the worker will get his fair share 
and the employer will reap a reasonable reward for his work, then I 
think that some attempt will be made by arbitration towards securing 
industrial peace. Unless that is accomplished, we shall simply have 
awards given by a judge on the basis of the cost of living, the man 
who is working will be kept on the bread line, and there will be 
umest everywhere ... (QPD, 1925:1359). 
Labor's solution was to provide the Industrial Court with more powers, information 
and personnel in the hope that such reforms would provide a greater ability to 
assess the welter of economic and statistical knowledge. However, this failed to 
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anest worker and union dissatisfaction with a system of wage fixing which was 
increasingly based on industry's capacity to pay rather than social considerations, 
such as securing to workers a decent standard of living. 
In 1931, at the height of the Great Depression, the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Court handed down a basic wage decision founded not 
on the needs of the 'working man and his family', but the capacity of industry to 
pay (Hagan, 1981). The determination of the basic or living wage had become 
influenced, increasingly, over time by industry's capacity to pay. The 1933 basic 
wage decision of the Queensland Industrial Court was to depart from the wage 
fixing principles being established by the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court. Queensland's Arbitration Court rejected the application of 
employers to reduce the basic wage. It maintained that the conservative economic 
orthodoxy accepted by most industrial tribunals that sweeping reductions in wages 
would improve employment was inconect. Instead, for the first time in its history 
the Court accepted the argument that "the state of employment is improved when 
the aggregate purchasing power of the wage eamers is maintained or increased" 
(QIC, 1933:28). However, the Court also cautioned that, "if the wages are beyond 
the capacity of the employers as a whole, or, indeed, any large section of them, 
wholesale dismissals, discharges and rationing become inevitable" (QIC, 1933:28). 
This decision was to ensure that the Queensland basic wage remained above 
the basic wage of all the other states throughout the depression years. This fact 
helps explain why Queensland's unions were able to commit themselves to a 
political exchange with Queensland Labor during the 1930s. However towards the 
end of the 1930s and throughout the 1940s the Queensland Industrial Court was 
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once again to become concemed with industry's capacity to pay when determining 
the basic wage. In particular, it became concemed with setting a basic wage which 
placed Queensland industry on a competitive footing with its rivals in the rest of 
Australia. This dissatisfied Queensland's unions and undermined their support for a 
political exchange with Labor in the post-Worid War II era. The following chapter 
explains in more detail, how Labor's concem with ensuring that labour market 
conditions in Queensland were competitive with those to be found elsewhere in 
Australia and overseas, was to help undermine union support for a political 
exchange. 
Australia's poor economic performance: implications for wage earners 
If Queensland's industrial tribunals had been able to deliver sizeable 
increases in real wages to workers during the period under consideration, then 
unions would have been much more interested in committing themselves to a 
political exchange with Queensland Labor. However, this was not to be the case. 
Australia's dismal economic and productivity performance in the period from the 
1890s through to the World War II hindered the industrial tribunals' ability to 
deliver a considerable increase in real wages (Forster, 1989). 
Australia's economy experienced a much longer period of slow per capita 
growth than most other capitalist industrial economies during the period from the 
1890s to World War II. Moreover, Australia's economic performance during this 
period contrasted sharply with the preceding and following periods in Australia 
(see Boehm, 1979; Butlin, 1970; Forster, 1989; Sinclair, 1976). Butlin explains 
that: 
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growth beyond previously established peaks was achieved in brief 
periods of intermittent 'booms', totalling fewer than seventeen of the 
years between 1890 and 1939. No other Westem country operated 
under a handicap of this dimension despite the restrictions and 
comparative stagnation of the interwar years (Butlin, 1970:282). 
Moreover, the problems of poor economic growth were matched by a high degree 
of economic instability and considerable fluctuations in output. In short, the 
Australian economy was "subjected to major fluctuations more severe in terms of 
amplitude and duration than most other Westem countries" (Butlin, 1970:281). 
There is a complex of factors which are responsible for Australia's poor 
economic performance during this period. This slow rate of economic growth was 
linked in part to the fact that Australia and New Zealand "had already substantially 
exploited their comparative advantage in world markets by the early specialisation 
in commodity exports which had made them rich" (Castles, 1988:107). 
Australia's decision at the beginning of the twentieth century to pursue an 
economic development strategy based on the protection of manufacturing is another 
important factor which helps explain why the economy performed so poorly. 
Castles (1988) contrasts the economic strategy based on industrial adjustment to the 
intemational economy which was pursued by several north European countries 
from the 1930s onwards, with the protectionist economic development strategy 
pursued by Australian govemments for most of the twentieth century. He concludes 
that: 
Grabbing competitive niches in new markets is built into the former, 
whilst protection serves, precisely, to insulate the economy from 
competition. This difference in strategies is presumably amongst the 
factors which explain why per capita economic growth rates this 
century have been so much higher in the smaller countries of 
Westem Europe than in either Australia or New Zealand (Castles, 
1988:107). 
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In summary, these difficult economic conditions limited the industrial 
tribunals' capacity to hand down decisions which resulted in general or sizeable 
increases in real wages. Consequently the wage eamers' welfare system was unable 
to deliver to workers generous wage outcomes which in tum could have been 
expected to help secure their commitment to a peaceful long term strategy of 
exchange with Queensland Labor. 
CONCLUSION 
An historic compromise was established in Australia at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. However, the institutional anangements which developed from 
this compromise were unable to create the conditions for the establishment of a 
political exchange relationship which dominated bargaining. Corporatist 
anangements were established, but they developed at the sectoral rather than 
societal level. Consequently govemment remained aloof from the bargaining 
process and, in particular, guaranteed few benefits to the workers. In short, it did 
not lead to govemments being a major guarantor of the workers' longer term 
interests. It thus failed to contribute to the development of a political bargaining 
process. Furthermore, the development of a bargaining system which was overly 
formalistic and judicial in nature was to encourage the key actors to adopt an 
adversarial posture that contributed to the persistence of industrial conflict. The fact 
that the system of compulsory arbitration also resulted in govemment being 
responsible for enforcing the mles of the game was to help embitter govemment-
union relations. 
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The wage eamers' welfare state was based primarily on a system of wage 
regulation that guaranteed workers a living wage, but also included a residual 
system of income maintenance which provided insurance against poverty for all 
those outside the labour market. Initially it formed the basis of a political bargain 
which was established between employers and unions during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Labour movement commitment to the system of compulsory 
arbitration at this juncture reflected its belief that it would ensure that workers were 
guaranteed the same high standard of living which they had experienced prior to 
the depression of the 1890s. However, in the period from World War I onwards the 
level at which the living wage was set failed to satisfy many unionists and unions. 
There were a number of factors which helped explain why this was the case. 
First, it was a result of the living wage being determined increasingly on the 
basis of industry's capacity to pay rather than social considerations, particularly the 
need to secure to workers a decent standard of living in a prosperous capitalist 
industrial country. Consequently, Australia's distinctive welfare system, namely one 
based on wage eamer security, emphasised the fact that workers were dependent on 
the market rather than govemment for their income and, in tum, encouraged them 
to pursue their interests in the economic arena through collective acts of militancy. 
Moreover, Australia's poor economic performance between the 1890s and World 
War II meant that the wage eamers' welfare state was unable to deliver generous 
real wage outcomes which might have been expected to help secure worker 
commitment to a peaceful exchange strategy. 
185 
The economic programs pursued by Queensland's Labor govemments were 
equally as unsuccessful in creating the conditions for a stable and lasting political 
exchange. The discussion now tums to consider why this was the case. 
CHAPTER 8 
QUEENSLAND LABOR'S ECONOMIC POLICIES 
During Queensland Labor's first decade of mle it pursued a program of 
economic reform that benefited workers and their unions and thus helped guarantee 
their support (Higgins, 1954, 1960). fts regulation of the labour market, changes to 
the taxation system and program of state owned enterprises secured significant 
benefits to workers. Indeed, Labor's actions during its first years of govemment 
could have been expected to contribute to the establishment of a political exchange 
with the unions which would have made them less reliant on the strike weapon. 
However, the previous two chapters have indicated that the Queensland union 
movement's organisational and political character as well as the system of 
compulsory arbitration did not allow industrial relations to be dominated by a 
political exchange during Queensland Labor's first years in office. Furthermore, the 
fact that Queensland Labor's program of economic reform secured considerable 
benefits to workers at the expense of business interests also set in train a sequence 
of events which undermined the conditions for a political exchange. 
Queensland Labor's program of economic reform represented a major 
frontal attack on business interests and the capitalist system. As a consequence 
business mobilised against Queensland Labor through the imposition of an 
economic blockade from 1920 to 1924 (Cochrane, 1984). This economic blockade 
resulted in the govemment's adoption of a much more conservative set of policies. 
Indeed, Queensland Labor govemments underwent a remarkable transformation in 
their political character during this period. They went from being relatively radical 
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to being conservative (Childe, 1924; Cochrane, 1984; Fitzgerald, 1984; Higgins, 
1954, 1960; Lewis, 1978; Murphy, 1975). From the eariy 1920s onwards 
Queensland Labor became firmly committed to balancing the budget through 
limiting any increases in public sector wages and improvements in working 
conditions. Secondly, the govemment ensured that labour market conditions and, in 
particular, the State's wages and working conditions, were competitive with those 
found elsewhere in Australia and overseas. At the same time. Labor was unwilling 
to adopt a development strategy which was reliant on encouraging business 
interests to invest in Queensland. This could have contributed to increased 
employment and economic growth and thus helped secure union support for a 
peaceful exchange strategy. 
The unions' response to Labor's adoption of an increasingly conservative 
economic program was not to create the conditions for industrial harmony. Those 
unions which subscribed to a labourist perspective sought to defend the economic 
policies of Queensland Labor on the grounds that the worst labour govemment is 
better than the best conservative govemment. However, their capacity to defend the 
more conservative program pursued by Queensland Labor from the mid-1920s 
onwards proved particularly difficult, especially given Labor's failure to secure for 
workers the sorts of rewards which they had initially received during its first 
decade of mle. Furthermore, the commitment of the leadership of the industrially 
powerful ARU to a militant unionism made this task even more difficult. The ARU 
argued that the more conservative economic policies introduced by Labor during 
the 1920s demonstrated the shortcomings of the unions entering into a political 
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exchange with Queensland Labor. The ARU argued that its members' interests were 
best advanced in the economic arena through collective acts of militancy. 
In the early 1930s the labourism-dominated unions contended that Labor 
secured greater benefits to workers than could be secured from conservative 
govemments or the economic arena. This gained more support than the strategies 
of the militant unions and thus contributed to a period of political exchange. 
However, from the mid to late 1930s the labourist message was severely weakened 
in the face of Labor's increasingly conservative approach to economic policies and, 
in particular, its concem to ensure that Queensland's wages and working conditions 
were competitive with those found elsewhere in Australia and overseas. 
Furthermore, the growing organisational strength of the militants within the union 
movement in the late 1930s, which persisted throughout the 1940s, threatened the 
labourism-dominated unions' influence in the union movement. Consequently, 
many labourist unions were to join the militant unions in their industrial 
campaigns, the most noticeable being the railway strike of 1948. 
The discussion now tums to consider the nature of the program introduced 
by Queensland Labor during its first few years in office. 
QUEENSLAND LABOR'S PROGRAM OF REFORM AND BUSINESS'S 
RESPONSE: 1915-1924 
A traditional labour reformist economic strategy 
Queensland Labor introduced reforms during its first few years in office 
which guaranteed workers considerable benefits. This helped guarantee their 
overwhelming support for Queensland Labor (Cochrane, 1989; Higgins, 1954, 
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1960; Murphy, 1975, 1980a, 1980b). Labor's policies were consistent with a 
traditional labour reformist economic strategy concemed primarily with 
redistributing the existing wealth in society towards working people. Some of the 
key redistributive measures introduced aimed to regulate the labour market and 
restmcture the taxation system in the interests of workers. Furthermore, a variety of 
state enterprises were established with the aim of securing a better standard of 
living for the worker through the regulation of prices, combating monopolies and 
price rings and the provision of better services and goods (Fitzgerald, 1984; 
Murphy, 1975, 1980b). A major government owned iron and steel works was also 
proposed (Cochrane, 1984). This proposal represented a major threat to business 
interests' control over the economic development process. The following discussion 
outlines, in more detail, the key elements of this quite extensive program of reform 
which was to benefit working people, but ignite business opposition to Queensland 
Labor. 
Perhaps the most important reform introduced was the Industrial Arbitration 
Act of 1916 (Murphy, 1980a). ft was responsible for a substantial change in labour 
market conditions during Queensland Labor's first decade in power. Indeed, as a 
consequence of changes introduced in certain key areas such as the length of the 
working day and the establishment of a basic wage, Queensland emerged as a 
pacesetter in the establishment of labour conditions that were beneficial to the 
worker. The Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916 resulted in the enshrinement of an 
eight hour day and forty eight hour week as law. The Industrial Court was given 
the power to determine a living wage. In 1921 this Court established a basic wage 
that was on a par with the New South Wales rate which was, at the time, the 
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highest in the country. In 1924 the govemment legislated for the introduction of a 
44 hour week. This resulted in the establishment of a working week that was on 
par with New South Wales and shorter than elsewhere in Australia. Finally, the 
Queensland Industrial Court created awards which set rates of pay and working 
conditions that were considered to be the most liberal in the country (Hunt, 1979). 
Business interests argued that these awards posed a serious threat to the 
viability of some of the State's most important industries. For instance, employers 
in the sugar industry complained that the award handed down by the Industrial 
Court in 1916, which resulted in wage increases of between 40% and 50% for all 
employees, would result in the "the extinction of one of our staple industries" 
(T. Crawford, President of the Australian Sugar Producers Association, quoted in 
Brisbane Courier, 26/8/1916). The Industrial Court failed, it was claimed, to pay 
sufficient regard to industry's capacity to pay. In this particular instance, the Court's 
decision demonstrated to many employers that Queensland Labor's Industrial 
Arbitration Act was designed primarily to advance the interests of the workers. It 
had, at the same time, contributed to unparalleled levels of unemployment, 
uncertainty in the future for industry, and everlasting industrial turmoil (Brisbane 
Courier, 3/9/1917, 31/7/1919). 
The financing of Labor's reform program was achieved primarily through 
fundamental changes in the operation of the taxation system and substantial 
increases in some taxes. Between 1914 and 1920 taxation, as a percentage of total 
revenue, jumped from being the second lowest in Australia to the second highest. 
Levels of taxation almost trebled during this period (Higgins, 1960). At the same 
time a graduated tax scheme was introduced which reduced the tax burden on the 
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worker at the expense of large monopolies. Labor's leaders considered these large 
monopolies to be harmful to society (Wiltshire, 1980a). 
New taxation measures, which particularly penalised business interests, 
included a new company tax as well as various land taxes. The increase in land 
taxes, introduced in the Land Act Amendment Act (1916) (see Irving and Schedvin, 
1973) particularly ignited opposition to Labor from powerful business and financial 
interests in Queensland, and even in the City of London, where business interests 
decried that it represented a "repudiation of obligation" (Cochrane, 1989). This 
particular fiscal measure threw into stark relief Labor's commitment to an 
aggressive frontal attack on capitalism and was one of the primary causes of the 
move by business interests in the City of London to impose an economic blockade 
on Queensland. The other important cause was Queensland Labor's commitment to 
the establishment of state enterprises and, especially, its attempt to establish a 
govemment owned iron and steel works (Cochrane, 1989). 
Queensland Labor presided over a considerable expansion of state 
enterprises during its first ten years of govemment (Fitzgerald, 1984; Murphy, 
1975, 1980b). These enterprises were established primarily with the aim of 
benefiting workers. However, they also reflected the labour movement's ambition to 
wrest control of economy and society from business interests. As Queensland 
Labor Premier Theodore commented, "Labor's ultimate policy is the replacement of 
the capitalist institutions which are used for the exploitation of human labour by 
co-operative or socialised organisations" (Theodore, 1923:199). 
There was a plethora of state enterprises established during this period 
which challenged capitalist control over the economy. For instance, the State 
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Govemment Insurance Office was given a monopoly on workers' insurance. Labor 
banned all private insurance companies from such insurance activity (Lewis, 1978). 
However, it was Labor's proposal to establish a govemment owned iron and steel 
works at Bowen which, if successful, would have represented the greatest threat to 
business's control over the economic development process. It would have ensured 
that the govemment, rather than domestic and/or foreign capitalists, played a key 
role in the future development of the State's economy (see Evans et al, 1985). 
However, Queensland Labor's inability to raise the required loan funds on the 
London money market was to sink this project (Cochrane, 1989). Labor was unable 
to secure the required loan funds as a result of the economic blockade imposed by 
business interests between 1920 and 1924 on Queensland Labor. The discussion 
now considers how business successfully countered Queensland Labor's frontal 
attack on its interests through the launching of this economic blockade. 
Business's economic blockade of Queensland 
The discussion so far has indicated that Queensland Labor's program of 
reforms severely disadvantaged business interests. It was not only business interests 
located in Queensland that were disadvantaged. Business interests in Australia's 
southem states and overseas, especially in Britain, were also disadvantaged 
(Cochrane, 1989; Higgins, 1954; Irving and Schedvin, 1973; Schedvin, 1971). 
Prevailing social and political settings tended to heighten business's concems about 
a program of reform which appeared to represent a major assault on its interests 
and the capitalist system generally. Cochrane (1989) explains that "there can be no 
doubt that the spectre of mutiny, worid revolution and property confiscation which 
rose up in Europe in 1918 and 1919" (Cochrane, 1989:22), was to feed the fears of 
193 
those business interests in Queensland and elsewhere which were concemed with 
Queensland Labor's program of reform. 
In 1920 Queensland had one of the few Labor govemments in the British 
Empire. It was considered to be a "Bolshevist comer of the British Empire" 
(Cochrane, 1989:22) which was "to be watched and dealt with by the owners of 
capital accordingly" (Cochrane, 1989:22). In short, the range of business forces 
which Queensland Labor had antagonised, through its program of reform, as well 
as the prevailing social and political settings, resulted in it being confronted by a 
major business counter-offensive. And it was forced to sunender. 
Conservative interests in Queensland had available to them a wide range of 
weapons which they utilised in their attempt to defend their interests from Labor's 
advance. They included "the law, the press (and therefore the electorate), the 
economic power afforded by the relatively nanow control of certain kinds of 
finance, and finally outright bribery of members of the Queensland parliament" 
(Cochrane, 1989:25). These weapons were "all invoked in the stmggle to reverse 
the assuredly temporary success of the parliamentary wing of the labour 
movement" (Cochrane, 1989:25). 
Queensland Labor's majority in the lower House of Pariiament was reduced 
substantially in the 1920 election, in part, as a consequence of the assault launched 
on it by conservative business interests. However Labor's capacity to survive this 
assauU highlighted the fact that it continued to maintain strong electoral support. 
This support was built on an alliance of workers and small farmers (MuUins, 1986; 
Murphy, 1975). Moreover, it was opposed by a divided and weakly organised 
conservative opposition (Higgins, 1960; Irving and Schedvin, 1973). 
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The following year Labor was to be successful in disposing of a hostile 
upper house of parliament which had rejected many of its legislative proposals. 
This meant that it had firm control over the polity and therefore could be expected 
to proceed relatively unhindered with its program of reform, fronically however, it 
was just at the point when Labor won firm control over institutional state power, 
that a substantial change in Labor's economic and social policies began to occur. A 
broad economic strategy that business interests developed and put into effect from 
1919 to 1924 was particularly effective in forcing Labor to retreat from its reform 
program. 
At the end of World War I, Labor sought to finance a significant expansion 
of its program of economic and social reforms by raising a major loan of 
nine million pounds on the London money market. Queensland's Labor Premier, 
Theodore, visited London in 1920 with the aim of securing such a loan. He was 
informed by London financiers that Labor would be granted a loan only if various 
pieces of legislation were either repealed or amended. He was told that future 
legislation should not interfere with the profits or activities of large employers 
(Daily Standard, 11/9/1920). ft was amendments to the Land Act "which had the 
effect of causing pastoral lessees (or absentee squatting interests, in plain language) 
to pay similar rents to those collected from small landholders" (Cochrane, 1989:7), 
that the London money market was particularly keen to change. "The City would 
only agree to the loan if the Queensland Govemment agreed to change its stand on 
pastoral rents" (Cochrane, 1989:9). 
Labor initially contemplated raising the funds it had failed to secure from 
London financiers in 1920, through the imposition of additional taxes (Daily 
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Standard, 11/9/1920). However, Labor's leaders quickly retreated from this 
position. Premier Theodore argued to various union fomms (see Advocate, 
10/2/1922; Daily Standard, 6/12/1923) that left wing solutions which called on 
Labor to resort to radical measures, including the imposition of further taxes on the 
wealthy or defaulting on its loans to money lenders, were umealistic. 
According to Premier Theodore (see Advocate, 10/2/1922; Daily Standard, 
6/12/1923) Labor's inability to fund its programs through loans or increased taxes, 
left it with little choice but to pursue cuts in public expenditure. This, in tum, led it 
to adopt a policy of retrenchments and wage reductions in the public sector which 
contributed to the undermining of union support for Queensland Labor. 
Furthermore, in 1924 Labor decided to accept most of the demands imposed by 
London financiers (see Cochrane, 1984; Schedvin, 1971) and from this point 
onwards until its final defeat in 1957, Queensland Labor was to adopt a more 
conservative set of economic policies, except for a brief period in the early to mid 
1930s. These conservative policies failed to deliver to workers the sorts of rewards 
which they expected to secure from a labour govenmient and consequently 
contributed to a number of bitter industrial confrontations. 
QUEENSLAND LABOR'S REVISIONIST PROGRAM, 1924-1957 
The London economic blockade led to a dramatic and permanent shift in 
Labor's thinking about the sort of economic policies which could be pursued in 
capitalist society (Cochrane, 1984). This shift did not result in Queensland Labor 
developing an analysis of the way in which capitalist society could be socialised 
(as Sweden had achieved) within the constraints imposed by business interests. In 
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short. Labor did not enter into the kind of debate about socialist strategies which 
leading thinkers in the Swedish labour movement participated in during the 1920s. 
Instead, Queensland Labor Premier Theodore claimed that faced with the 
restrictions of capitalist economic laws and in particular business's control over the 
investment process, the most realistic strategy to be pursued was one of gradual 
and slow reform. Such an approach would ultimately result in capitalist institutions 
being replaced with socialist organisations via an extension of the economic 
functions of the State (see statements by Theodore in Advocate, 10/4/1922, 
10/7/1992, 10/1/1925; Labour Magazine, 1923; Daily Standard, 6/12/1923). In the 
meantime, political power was to be used "to ameliorate the worst evils of 
capitalism, rather than to engage that system in the frontal attack that Ryan and 
Theodore had pursued from 1915" (Murphy, 1975:214). This led to the adoption of 
a radically different mix of economic policies. 
Queensland Labor committed itself to an orthodox economic strategy which 
attempted to reassure business interests. This strategy was founded primarily on 
two factors. First, a commitment to balancing the govemment's budget, not through 
increases in taxes or the raising of loans but, instead, through a pmdent approach 
to govemment spending in areas such as public sector wages and working 
conditions. Second, an overriding concem to ensure that the State's labour costs 
placed it on a competitive footing with the rest of Australia and overseas. At the 
same time, Labor's commitment to economic orthodoxy did not lead it to introduce 
policies aimed at enticing domestic and intemational capitalists to invest in 
Queensland's economy. This reflected its distmst of business interests and its 
general opposition to the capitalist economic system. Consequently, it is explained 
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that Labor was unable to create the sort of economic growth which might have 
been expected to deliver an improved standard of living to the State's workforce. 
The discussion now tums to explain how these economic policies failed to 
guarantee to workers sufficient rewards or benefits to secure their ongoing 
commitment to a strategy of long term exchange. 
A restrictive fiscal policy 
Labor pursued a particularly expansionary fiscal policy during its early 
years in govemment. Labor "taxed, spent, and bonowed heavily in an effort to 
develop the State and provide full employment" (Wiltshire, 1980a: 168). The 
increases in taxes imposed primarily on profitable companies, absentee landlords 
and wealthy individuals, formed the basis of this expansionary fiscal policy. It 
allowed Labor to meet its commitments in relation to economic development and 
the provision of improved govemment services, while at the same time balancing 
its budget (Murphy, 1977; Wiltshire, 1980a). 
However, the shortfall of loan funds in the early 1920s led to Queensland 
Labor's adoption of a much more restrictive fiscal policy. This was because, as 
already explained. Labor's leaders believed that it was umealistic to seek to meet it 
objectives through either defaulting on loans or increasing taxes. Furthermore, since 
the wages of the public sector represented 50% of govemment expenditure. Labor's 
leaders accepted that they had little choice but to pursue a policy of retrenchments 
and wage reductions in the public sector. In 1922 Labor sought a reduction in the 
basic wage of govemment employees in order to avoid an anticipated budget 
deficit. This followed a decision of the Industrial Court earlier that year to reduce 
the basic wage of private sector employees, which in tum was largely a 
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consequence of Labor's failure to raise loan funds. This sparked a major campaign 
of union resistance (Smith, 1983) which led to the rail unions taking major 
industrial action in August 1925. This industrial action forced Labor to legislate for 
the restoration of the basic wage to its pre-1922 level which in tum resulted in the 
Govenmient's 1925-1926 budget being tumed from an anticipated surplus into a 
deficit. 
Labor responded by emphasising to the unions over the following two years 
that, as it was confronted with the highest deficit on consolidated revenue in the 
State's history, and continuing problems with loan expenditure, it would be 
determinedly opposing any improvements in the wages and working conditions of 
the state's workforce (Kennedy, 1973, 1978; Ryan, 1929). Labor's approach to 
fiscal matters in the 1920s had become concemed first and foremost with balancing 
the govemment's budget (Kennedy, 1973). Consequently relations between the 
govemment and militant unions in particular became increasingly embittered. 
Indeed, they led to one of the most bitter industrial disputes of the period, the 
South Johnstone strike of 1927 (Higgins, 1954, 1960; Kennedy, 1983). 
During the depression years. Labor accepted the need for budget deficits if 
social upheaval was to be avoided (Wiltshire, 1980a). This contributed to the 
development of a political exchange during this period. It is arguable that during 
the 1940s and 1950s Labor could have afforded to adopt a more expansionary 
fiscal policy. However, this was not to be the case. With the end of the depression, 
Queensland Labor reverted to a more restrictive fiscal policy. According to 
Jackson: 
The three treasurers in the period 1946 to 1951, Larcombe, Gair and 
Walsh, stressed the importance of a balanced budget for the State's 
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economic stability. Queensland's economic debt remained the second 
lowest in Australia (Jackson, 1968:99-100). 
The impact of the London economic blockade had wrought an enduring 
change in the ideological posture of Labor in Queensland. This was evident in the 
attitude it adopted to the management of its budgets in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Labor's commitment to a conservative fiscal policy had become an article of faith 
which made it much more difficult to deliver to public sector unions the sorts of 
wages and working conditions they expected in retum for their support. The result 
was a series of conflicts which sometimes resulted in major strikes. For instance. 
Labor's determined opposition to rail employees' demands for an increase in wages, 
was to contribute to the rail strike of 1948 (see Blackmur, 1986, 1993). 
In the 1950s Labor resisted union demands to legislate for the introduction 
of three weeks annual leave, primarily on the grounds that it would be an added 
financial burden for the govemment to cany at a time when it faced a budget 
deficit. Govemment resistance on this occasion was not to lead to industrial 
conflict but, instead, to a political crisis which led to Labor Premier Gair's 
expulsion from the Labor Party and Labor's defeat at the elections in 1957 
(Murphy, 1980c). 
These conflicts with the unions were also influenced by Labor's concem to 
develop a competitive labour market. This is now considered. 
Labor's establishment of a competitive labour market 
One of the most noticeable effects of Labor's commitment to a program of 
radical reform in the period from 1915 to 1924 was in relation to its impact on the 
wages and working conditions of Queensland workers. By the early 1920s 
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Queensland Labor govemments had gained a reputation as "pace setters" in the 
establishment of wages and working conditions favourable to workers. By 1919 
Queensland workers could boast the highest average hourly wages and the shortest 
working week in Australia (Higgins, 1954). Furthermore, workers enjoyed 
industrial conditions considerably in advance of those found elsewhere in Australia 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Murphy, 1980a). 
However, in the aftermath of the economic blockade of the early 1920s, 
Queensland's Labor leaders were increasingly concemed to ensure that the State's 
labour costs placed it on a competitive footing with the rest of Australia and 
overseas. Labor Premier Theodore argued (see Daily Standard, 6/12/1923) that they 
must rein in any future increases in wages and improvements in working conditions 
if Queensland's industries were to be able to effectively compete in both the 
domestic and intemational markets. In short. Labor needed to ensure that any major 
reforms in relation to wages and working conditions did not undermine the State's 
competitiveness and, in tum, threaten its ability to develop its economy and create 
greater employment opportunities. 
Theodore consistently stressed during the early 1920s that "Labor's 
administration was subject to the restriction of economic laws" (Advocate, 
10/1/1925). He argued that two important elements were capitalist control over the 
investment process, and Queensland industry's need to remain competitive with 
industries in other States. In short, Theodore contended that "they could only cany 
their industries if they produced sufficient to pay for raw material, wage costs and 
other costs of production, and a reasonable retum on the capital invested" (Daily 
Standard, 6/12/1923). 
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Flowing from this analysis was Theodore's belief that Labor's continued 
survival depended on its ability to ensure that any major reforms to wages and 
working conditions did not hinder economic growth. In tum, this would damage 
investor confidence, lead to the collapse of some industries in the face of interstate 
trade and create unemployment (Daily Standard, 6/12/1923). 
During the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s Labor's leaders were to hold similar 
views. They consistently advocated the need to ensure that Queensland's wages and 
working conditions remained competitive with those found in Australia's southem 
states and among its overseas competitors. 
During the 1930s, debate in the labour movement about improvements in 
industrial conditions centred around the proposed introduction of a 40 hour 
working week. Labor Premier Forgan Smith maintained that a unilateral reduction 
in working hours would place an exporting State like Queensland at a great 
disadvantage when trading on world markets (ALP, 1935:55). He argued that there 
was a danger that if the costs of production increased in Queensland then "trade in 
those goods would shift to other states with a longer working week" (ALP, 
1941:21). 
Queensland Labor was to support the introduction of the 40 hour week in 
1947. However, this was only because it was being introduced at a national level 
and therefore would ensure that "no state would be at any disadvantage in the 
matters of trade and industry" (Telegraph, 11/2/1946). 
The other labour market condition which had a significant impact on 
interstate competition was the rate at which the basic wage was set. In the period 
from the 1920s to 1950 the Queensland basic wage was set at a higher rate than 
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that of the Commonwealth basic wage, though the difference was gradually 
reduced during the 1940s. 
Finally, at the Queensland Industrial Court's hearing into the setting of the 
basic wage in 1950, the Queensland govemment argued that the State's basic wage 
should be set at the same rate as the Commonwealth's. The Queensland Industrial 
Court decided to adopt the federal basic wage as the standard for all Queensland 
state awards, much to the chagrin of the majority of unionists. The position 
adopted by Labor in the 1950 hearing into the basic wage, reflected its concem that 
the wages and working conditions of the Queensland workforce should be brought 
into line with those of its southem counterparts and, in doing so, ensure the 
competitiveness of Queensland industry (Blackmur, 1986). 
The unions rejected this policy and, instead, demanded that Labor secure for 
the workers superior wages and working conditions to those found elsewhere in 
Australia. Indeed, the unions sought to break the govenmient's policy stance 
through political lobbying and industrial action. For instance, the 1925 and 1948 
rail strikes were in large part the result of union opposition to Labor's stance on the 
basic wage and setting of working hours. 
It is conceivable that Labor may have been able to secure greater 
commitment from the unions to such a policy on the setting of wages and working 
conditions if this had been part of a broader economic development strategy 
offering tangible benefits to the unions in retum for a commitment to wage 
restraint. In other words, union support for a political exchange may have been 
secured if Labor's commitment to the establishment of a competitive labour market 
had been combined with policies which encouraged capitalist investment and, in 
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tum, enhanced the potential for economic growth. This in tum could have been 
expected to deliver greater employment opportunities and an improved standard of 
living for workers. Consequently unions may not have felt such a great need to 
resort to industrial action to secure their objectives. However, as the following 
section demonstrates, Queensland Labor failed to introduce economic policies 
which created the conditions for dynamic economic growth. 
Labor's economic development strategy for Queensland 
When Queensland Labor came to power in 1915 it inherited an economy 
which performed relatively well compared with the rest of Australia (Lewis, 1978). 
Its economy had been growing steadily from 1906. This was to continue through to 
1927 when the depression started to bite (Lewis, 1978). However, the Queensland 
economy's long term prospects did not look good. It remained dependent, during 
this period, on primary production. If Queensland was to develop economically, 
and in particular, establish growth rates that allowed Labor to introduce economic 
and social policies that benefited both business and labour in the period from the 
mid 1920s onwards, it needed to diversify its economy and, in particular, develop 
its industrial base. The key to increased economic wealth at this juncture was the 
development of value adding manufacturing industries. It would otherwise remain 
an economically depressed region in which economic growth was "contained in the 
inherently unstable agricultural and pastoral industries" (MuUins, 1980:212). 
However, this shift towards economic development based on the 
encouragement of manufacturing industry was not to occur in Queensland during 
the 1920s and 1930s. This was also the case for Westem Australia and Tasmania. 
Instead, economic development in these states continued to rely on the agricultural 
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and pastoral industries. The little manufacturing industry which developed was 
confined to primary processing (Gough et al, 1964; MuUins, 1980). In contrast, a 
process of economic development based on the promotion of manufacturing 
industry behind tariff barriers occuned in the 1920s and 1930s in the two dominant 
states of New South Wales and Victoria, and in one of the four smaller states. 
South Australia. 
In the dominant states of New South Wales and Victoria various stmctural, 
spatial and historical factors were responsible for the development of 
manufacturing. It has been noted that South Australia's greater industrial expansion, 
when compared with Queensland and Westem Australia, was in part the result of 
its early establishment of industry relative to these two states, and also the 
specialist nature of the industry established in South Australia (see MuUins, 1980; 
Stutchbury, 1984). However, it is contended that the factor of critical importance in 
determining the quite different developmental paths which were followed on the 
one hand by South Australia and on the other hand by Queensland and Westem 
Australia in the 1920s and 1930s were the different economic policies favoured by 
labour and liberal govemments (see Layman, 1982; Wanna, 1988). 
Queensland's and Westem Australia's Labor govemments were keen to 
implement developmental policies which would assist in industrialising their state's 
economies. However, they were distinctly unwilling to do this in partnership with 
major business interests. Instead, they were only interested in such a development 
strategy if it was the result of a process of 'state-based industrialisation', rather 
than one based on the attraction of capitalist investors from interstate and overseas 
(Layman, 1982). 
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A strategy based on 'state-based industrialisation' would certainly have 
contributed to the process of economic development if successful. For instance, 
Queensland Labor's proposal to establish a state iron and steel works at Bowen, 
had it succeeded, would have contributed to the process of industrialisation. This 
process was vital to the process of economic development at this juncture. For 
instance, in his discussion about the limited nature of manufacturing development 
which took place in Queensland under Labor, Wiltshire (1980b) notes that this 
proposal would have accelerated industrialisation of the State through its linkage 
effects and spawned a whole anay of metal-processing and fabrication industries 
which would have been cmcial in creating the conditions for economic 
development. However, attempts at 'state-based industrialisation' failed. 
The New South Wales Labor govemment had first attempted to pursue such 
a strategy prior to Worid War I (Connell and Irving, 1980). In 1912 the New South 
Wales Labor government got as far as introducing a State fron Works Bill but was 
forced to withdraw in the face of pressure from the most powerful company in the 
country, B.H.P.. Similarly, Queensland Labor's attempt to establish a state iron and 
steel works at Bowen immediately after World War I did not prove to be any more 
successful since it was not acceptable to powerful capitalist interests in both 
Australia and Britain. Moreover, these interests were able to effectively block such 
an economic development strategy, as already demonstrated in the previous section. 
If Queensland Labor's response to the failure of its prefened economic 
development strategy, that is one based on 'state-based industrialisation', had been 
to pursue one aimed at developing industry through the attraction of capitalist 
investors from interstate and overseas, it may have been able to break from its 
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dependence on the economically unstable agricultural and pastoral industries during 
the 1920s and 1930s. In doing so, moreover, it may have generated the conditions 
for economic and employment growth which, in tum, could have contributed to a 
political exchange. However, this was not to be the case. Faced with the 
impossibility of pursuing a program of 'state-based industrialisation', Queensland 
Labor opted instead for an economic development strategy based on the 
development of primary production. The reticence to encourage capitalist 
investment, which had its roots in a populist distmst of monopoly capital, led to a 
growing reliance by Queensland Labor on an economic development strategy based 
primarily on primary production. 
Queensland Labor's commitment to agrarian policies fitted neatly with the 
ideas held by many in the Labor Party about the importance of building a worker-
farmer alliance against the big monopolies and large landholders who often resided 
outside the State. Associated with this is the importance of such policies to Labor's 
continued political success. During Labor's first term of mle, from 1915 to 1929, 
numerous legislative and administrative policies were introduced which were to 
assist the development of primary production. This trend towards greater 
agricultural development was further entrenched in the 1930s (CanoU, 1978; 
Costar, 1980; Bulbeck, 1987). Indeed, Labor Premier Forgan Smith believed that it 
was desirable to maintain Queensland as a largely primary producing state. 
Consequently, he believed that it was preferable to use the strong components of 
the State's economy to best advantage, rather than embark on a fundamental 
restmcturing of the economy which would result, in his view, in an unwelcome 
result - an industrialised state (Canoll, 1978). 
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Furthermore, in the post-World War II era, the focus on the development of 
Queensland mainly through primary production persisted (MuUins, 1980; Bulbeck, 
1987). In the immediate World War II era the major concession offered to new 
industries interested in locating in Queensland was the lowering of the State's 
company taxation so that it was in line with other states. Throughout the 1920s and 
1930s Queensland taxes on companies had been the highest in the country 
(Wiltshire, 1980a). This concession was therefore "hardly a competitive enticement 
to manufacturers" (Bulbeck, 1987:14) when compared with the inducements offered 
by other state govemments. It was only in the mid 1950s, with a "fast rise in 
unemployment due to technological change in the sugar, meatworks, and 
bulkhandling industries" (Bulbeck, 1987:15), that Labor govemments began to 
develop policies aimed at encouraging capitalists to invest in Queensland's infant 
manufacturing industries (Bulbeck, 1987). 
In contrast. South Australia's Liberal govemment was willing to attract 
business investors from the early 1930s onwards (Mitchell, 1962; Wanna, 1988). 
This, in tum, was instmmental in allowing that State to escape its apparent destiny 
as a primary producer, and to industrialise. However, Labor govemments in 
Queensland and Westem Australia were generally unwilling to adopt policies 
which would have attracted major capitalist investors. As a consequence, the 
former continued to rely on primary production, while the latter was far less 
successful than South Australia in its attempt to industrialise (Bulbeck, 1987; 
Layman, 1982). 
Despite the difficulty of establishing a direct link between levels of conflict 
in South Australia and the State's distinctive program of economic development, it 
208 
is nonetheless possible to conclude that its strategy of industrialisation had some 
success in creating the conditions for an effective political exchange between 
capital, labour and the state. In short, such a strategy offered tangible rewards to 
the major actors, capital and labour, and thus secured their commitment to its 
success. As Wanna (1980, 1988) points out, the South Australian drive to 
industrialise was dominated by a collaborative commitment on the part of unions, 
capital and the state to such a strategy, for it offered economic growth and greater 
employment opportunities. 
In contrast, Queensland Labor was unwilling to embrace the only viable 
economic development strategy available to state govemments in the period from 
World War I through to the 1950s. This was one aimed at seeking to attract 
interstate and overseas capitalist interests to invest in the development of 
manufacturing which, in tum, would have created the conditions for economic and 
employment growth. Instead, faced with the impossibility of implementing an 
economic development strategy based on 'state-based industrialisation', Queensland 
Labor opted for the development of an economy based on primary production. 
A significant consequence of the economic development in Queensland in 
the period from the 1920s through to 1957 was "a limited level of capital 
accumulation when contrasted with dominant states" (MuUins, 1980:224), and 
workers receiving lower wages, suffering higher levels of unemployment and 
poverty and receiving the lowest social consumption expenditure (MuUins, 
1980:224). 
Queensland's poor economic performance in the period from the 1920s 
through to 1957, when combined with Labor's commitment to a restrictive fiscal 
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policy and the establishment of a competitive labour market, made the task of 
securing the unions' commitment to a peaceful exchange strategy particularly 
difficult. Furthermore, the response of the unions to Queensland Labor's 
increasingly more conservative economic policy direction was to further hinder the 
possibility of industrial relations being dominated by a political exchange in the 
period from the mid 1920s to 1957. The reasons for this are considered in the next 
section. 
THE UNION MOVEMENTS RESPONSE TO LABOR'S REVISED PROGRAM 
Throughout the 1920s and first half of the 1930s those unionists who 
subscribed to a labourist strategy maintained that Queensland Labor had secured 
for workers far greater benefits than they could expect to secure from a 
conservative govemment. However, this support on the part of the labourism-
dominated unions for Labor was not sufficient to create the conditions for 
industrial peace. The militant leadership of the industrially powerful ARU argued 
that Labor's adoption of an increasingly more conservative set of economic policies 
during the early to mid 1920s demonstrated the shortcomings of the unions 
entering into a political exchange with Queensland Labor. Consequently, they 
argued that the advancing of their members' interests was best achieved in the 
economic arena through collective acts of militancy. The result was two major 
strikes in Queensland's railways in 1925 and 1927. 
During the early to mid 1930s a major economic depression contributed to 
the greater success of the labourism-dominated unions' message that Labor was 
able to deliver greater rewards to workers than could be secured from a 
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conservative govemment or implicitly, through action in the economic arena. 
However from the mid to late 1930s this labourist message was to lose its force in 
the face of Labor's increasingly more conservative approach to economic policies 
and, in particular, its concem to ensure that Queensland's wages and working 
conditions were competitive with those found elsewhere in Australia and overseas. 
Furthermore, the renewed strength of the militants within the union movement in 
the late 1930s, which was to persist throughout the 1940s, threatened the 
labourism-dominated unions' influence in the union movement. Consequently, 
many labourist unions were to join the militant unions in their industrial 
campaigns, the most noticeable being the railways strike of 1948. 
The next section focuses first on the moderate labourist response to Labor's 
increasingly conservative economic policies program and then discusses the 
response of the militants within the unions. It is claimed that this response on the 
part of the unions led to a number of bitter industrial confrontations. 
The labourist response to Labor's revised program 
Queensland's labourism-dominated unions did express reservations about a 
number of actions taken by Queensland Labor in the 1920s. For instance, the 
reduction of public sector wages in mid 1922 and Labor's response to the South 
Johnstone strike of 1927, were two events triggered by its adoption of a more 
conservative economic policy stance during the early 1920s. Nevertheless, the 
concems of the labourism-dominated unions were not to undermine their support 
for Queensland Labor. The moderates in the leadership of the AWU, in many 
smaller craft unions, and in the Brisbane TLC leadership firmly believed that 
Queensland Labor had secured significant benefits for the unions and thus pointed 
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to the advantages of the traditional methods of the Australian labour movement. 
This traditional approach was political action and a reliance on arbitration, rather 
than that proffered by the militants: revolutionary overthrow and direct industrial 
action. The majority of unionists in Queensland subscribed to this labourist 
perspective. They believed that during Labor's first decade of mle it had 
demonstrated the substantial advantages which workers could expect to secure from 
the successful implementation of labourist programs. In one of its many editorials, 
written in support of Queensland Labor's record, the Worker noted that: 
Queensland without doubt is the best State in the Commonwealth, 
from the working class point of view, and it has been rendered such 
not so much because trade unionists have continuously insisted on 
wages, but because the effectiveness of those wages has been 
safeguarded by the legislation and administration of Labor's political 
policy (Worker, 10/2/1921). 
Indeed, after ten years of Labor mle in Queensland the Worker claimed that "it can 
be reasonably argued that the Labor Govemment in Queensland, despite its 
limitations, despite the long way off that Utopia yet may be, is the best in the 
worid" (Worker, 28/5/1925). 
This strong support on the part of the labourism-dominated unions resulted 
in a resolution supporting the Labor Party at the upcoming federal and state 
elections being passed at the 1928 Queensland Trade Union Congress and 
reaffirmed at a TLC meeting in March of 1929. While at the fifteenth annual 
delegates meeting of the AWU, held in early 1928, the President of the AWU, 
Marten, was to clearly express the sentiment of many moderate labourist unionists 
when he stated that, while the South Johnstone strike had nearly been responsible 
for a political crisis which may well have threatened Labor's hold on govemment, 
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it was still the case that "the worst kind of workers' govemment is better than the 
best Tory govemment that can possibly be conceived" (Worker, 19/1/1928). 
In short, while disappointed at various elements of the policy program 
pursued by Queensland Labor in the 1920s, the moderate labourist unions saved 
much of their criticism for those militant unionists who sought to take advantage of 
the difficulties which the labour movement had been confronted with as a 
consequence of the "intemational financial blockade" (Worker, 28/5/1922). 
However, the labourism-dominated unions' often strident defence of 
Queensland Labor's record during its first fourteen years in office (1915-1929) was 
not to secure union movement support for a political exchange during the 1920s. 
The previous two chapters indicated that the organisational and political character 
of the unions and Queensland's system of compulsory arbitration hindered the 
establishment of an industrial relations system dominated by a political exchange. 
Furthermore, Labor's adoption of a more conservative set of economic policies 
during the 1920s, and the presence of an influential revolutionary opposition in the 
unions made it increasingly more difficult for the labourism-dominated unions to 
secure rank and file support for a political exchange. Consequently, the union 
movement and Queensland Labor were involved in a number of bitter industrial 
confrontations during the mid 1920s. However, the labourism-dominated unions' 
capacity to secure support for a political exchange with Queensland Labor proved 
to be possible during the early to mid 1930s. 
In the period immediately after Queensland Labor's re-election in 1932 
(following a brief intenegnum of three years during which it was not in power) the 
moderate labourist leadership of the union movement extolled the virtues of Labor 
213 
in Queensland. This contrasted with the position of workers under conservative 
govemments in most other parts of Australia. President of the Brisbane TLC, 
Bryan, declared to the Trade Union Congress held in 1934, that Queensland Labor 
had gone a long way to restoring to the workers many of the benefits which they 
had lost under a conservative govemment during the depression. It 
demonstrated that it is necessary that political and industrial action 
to obtain any benefits for their members must be taken by trade 
unions, particularly when through economic pressure the power of 
the unions is weakened (QTUC, 1934:4). 
In the second half of the 1930s, a growing concem emerged in the labourism-
dominated ranks of the TLC leadership about insufficient progress being made 
towards improving the wages and working conditions of workers under Queensland 
Labor. The leadership was aware that this was contributing to a weakened position 
of the labourist leadership within the union movement, which was coming under 
continual attack from a growing militant force. 
President of the TLC, Bryan, told various Labor ministers that the unions 
were concemed with matters such as the basic wage and working hours, and that 
the other states had gradually come up almost into line with Queensland. 
Furthermore, Bryan argued that this occuned as a direct result of Labor's failure to 
give a lead in the setting of basic wages and working conditions and, in tum, was a 
consequence of Labor's obsession with ensuring that Queensland industry could 
compete with its southem counterparts (Queensland Labour and Industry 
Department, A9894, A9885, A9884). 
In his opening Presidential address to the Queensland Trade Union Congress 
in 1940, Harvey, who had been part of the moderate labourist leadership of the 
TLC throughout the 1930s and who was to later become an Industrial 
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Commissioner, commented that the Govemment had failed to accede to any of the 
unions industrial requests in the previous few years. He commented moreover that: 
To any delegate who has seen the industrial position remain almost 
stationary of recent years it must appear that some understanding 
must exist in high political quarters that no further advancement is to 
be made until some of the backward States have made some 
progress. There was a time when the Queensland basic wage was ten 
shillings per week higher than the Federal basic wage, the working 
week four hours less, while general working conditions were 
immeasurably superior to those obtaining in other states; however, 
since the depression slowly but steadily the formerly backward states 
are reaching the level of our own, and, in some cases, actually 
passing it. The present Federal basic wage is only five shillings 
behind the local wage, the difference in the average working week 
has been reduced to a decimal point. One hopes that Congress will 
continue to press for re-enactment of benefits previously enjoyed 
and for further improvements, so that Queensland may again occupy 
the proud position it did prior to 1929 (QTUC, 1940:11). 
By the end of World War II this concem for the industrial position of the workers 
had become widespread within the union movement. Even the most moderate of 
labourist unions began to express concem that Queensland was becoming a low 
wage state under Labor. 
In conespondence to the Minister for Labour in 1944, T. Bolger, General 
Secretary of the Queensland State Service Union, indicated his union's concem 
about the State Industrial Court's failure to maintain living standards in 
Queensland. He stated that while the union wished to indicate that it was not taking 
a stand against arbitration, it had little choice but to express its concem that 
Queensland wage eamers had suffered a drop in wages during the war. This drop 
was much greater than the drop in wages which was experienced by workers in 
other Australian states. He hoped that the govemment would ensure that the 
standard of living in relation to other states not be reduced further (Queensland 
215 
Labour and Industry Department A9894). The AWU State Secretary Fallon, also 
expressed concem about the Queensland basic wage in 1946. He contended that it: 
is not even in keeping with the standard prevailing over the last 
fifteen years, and not up to the average comparative standard 
maintained by the State Court in the first twenty five years of its 
existence (Worker, 9/12/1946). 
In the post-World War II period, the moderate labourist unions increasingly 
expressed the view that Queensland Labor and its arbitration system were not 
delivering industrial reforms but, rather, blocking the just wage demands of the 
unions. This attitude helps explain why: 
the 1947 wages campaign in Queensland, which culminated in the 
1948 Railway Strike, was planned and conducted by a loose 
coalition of union officials whose political attitudes and philosophies 
were, to say the least, diverse (Blackmur, 1993:139). 
Most union leaders strongly subscribed to a labourist strategy. However, 
they found it increasingly difficult to secure their members' support for such a 
strategy in the post-Worid War II period. Consequently, the moderate labourist 
leadership of the union movement found itself involved in major industrial 
campaigns aimed at securing improvements in the wages and working conditions of 
the rank and file through strike action such as that mounted by Queensland's 
railway workers in 1948. 
The capacity of those unionists who subscribed to a labourist strategy to 
secure the rank and file's support for a peaceful exchange strategy with Labor 
became increasingly limited because of the influence of those unionists who 
subscribed to a militant or revolutionary politics. The discussion now tums to 
consider the influence of these unionists. 
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A militant response to Labor's revised program 
As already explained in chapter six, in the period from World War I 
onwards, a growing number of unionists rejected the dominant labourist strategy 
which the majority subscribed to. Instead, they opted for more militant strategies 
that were based on syndicalist and communist ideas (Hagan, 1980). To those 
unionists who subscribed to such ideas, Queensland Labor's capitulation to 
London's financiers demonstrated the shortcomings of the labour movement's 
pursuit of a reformist political strategy (Advocate, 7/12/1920, 7/1/1921). In 
particular. Labor's compromise with London's financiers illustrated the way the 
possession of economic power rendered "it immaterial whether the party in power 
is branded Labour Tweedledum or National Tweedledee" (Advocate, 7/1/1921). 
Furthermore, the Advocate approvingly quoted a marxist analysis of Theodore's 
compromise with London financiers in 1924, in which Theodore was "forced to 
acknowledge the superiority of economic to political power" and, in doing so, 
"reduced his Cabinet and himself to the position of subservient managing 
committee for the bourgeoisie" (Childe, 1924:285). In short, the economic blockade 
demonstrated that workers could not expect emancipation via parliament. 
According to the militants in the union movement, Queensland Labor's 
policies were concemed, from the mid 1920s onwards, with managing the capitalist 
system rather than goveming in the interests of the working class. For instance. 
Labor's opposition to union demands for the restoration of the basic wage and 
introduction of a 44 hour week demonstrated how, in existing capitalist society, 
workers and their govemments were ultimately mled by "international finance, 
worid markets and worid competition" (Workers Weekly, 21/12/1923). Labor 
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Premier Theodore's argument that working hours could not be reduced to 44 hours 
in 1924 because of its deleterious impact on the competitiveness of Queensland 
industry demonstrated that workers were firmly wedged "into a system of wages, 
competition and exploitation with [their] fellow workers alike in all the states" 
(Workers Weekly, 21/12/1923). 
This situation confirmed moreover that: 
outside forces bom of capitalism are stronger than the Queensland 
Govenmient. It is an admission that legislation is moulded according 
to the requirements and readjustments of capitalist interests (Workers 
Weekly, 21/12/1923). 
In the period from 1924 to 1957 militant unionists were to argue that the 
many actions of successive Queensland Labor govenmients were shaped by the 
demands of the capitalist system and powerful business interests located in the 
southem states or overseas. Thus, faced with a Labor govemment which was 
subservient to the interests of business, the union movement had little choice but to 
pursue workers' immediate interests through direct industrial action, while 
organising the working class for the decisive day on which existing capitalist 
society could be overthrown. In doing so, the militants rejected the possibility of 
the unions engaging in a peaceful exchange strategy with Labor. Instead, they 
played an influential part in many of the major industrial confrontations involving 
Labor and the unions, including the Rail strikes of 1925 and 1948. 
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CONCLUSION 
Queensland Labor govemments were not to develop an economic program 
that benefited both workers and business interests and thus were unable to 
contribute to the development of a lasting political exchange. Instead, in common 
with many other labour govemments, Queensland Labor initially pursued a set of 
economic policies which benefited the workers but severely disadvantaged business 
interests. Consequently, business launched a formidable counter-offensive in the 
early 1920s which led to Queensland Labor's adoption of a much more 
conservative set of economic policies that it was largely to adhere to until its defeat 
in 1957. 
The chapter has explained that there was, firstly, a restrictive fiscal policy. 
Secondly, there was a commitment to ensuring that labour market conditions and, 
in particular, wages and working conditions were competitive with those to be 
found elsewhere. At the same time, however, Queensland Labor's distmst of 
business interests and the capitalist system meant that it was unwilling to 
encourage business to invest in Queensland. This failure meant, in tum, that it 
failed to develop a labour reformist economic growth strategy which could have 
been expected to help secure union support for a peaceful exchange strategy. 
Finally, those unionists which were committed to a traditional labourist 
union perspective sought to defend Labor, despite the fact that it adopted an 
increasingly more conservative set of economic policies from the mid 1920s 
onwards. However, the traditional labourist unions' capacity to secure worker and 
union support for such a position was to prove increasingly limited. Further, the 
growing influence of a militant uninism which argued that workers should abandon 
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their support for Labour and, instead, pursue a militant wages stmggle made the 
traditional labourist unions' task even more difficult. Consequently, the unions' 
response contributed to a number of significant industrial confrontations involving 
the govemment and unions. 
Queensland Labor's economic program was the third element which helped 
contribute to the development of a bargaining system in which industrial factors 
dominated. The other two were the organisational and political character of the 
trade unions and the institutional anangements which developed in response to an 
historic compromise which were discussed in the previous two chapters. As a 
consequence strikes persisted under Labor in Queensland during this period. 
The next chapter first summarises the key elements of the argument 
proffered in this thesis and then briefly demonstrates how the analytical framework 
utilised in this thesis is able to help explain why industrial peace has been 
established under the cunent Australian Federal Labor Govemment (1983-). 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
Labour reformists traditionally have subscribed to the view that political rather 
than industrial action represents a more effective way of advancing the interests of the 
working class and, in particular, securing improvements in their standard of living in 
capitalist industrial society. This thesis does not contest this view. However, it does 
reject the view that working class control of the polity will inevitably result in 
workers being less reliant on industrial action to secure their objectives. Indeed, this 
thesis focused on Queensland where strikes persisted at a high level under Labor 
govemments between 1915 and 1957 (see Kelsall, 1959; Wooden and Creigh, 1983). 
This thesis has undertaken a detailed analysis of the Queensland case in an 
attempt to explain why workers and their unions continued to rely on industrial action 
during a period of Labor goverrmient. In completing this task, the Queensland case 
was contrasted with a case where workers and unions became less reliant on industrial 
action; that is, the case of a Swedish Social Democratic govemment (1932-1976). 
This comparative analysis teased out the complex set of factors which explain the 
quite different strike outcomes in the two cases and, in doing so, shed some light on 
the determinants of industrial peace under labour govemments. 
This chapter first summarises the key findings of this thesis and then concludes 
by utilising the analytical framework to briefly explain why industrial peace has been 
established under Australia's current Labor Govemment (1983-). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS 
The analysis is founded on a political economy approach to industrial relations. 
This argues that political factors have a key role to play in determining the sorts of 
bargaining arrangements that dominate industrial relations. This thesis supports 
Pizzomo's (1978) argument that three different sorts of exchange relationship have 
developed in capitalist industrial countries. These are a system of individual exchange; 
a system of collective bargaining; and a system of political exchange. Furthermore, 
Pizzomo's contention that it is where a political exchange relationship dominates 
industrial relations that strikes will wither away, is central to this thesis. The 
likelihood of industrial peace being established where there is a labour govemment is 
dependent on whether or not industrial relations is dominated by a political exchange 
relationship. 
The argument proffered by some political economy researchers, that a 
bargaining system dominated by a political exchange relationship will develop where 
the working class exercises control of the polity, was rejected on the grounds that it 
failed to account for the diversity of industrial relations outcomes in capitalist 
industrial countries. In particular, it was unable to account for a number of cases 
where bargaining was dominated by a political exchange relationship despite the fact 
that the working class did not exercise control of the polity. Moreover, it failed to 
account for the Queensland case. The political economy argument that the existence 
of corporatism has led to the development of industrial relations systems dominated 
by a political exchange relationship where there are labour govemments, was also 
rejected. This only provided a partial explanation for the development of bargaining 
systems dominated by a political exchange relationship. In other words, political 
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exchange is considered to have been produced by a complex set of conditions rather 
than being reducible to the rise of corporatism. 
A conceptual framework which acknowledged the variability of the conditions 
for a political exchange was developed. This was based on a comparative historical 
sociological method. According to this methodological approach, developments in 
capitalist industrial countries, such as the establishment of a political exchange 
relationship which dominates industrial relations, are determined by a complex set of 
factors including changing social stmctures, institutional anangements and pattems of 
behaviour. And then vary both over time and from country to country. The analytical 
work undertaken to complete this thesis consequently focused on identifying the 
complex set of conditions which help explain why industrial relations was not 
dominated by a political exchange relationship during a period of Labor govemments 
in Queensland. 
At the same time, however, this analysis did not seek to reduce explanation to 
certain conditions which it could be argued were unique to the Queensland case. 
Instead, the analytical work undertaken had as its aim the development of a conceptual 
framework that would contribute to the difficult task of general theory building. In this 
case, the task was to develop a conceptual framework capable of accounting for the 
likelihood of industrial peace being established where there are labour govemments. 
This was attempted by contrasting a case where a political exchange relationship 
dominated industrial relations during a period when the working class exercised 
control of the polity (Sweden), with the main case (Queensland) where a political 
exchange relationship failed to dominate industrial relations during a period of Labor 
govemments. 
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It was acknowledged that it might be contended that the difference in the cases 
being contrasted, that is a state (Queensland) versus a nation (Sweden), might be 
responsible for the difference in outcomes. However, it was maintained that the 
comparative work undertaken was not hindered by the difference in configurations, as 
the factors which it is maintained are responsible for the difference in outcomes can 
be validly applied to both cases. 
An analytical framework was developed which, it is maintained, is able to 
account for the different bargaining outcomes in these two cases. There are three 
factors which contributed to the quite different bargaining outcomes in these two 
cases. The first of the three factors is the organisational and political character of the 
unions. The second is the sorts of institutional anangements established in response 
to societal crises, and the third is the sorts of economic policies implemented by 
labour govemments. 
The establishment of a political exchange relationship which dominated 
industrial relations under Sweden's Social Democratic govemments (1932-1976) was 
a result of the ideal conditions associated with these three factors being present. First, 
the unions were dominated by a strong federation and a reformist leadership which 
was opposed by a weak revolutionary opposition. The presence of a socialist ideology 
during the process of union formation and the absence of cleavages within the union 
movement, based on religion, race, ethnicity, language, region or politics, were two 
of the key factors in the establishment of an organisationally unified movement 
dominated by a strong federation, the LO. Moreover, the establishment of corporatist 
anangements at the societal level contributed to the development and strengthening 
of the LO. Consequently, the unions were able to resist the rank and file's demands 
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to secure more immediate short term gains such as increases in wages and working 
conditions. The revolutionary opposition which existed within the Swedish union 
movement failed to establish a significant organisational base, and thus was unable to 
effectively challenge the reformist union leadership which was firmly committed to 
a peaceful exchange with Sweden's Social Democratic govemment. 
Second, an historic compromise was established in Sweden in response to 
major societal crises in the 1930s and 1940s. Corporatist institutions were established 
at the societal level leading to the informal coordination of conflicting objectives via 
various tripartite and bipartite agreements and fomms. These, in tum, were based on 
a social partnership established between the key contending actors. The establishment 
of corporatist anangements at the societal level also led to a wide range of issues 
being the subject to the bargaining process and, importantly, this meant that 
govemment was to become more responsible for guaranteeing to workers the sorts of 
benefits which were likely to help secure their commitment to a political exchange 
relationship. The welfare regime that was established at this juncture resulted in the 
development of generous, highly decommodifying and universalistic welfare programs 
which made the worker less reliant on the market. Consequently, the institutional 
mechanisms established in response to Sweden's historic compromise was another 
important factor which contributed to industrial relations being dominated by a 
political exchange. 
Finally, Sweden's Social Democrats were committed to the implementation of 
a labour reformist economic growth strategy throughout most of the period during 
which it was in office. This particular set of policies benefited both business and the 
workers and thus contributed to the development of a stable political exchange. The 
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one exception was during the second half of the 1940s when Sweden's Social 
Democratic govemment pursued a more traditional redistributive policy approach 
combined with a commitment to greater economic planning. The counter-offensive 
launched by business at this juncture contributed to a period of economic instability 
and led to a change in the Swedish Social Democrats' policy priorities. This change 
disadvantaged the unions and threatened to undermine the political exchange which 
dominated industrial relations. However, Sweden's unions were firmly committed to 
the view that workers' interests were best advanced through long term economic and 
social policy changes rather than through industrial strategies. This meant that they 
were not to respond to the change in Sweden's Social Democrats' policy direction in 
the late 1940s by seeking to pursue their members' interests through collective acts of 
militancy in the economic arena. Instead, they were to develop, and seek to impose 
on the Swedish Social Democrats, a set of economic policies which contributed to the 
development of economic and employment growth which in tum contributed to the 
development of a stable political exchange. 
In contrast, the ideal conditions associated with these three factors were not 
present in Queensland under its Labor govemments (1915-1929, 1932-1957). 
Consequently, industrial relations was not dominated by a political exchange. First, 
because Queensland's trade unions failed to develop the sort of organisational and 
political character which would have allowed them to secure the rank and file's 
commitment to a political exchange strategy. Attempts to develop an organisationally 
unified movement dominated by a strong federation were hindered by a number of 
factors. They included the significant influence exercised by craft unionism, the 
presence of regional divisions within Queensland, political divisions which led to the 
226 
development of two competing centres of union power and finally the impact of a 
system of compulsory arbitration. The result was the development of a complex and 
fractured organisational stmcture which hindered the union leadership's ability to 
secure rank and file support for a long term strategy of exchange. 
Furthermore, there developed within the union movement an influential 
revolutionary opposition that was able to challenge the reformist strategy subscribed 
to by many unionists. During the period from 1915 to 1929 an influential syndicalist 
militancy developed in the north of the State and in the second largest and most 
industrially powerful union in the State, the ARU. Furthermore, during the period from 
1942 to 1957 Communist Party trade unionists dominated the leadership of the most 
important trade union centre in the State, the Brisbane and then Queensland TLC. The 
strength of this revolutionary opposition was to undermine the union movement's 
support for a political exchange with Labor govemments. 
Second, a major societal crisis which occuned in Australia during the 1890s 
led to the development of an historic compromise. A number of factors were present 
during the two decades spanning the tum of the twentieth century which contributed 
to the establishment of an historic compromise. They included economic vulnerability, 
divisions within the ranks of business, a strong reformist working class and a strong 
state. However, Australia's historic compromise, unlike the historic compromise which 
was established in Sweden a generation later, did not lead to the establishment of the 
sorts of institutional anangements which this thesis argued could have been expected 
to contribute to the development of a political exchange relationship that dominated 
industrial relations. 
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This occuned in part because Australia's corporatist arrangements were 
established at the sectoral or industry level rather than the societal level. These 
corporatist institutions (i.e. a system of compulsory arbitration) did not allow 
govemment to guarantee to workers the sorts of benefits or rewards which could have 
been expected to secure their commitment to a peaceful exchange strategy. 
Compulsory arbitration also led to the development of a formal legalistic bargaining 
system which encouraged labour and capital to adopt an adversarial posture. Labor 
therefore pursued its interests through whatever means possible, including industrial 
action. This formal legalistic bargaining system also resulted in govemment's role 
being confined to enforcing the mles of the game rather than being involved directly 
in the bargaining process. Consequently, Queensland Labor was to discipline striking 
unionists which, in tum, embittered govemment-union relations and led to the 
persistence of industrial conflict. 
A wage eamers' welfare system was the other important institutional outcome 
of Australia's historic compromise. It was to guarantee workers a living or basic wage 
while a residual system of income maintenance provided insurance against poverty for 
all those who fell outside the labour market. This welfare system formed the basis of 
the political bargain established between labour and capital during the first decade of 
the twentieth century. Union support for this system was founded on a belief that it 
would guarantee to workers the same high standard of living that they had experienced 
prior to the depression of the 1890s. However, this was not to be the case. Australia's 
poor economic performance, from the 1890s through to World War II, limited the 
industrial tribunals' capacity to substantially increase the living wage. Furthermore, the 
industrial tribunals' increasing concem with determining wages on the basis of 
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industry's capacity to pay rather than social considerations, was to dissatisfy many 
unions and unionists and also emphasise their dependence on the market rather than 
govemment for improvements in their wage and working conditions. Consequently, 
workers and unions were increasingly to pursue their interests through collective acts 
of militancy in the economic arena. 
Finally, Queensland's Labor governments initially pursued a traditional labour 
reformist strategy that redistributed the existing wealth in society to the working class 
and also aimed to extend public ownership of industry. This strategy secured the 
support of the unions, but aroused considerable business opposition, since it clearly 
disadvantaged them. The resulting assault by business interests on Queensland Labor 
led to a major shift in its policies. The more conservative policies pursued by 
Queensland Labor following this assault included a commitment to balancing the 
budget through the adoption of a pmdent fiscal approach and a strong commitment to 
ensuring that Queensland's labour market conditions were competitive with those 
found elsewhere in Australia and overseas. At the same time however. Labor did not 
adopt an economic development strategy that was reliant on encouraging interstate and 
overseas business interests to invest in Queensland. Consequently, rather than 
developing a manufacturing base through capitalist investment, which could have 
contributed to increased levels of employment and economic growth, Queensland 
remained dependent on its primary producing industries during the 1940s and 1950s. 
The consequence of these economic policies was Queensland Labor's inability to 
guarantee to workers the sort of benefits which would have helped secure their 
commitment to a political exchange. Furthermore, the unions' response to the more 
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conservative economic policy direction of Queensland Labor, contributed to the 
persistence of strikes. 
Those unionists who subscribed to a reformist perspective initially sought to 
defend Labor's record on the grounds that the worst labour govemment is better than 
the best conservative govemment. However, this defence proved increasingly 
ineffective in the face of the impact of Queensland Labor's conservative economic 
policies and the influence of the militants in the union movement. The militants 
argued that Labor's increasing policy conservatism was evidence of the shortcomings 
of the reformist project, and pointed consequently to the need for unions to take direct 
industrial action if they were to advance the interests of their members. Moreover, the 
militants' organisational strength in the mid 1920s and again in the second half of the 
1940s allowed them to successfully put their prefened industrial response to Labor's 
policy conservatism into practice. This resulted in a number of major industrial 
confrontations involving Queensland Labor and the unions. 
RELEVANCE TO OTHER CASES? 
The analytical framework proffered in this thesis to account for the different 
outcomes in the two cases examined cannot be readily generalised beyond these cases 
for the reasons identified in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, this analysis does assist in 
helping account for the sorts of exchange relationships that have dominated bargaining 
anangements where there have been labour govemments. The following discussion 
briefly considers how this analysis is able to help explain why a political exchange 
relationship has dominated industrial relations and, as a consequence, why strikes have 
declined under Australia's cunent Labor Govemment (1983-). 
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Prior to the 1980s Australia's Labor govemments generally were not to preside 
over a decline in strikes (Waters, 1982). Indeed, quite the opposite was to occur under 
the Chifley (1945-1949) and Whitlam (1972-1975) Labor govemments (Waters, 
1982). Those conditions which this thesis argues hindered the establishment of a 
political exchange relationship in Queensland, also hindered its development under 
Australia's Federal Labor govemments. In contrast, Australia's cunent Labor 
Govemment (1983-) has presided over a dramatic decline in strikes (see Beggs and 
Chapman, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c; Chapman and Gmen, 1990; Morris and Wilson, 
1994). 
These researchers argue that the Prices and Incomes Accord (hereinafter 
refened to as "the Accord" and now in its eighth version), which was entered into by 
the Australian Labor Party and the ACTU in Febmary 1983, has been primarily 
responsible for the establishment of industrial harmony. This contention is accepted 
here. However, it is important to note that, encapsulated in the Accord, is the complex 
set of factors which it is argued has contributed to the development of a political 
exchange which dominates industrial relations. These factors are briefly discussed 
below. In doing so, the discussion highlights the usefulness of the analytical 
framework proffered, to explain the different sorts of exchange relationships which 
dominated industrial relations under labour govemments in Queensland (1915-1929, 
1932-1957) and Sweden (1932-1976). 
Prior to the 1980s the Australian union movement's organisational and political 
character was relatively similar to that of the Queensland union movement. This helps 
explain why industrial peace was not established under previous Australian Labor 
govemments. Significant changes have been wrought on the organisational and 
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political character of the Australian union movement in recent decades. These meant 
that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the union movement has been able to exercise restraint 
in the short term in exchange for the longer term benefits which it expected to secure 
from Labor govemments. This was, in part, because the ACTU (which was established 
as Australia's main union federation in 1927) was to develop into a strong federation 
which dominated the union movement during the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, in 
the 1980s the militant or revolutionary politics which, for a long time had exercised 
a considerable influence over union strategies, was replaced by a firm commitment on 
the part of the whole union movement to a reformist political strategy. This has 
resulted in the union movement being willing to commit itself to a long term exchange 
strategy with a Labor govemment. 
A complex set of factors is responsible for the ACTU's recent transformation 
into a strong federation capable of securing rank and file commitment to a long term 
strategy of exchange. Dramatic changes in the economy and workplaces have 
contributed to the waning influence of an exclusivist craft ideology which exercised 
considerable influence during the ACTU's formative period (Donn and Dunkley, 
1977). State Trades and Labor Councils exercised significant influence over the ACTU 
during its first few decades of existence which hindered its capacity to develop as a 
strong co-ordinating centre. This influence has waned considerably in the post-World 
War II era (see Pilkinton, 1983). Political divisions which developed between World 
War I and World War II led the largest union in the country, the AWU, to opt to 
remain aloof from the ACTU for a period of forty years, fts affiliation to the ACTU 
in 1967 pointed to a marked decline in these political differences (Rawson, 1982). 
Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s political divisions have been replaced by a growing 
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consensus within union ranks (Davis, 1983, 1985, 1992, 1993; Martin, 1992). The 
decision of three white collar peak councils to merge into the ACTU between 1979 
and 1985 also points to the breaking down of significant occupational divisions which 
had hindered the establishment of a strong federation (Griffin, 1994). 
There are a number of other developments which occuned in the 1980s that 
also have contributed to the ACTU's establishment as a strong federation. This thesis 
has noted that corporatist anangements, established at the societal level, can be 
expected to contribute to the development of strong union confederations. This has 
certainly been the case in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia. Labor corporatist 
anangements established at the societal level have contributed to the development and 
strengthening of the ACTU. As already mentioned the most important of these 
corporatist anangements was the bilateral Accord reached between the present Labor 
Govemment and the ACTU: 
This Accord process greatly enhanced the intemal authority of the 
ACTU. Its full-time officers and Executive sub-committee became the 
de facto negotiators for improved wages and conditions for not only 
unionised workers but also non-unionised employees as well. 
Inevitably, power and authority accumulated to the ACTU (Griffin, 
1994:91). 
During the 1980s key leaders in the Australian union movement sought to 
replicate the strategies that the labour movements in a number of north European 
countries (particularly the Scandinavian countries) had developed in the post-World 
War II era (some of the key tenets of this approach were discussed in Chapter 5). 
Australia Reconstructed (ACTU/TDC, 1987) was based on a joint analysis undertaken 
by the ACTU and Trade Development Council of successful union strategies 
developed in countries such as Norway, Austria and Sweden during the post-Worid 
War II era. ft was to represent a key strategy document of the Australian union 
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movement. It also was to provide "the theoretical underpinning for the more specific 
proposals outlined in Future Strategies for the Trade Union Movement" (ACTU, 1987; 
Costa and Duffy, 1991). 
Australia Reconstructed (ACTUATDC, 1987) noted that the considerable 
success of the union movements in these countries resulted in part from them being 
dominated by strong federations. The report concluded that if the Australian union 
movement was to succeed in delivering the sorts of benefits that these north European 
union movements had delivered to their membership, then it was vital that the ACTU 
develop into a strong federation. Future Strategies for the Trade Union Movement 
(ACTU, 1987), also emphasised the need for organisational change and the 
development of a more co-ordinated movement. Thus, these reports gave further 
impetus to the transformation of the ACTU into a strong federation and the process 
of union amalgamations. This process of organisational development has contributed 
to the unions being able to secure individual union commitment to restraint in the 
short term in retum for the longer term benefits which the ACTU sought to secure 
from a Labor govemment. 
Major unions, such as the metal workers and building workers, have for a long 
time been dominated by a leadership committed to revolutionary politics and militant 
industrial strategies (see Frenkel and Coolican, 1984). Accordingly, these unions could 
have been expected to help undermine the Accord process and the establishment of 
a stable political exchange with Australia's Labor govemments during the 1980s and 
1990s. However, during the early 1980s major left unions, such as the metal workers 
and building workers, were to embrace the sort of strategies pursued by the union 
movement in the Scandinavian countries (Ewer et al, 1991; Frenkel, 1993; Stilwell, 
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1986). They embraced a constmctive strategy of change concemed with a broad range 
of social and economic issues which were pursued through the Accord process. 
Consequently, these unions have willingly committed themselves to a political 
exchange with Labor rather than continuing to pursue their members' interests via 
militant industrial tactics. 
The decision of the militant unions to embrace the Scandinavian approach was 
the result of a complex set of factors. The metal workers union, in particular, 
acknowledged that the militant wages stmggles which they had spearheaded in the 
1970s and early 1980s had tended to exacerbate inflation and thus led to deflationary 
govenmient measures that reduced employment and left "unions with few gains and 
less strength" (Frenkel, 1993:262). Furthermore, the cmmbling of the socialist bloc 
discredited the revolutionary ideal. "There was an ideological vacuum that came to be 
filled by the more realistic concept of advanced social democracy epitomised by 
Sweden, where the union movement played a significant strategic role" (Frenkel, 
1993:262). 
Thus, during the first half of the 1980s, many influential radical unionists in 
Australia, such as the Assistant National Secretary of the Metal Workers' Union and 
former Communist Party member, Laurie Carmichael, committed their unions to a 
political exchange with Labor. They did so in the belief that it could secure real 
benefits for workers and also could form the basis of an altemative transitional 
program to socialism (Stilwell, 1986). The decision to abandon a revolutionary politics 
and militant industrial strategy in favour of an advanced social democratic strategy 
meant that from the early 1980s onwards major left unions were, along with the right 
of the union movement, to commit themselves to a political exchange with Labor. 
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The changes in the organisational and political character of the Australian 
union movement are one set of factors which help account for the establishment of a 
political exchange which has dominated industrial relations under Australia's Federal 
Labor govemment in the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1980s the institutional 
anangements established in response to the economic crisis of the 1890s have been 
restmctured in response to a crisis in Australia's intemational economic 
competitiveness (see Frenkel [1993] for a useful discussion of the process of 
institutional restmcturing which has occuned during the 1980s). These new 
institutional anangements have also contributed to the establishment of a political 
exchange under Australia's Federal Labor govemments. 
Labor was elected to govemment in March 1983 at the height of a major 
economic crisis. This crisis contributed to a degree of co-operation involving 
govemment, unions and employers (Stilwell, 1986). This was made possible because 
there were factors present which were likely to contribute to the development of a 
compromise between the key contending actors in society. In other words, Australia's 
economic vulnerability, the labour movement's considerable political and industrial 
strength and firm commitment to a reformist political strategy and, finally, following 
Labor's election to govemment in March 1983, the willingness of sections of business, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, to co-operate with Labor (McEachem, 1986; 
Stilwell, 1986) were the key factors which contributed to the establishment of a 
compromise. However, in contrast to the institutional anangements established in 
response to an earlier historic compromise which occuned in Australia at the 
beginning of the twentieth century (see Chapter 7), the corporatist institutions and 
welfare anangements established in the 1980s have contributed to the development of 
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a political exchange which has dominated industrial relations under successive Labor 
govenmients. 
The Accord represents the most significant of a plethora of tripartite and 
bipartite agreements and forums which have contributed to the establishment of a 
corporatism at the national level. The Accord is a bipartite agreement reached between 
the industrial and political wings of the labour movement. The National Economic 
Summit which was held soon after Labor's election to govemment was to involve 
representatives of govemment, business and the unions in a major tripartite fomm 
(Stilwell, 1986). Furthermore a number of tripartite procedures and organisations were 
to flow on from the National Economic Summit. These included for example, the 
Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC), Industry Councils, the Australian 
Manufacturing Council and the Advisory Committee on Prices and Incomes 
(Singleton, 1985; Sdlwell, 1986). 
These institutional anangements have resulted in bargaining between 
govemment, unions and business being determined not through an adversarial 
approach, which hitherto had dominated bargaining in the industrial relations arena in 
Australia, but instead, through a bargaining system based on the reaching of negotiated 
settlements. Furthermore, through these bipartite and tripartite agreements and fomms, 
a broad range of economic and social issues have become the subject of the 
bargaining process. They have included issues relating to job creation and associated 
labour market policies, industrial development, industrial relations, health, education, 
superannuation and social security which, in tum, have contributed to the development 
of a social wage (Stilwell, 1986; Chapman and Gmen, 1990; Willis, 1995). 
Consequently, Australia's Federal Labor govemment has become more responsible for 
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guaranteeing to workers various material benefits which have helped secure union 
commitment to a political exchange with Labor. These developments are also the 
outcome of corporatist anangements which are established at the societal level. 
Some researchers (see Ewer et al, 1991) have argued that despite all the 
rhetoric about the development of a social wage, Australia's Federal Labor govemment 
has implemented welfare policies which have encouraged the persistence of a selective 
welfare system, rather than one based on decommodifying and universalist principles. 
Furthermore, the difficult economic conditions which have prevailed for most of the 
period since 1983 have limited the Federal Labor govemment's capacity to deliver the 
sorts of generous welfare anangements which the Scandinavian countries introduced 
during the prosperous economic times which prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Nevertheless, research undertaken by the National Centre for Social and 
Economic Modelling (NATSEM), which was released in the April 1995 issue of the 
centre's Income Distribution Report, indicates that the social wage has contributed to 
a significant improvement in the incomes of the less well off in Australian society. 
Whitlock's (1993) research also indicates that welfare benefits are now significantly 
higher as a proportion of the poverty line than they were in 1983. Furthermore, 
according to a recent EPAC report, the argument that Labor's welfare policies have 
led to an "increased selectivity and residualisation of social services" has, in fact, 
tended to downplay the importance of many of the social and welfare initiatives 
introduced by Labor since 1983. Initiatives which have "bolstered the role of the state 
and improved social welfare provision" (EPAC, 1995:73). 
The evidence in relation to developments in the welfare system under Labor 
since 1983 suggests, on the one hand, that it has failed to emulate the sorts of welfare 
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regimes established in the Scandinavian countries from the 1930s onwards and 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, the significance of some of 
the welfare reforms introduced by Labor, such as those relating to superannuation, 
should not be underestimated (see EPAC, 1995; Willis, 1995). Substantial 
improvements have been made to Australia's welfare system in the period since 1983 
which, in tum, have secured material benefits to those whom the union movement 
represents. Thus, it is fair to say that Australia's welfare system has contributed to the 
development of an industrial relations system dominated by a political exchange. The 
economic policies pursued by the Federal Labor govemment has also contributed to 
the development of a relatively stable political exchange. 
Prior to the 1980s, Australia's Labor govemments were committed to economic 
policies which were concemed primarily with redistributing income to the working 
class rather than creating the conditions for economic growth from which both labour 
and capital could expect to benefit. It had, on the rare occasion, also sought to 
nationalise various industries or establish govemment owned enterprises. The Chifley 
Labor Govemment's attempt to nationalise the banks in 1947 is perhaps the most 
controversial attempt to implement such a policy. In contrast, since 1983 the Federal 
Labor govemment has pursued a quite different set of economic policies. For instance, 
underlying the Accord is a determined attempt "to focus the attention of both those 
who derive their income from capital and labour on to the mutual advantages of 
expanding total income, rather than fighting over shares in a static or declining total 
income" (Stilwell, 1986:118). 
During the 1980s and 1990s Labor has sought to achieve this objective through 
a substantial program of economic reform aimed at creating "a low-inflation, high-
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employment economy largely free from protection" (Frenkel, 1993:257). The plethora 
of reforms which have been introduced "can be grouped under three headings: 
attempts to improve competitiveness through economic adjustment measures; reforms 
of industrial relations institutions; and changes in wage-determination principles" 
(Frenkel, 1993:258). 
These reforms, along with Labor's particular commitment to the "restoration 
of business confidence and the profit share" (Chapman and Gmen, 1990:16), have 
offered tangible benefits to business. Consequently, employers and business have not 
launched a major counter-offensive against Labor. 
However, Australia's continuing economic difficulties, in particular, an 
economic crisis in 1985-1986 and a major economic recession in the early 1990s have 
meant that the capacity of Labor's economic growth strategy to deliver the sorts of 
rewards which might be considered necessary to secure the unions ongoing 
commitment to a political exchange strategy, has at times been difficult. Nevertheless, 
the political exchange established in 1983 between Labor and the unions has survived 
for twelve and a half years. There are a number of factors which help account for its 
longevity in the face of Australia's ongoing economic difficulties. 
Labor's commitment to the development of a high employment economy and 
progressive social welfare policy has ensured that workers' living standards have 
improved in spite of the economic difficulties which have confronted Australia in the 
1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the response of both Labor and the unions to the 
economic crisis of 1985-1986, which led to the renegotiation of the Accord, 
demonstrated the durability of the political exchange relationship (Willis, 1995). On 
the one hand Labor was not interested in pursuing a conservative economic policy 
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formula in the face of Australia's deteriorating economic conditions. On the other 
hand, as already discussed, the unions recognised the importance of committing 
themselves to longer term economic and social policy changes rather than seeking to 
pursue their interests in the economic arena through industrial action. 
Furthermore, the action of a number of conservative employers and 
conservative state govemments (see Blackwood, 1989) during the past decade have 
indicated that the political agenda which they are pursuing can be expected to have 
dire consequences for Australian workers and their unions. Thus the unions' 
commitment to a political exchange with Labor in the past decade has also been based 
in part on their recognition that were Australia's conservative parties to win control 
of the polity, workers and unions would be severely disadvantaged. 
This thesis has developed a conceptual framework based on three factors to 
explain the different sort of exchange relationships which were to dominate industrial 
relations under labour govemments in Queensland and Sweden. It was emphasised 
that these three factors could not be readily generalised beyond these two cases. 
Nevertheless, they represent a useful starting point when attempting to explain whether 
a political exchange is likely to dominate industrial relations where there is a labour 
govemment. The ability of this conceptual framework to explain why industrial 
harmony has been established under an Australian Federal Labor govemment in the 
1980s and 1990s, also further highlights its usefulness for future research into the 
likely establishment of industrial peace where labour govemments are in power. 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 
Statistical mformation which is available to analyse strike trends in Queensland and Sweden 
includes annual aggregate data concemmg the number of strikes, the number of workers 
involved and the number of days lost. 
When making comparisons based on these three indicators, differences in the number of persons 
in the labour force must be taken into account. Three deflated indicators which can be used are: 
(a) Number of stoppages relative to persons in the labour force 
(i.e. relative frequency) 
(b) Number of workers involved relative to persons in the labour force 
(i.e. relative involvement) 
(c) Number of working days lost relative to persons m the labour force 
(i.e. relative volume) 
Comparisons based on relative frequency are likely to prove unreliable. This is primarily because 
of differences between countries in the criteria required for inclusion in their statistical records 
(see Creigh and Poland, 1983:56). This measure has therefore not been utilised to analyse trends 
in industrial conflict in Queensland and Sweden. 
Comparisons based on relative involvement are not as statistically reliable as comparisons based 
on relative volume (Creigh and Poland, 1983). Nevertheless, relative involvement is a useful 
measure since it "reflects the number of workers mobilised in collective conflict and therefore 
has obvious sociological and political significance" (Korpi and Shalev, 1980:310). It is utilised 
to analyse trends in industrial conflict in Queensland and Sweden. 
Comparisons based on relative volume are considered to be the most reliable in statistical terms 
(Creigh and Poland, 1983:56-57). This is because "the bulk of days lost in each country are 
accounted for by a small number of major stoppages which will be recorded inespective of 
differences in definitions and collection methods" (Creigh and Poland, 56:1983). Relative 
volume is utilised to analyse trends in industrial conflict in Queensland and Sweden 
Table 1, Relative volume and involvement in industrial conflict in eighteen Western countries 
during the 1900s: Analysis of the Swedish figures highlights how industrial conflict declined 
sharply from record high levels of relative volume during the first third of the century to 
internationally low levels. Relative involvement in industrial conflict has also fallen to very low 
levels in Sweden in the post WWII period. In contrast, Australia's relative involvement has been 
at an intemationally high level throughout the period from 1900 to 1976 and relative volume has 
been above the mean average for the eighteen countries measured from 1919 to 1976. 
Table 2, Relative volume in industrial conflict in Australia's states, 1915 -1957. Queensland rate 
for the period 1915-1957 was the second highest in the country behind New South Wales. For 
the period 1915-1929 Queensland rate also was the second highest in the country. For the period 
1945-1957 Queensland rate was the highest in the country. Queensland rate was closest of all 
states to Australian rate for period 1915-1957. 
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Table 3, Relative involvement in industrial conflict in Australia's states, 1915-1957. Queensland 
rate was again second highest for periods 1915-1929, 1945-1957 and 1915-1957. 
Table 4, Relative volume in industrial conflict in Australia's states (calculated on a yearly 
basis), 1915-1957. Annual figures highlight the significant contribution that major disputes in 
1917, 1919, 1925, 1927, 1946 and 1948 made to Queensland's high strike rate for the period 
1915-1957. 
Table 5, Relative involvement in industrial conflict in Australia's states (calculated on a yearly 
basis), 1915-1957. Annual figures again highlight importance of major industrial disputes for 
Queensland's high strike rate. 
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Table 1 
Relative volume and relative involvement in industrial conflict in eighteen Western 
countries during the 1900s. 
Country 
Sweden 
Norway 
Austria 
Denmark 
UK 
Belgium 
New Zealand 
Australia 
Finland 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Ireland 
Canada 
USA 
West Germany 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Relative Volume * 
1900-13 
1286 
491 
280 
272 
460 
722 
-
399 
834 
309 
293 
-
-
471 
-
489 
251 
-
1919-38 
1440 
1853 
325 
681 
1066 
665 
146 
684 
399 
404 
126 
40 
508 
296 
356 
875 
379 
55 
1946 - 76 
43 
90 
44 
173 
213 
255 
191 
381 
630 
566 
631 
241 
443 
509 
585 
31 
34 
11 
Relative Involvementf 
1900 -13 
397 
165 
177 
94 
237 
168 
-
323 
233 
184 
270 
3 
-
173 
259 
151 
122 
79 
1919-38 
295 
384 
343 
203 
396 
468 
180 
517 
120 
388 
394 
32 
140 
151 
277 
775 
116 
42 
1946 - 76 
36 
65 
145 
184 
432 
331 
523 
1589 
835 
1367 
2313 
450 
293 
314 
354 
92 
57 
7 
Source: Korpi (1983:165) 
* Number of man-days of idleness per 1,000 workers in the non-agricultural labour force. 
t Number of persons involved in industrial conflict per 10,000 workers in the non-
agricultural labour force. 
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Table 2 
Relative volume* in industrial conflict in Australia's states, 1915-1957# 
YEAR 
1915- 1929 
1930-1944 
1945 - 1957 
1915- 1957 
NSW 
2780 
853 
824 
1516 
VIC 
892 
132 
326 
456 
QLD 
1119 
197 
890 
728 
SA 
609 
75 
218 
305 
WA 
221 
248 
177 
217 
TAS 
437 
230 
189 
290 
AUST 
1621 
418 
551 
877 
Sources: Raw figures from which these calculations were made were obtained from 
Commonwealth Labour Reports from 1915 to 1973, and Census Reports for 1911, 1921 and 
1933. 
* Number of workmg days lost per 1,000 workers (excludmg wage and salary eamers employed 
in rural production, female domestics and defence forces). Wage and salary eamer figures from 
1915 to 1938 are based on census figures for 1911, 1921 and 1933. Figures for years between 
each census represent estimated average annual growth. From 1939 direct measures were 
available (from Labour Reports) for wage and salary eamers excludmg mral, female domestics 
and defence forces. 
# Annual figures at table 4 used to calculate arithmetic means for periods 1915-1929, 1930-
1944, 1945-1957 and 1915-1957 
Table 3 
Relative involvement* in industrial conflict in Australia's states, 1915 - 1957# 
YEAR 
1915-1929 
1930-1944 
1945-1957 
1915-1957 
NSW 
2,193 
1,538 
2,700 
2,118 
VIC 
362 
169 
583 
362 
QLD 
647 
173 
1,438 
721 
SA 
314 
196 
559 
354 
WA 
647 
321 
381 
453 
TAS 
482 
90 
748 
321 
AUST 
1,122 
725 
1,528 
1,106 
Sources: As for Table 2. 
* Number of working days lost per 10,000 workers. Figures for wage and salary eamers as for 
Table 2. 
# Annual figures at table 5 used to calculate arithmetic means for periods 1915-1929, 1930-
1944, 1945-1957 and 1915-1957 
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Table 4 
Relative volume* in industrial conflict in Australia's states (calculated on a yearly basis), 
1915-1957. 
YEAR 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
NSW 
1371.30 
2781.52 
7715.47 
382.12 
5568.31 
4876.33 
1429.17 
1226.27 
1855.98 
1257.68 
1337.61 
2275.55 
2310.23 
973.61 
6342.86 
2895.07 
271.36 
125.85 
104.85 
400.22 
534.65 
727.51 
693.00 
1556.00 
587.76 
1698.14 
1023.27 
419.25 
1021.80 
736.90 
2293.23 
835.96 
VIC 
199.38 
5216.39 
2478.01 
476.58 
1754.39 
2341.32 
599.15 
180.19 
272.34 
181.32 
354.52 
268.01 
143.15 
288.01 
3335.64 
19.58 
70.16 
247.63 
65.63 
258.61 
104.85 
27.26 
151.60 
215.75 
54.55 
198.35 
236.49 
62.29 
136.81 
130.38 
92.60 
843.25 
QLD 
150.71 
1264.61 
2336.14 
1232.44 
3858.93 
731.83 
911.22 
839.24 
375.54 
315.13 
1437.54 
192.85 
2686.87 
435.29 
20.48 
58.41 
295.34 
120.03 
77.09 
158.64 
377.60 
72.82 
74.90 
402.02 
8.41 
583.60 
212.44 
11.67 
243.99 
260.20 
856.86 
2328.15 
SA 
208.72 
81.33 
607.37 
171.61 
2225.68 
1967.88 
900.56 
1072.33 
243.95 
182.98 
182.98 
213.96 
481.46 
514.36 
84.48 
214.04 
6.57 
0.94 
0.94 
0.00 
21.40 
4.08 
31.19 
148 
13.50 
62.87 
109.59 
62.50 
118.65 
472.67 
182.22 
165.34 
WA 
54.62 
285.52 
701.49 
6.19 
848.23 
425.45 
323.92 
122.95 
14.30 
148.37 
37.74 
63.12 
182.60 
67.06 
40.05 
4.63 
61.54 
174.87 
186.33 
190.29 
746.42 
325.70 
140.36 
414.03 
129.23 
66.54 
0.08 
84.92 
362.60 
829.49 
292.52 
542.48 
TAS 
130.01 
573.11 
1390.36 
13.09 
1639.04 
811.57 
610.12 
236.16 
28.01 
296.30 
76.86 
131.07 
386.69 
144.7 
88.17 
10.40 
140.88 
408.27 
31.50 
0.00 
2.41 
85.63 
377.30 
1536.50 
408 
205.07 
0.00 
1.80 
3.73 
650.27 
110.32 
103.94 
AUST 
636.44 
1506.11 
4219.53 
477.13 
3739.55 
3063.05 
1079.21 
486.88 
943.81 
749.52 
912.32 
1049.38 
1359.64 
611.02 
3474.58 
1165.99 
188.04 
160.78 
84.03 
278.69 
340.52 
327.41 
123.63 
807.70 
265.40 
827.71 
514.77 
198.60 
51737 
476.95 
1107.59 
926.42 
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YEAR 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
NSW 
1005.95 
668.95 
1037.14 
627.19 
641.47 
737.28 
748.18 
475.18 
637.83 
548.64 
451.89 
VIC 
519.67 
238.65 
86.76 
1676.70 
55.59 
155.21 
76.67 
174.09 
171.28 
135.93 
16.21 
QLD 
105.87 
2625.12 
572.27 
221.89 
272.96 
218.94 
443.86 
513.40 
268.16 
634.94 
2511.85 
SA 
210.16 
152.19 
136.25 
575.00 
150.15 
285.65 
247.99 
133.67 
278.05 
298.32 
14.87 
WA 
43.73 
53.35 
174.29 
33.54 
30.00 
748.68 
28.59 
118.90 
51.69 
171.87 
16.95 
TAS 
82.35 
13.80 
391.71 
107.97 
128.07 
172.79 
223.03 
305.42 
234.75 
527.55 
59.17 
AUST 
589.99 
700.11 
548.97 
809.96 
326.96 
442.61 
403.48 
332.69 
360.83 
392.70 
219.91 
Sources: As for Table 2. 
* Number of working days lost per 1, 000 workers. Figures for wage and salary eamers as for 
Table 2. 
Table 5 
Relative involvement* in industrial conflict in Australia's states (calculated on a yearly 
basis), 1915-1957 
YEAR 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1 1930 
NSW 
1697 
2938 
3116 
750 
2222 
1965 
2916 
2140 
1254 
2768 
2891 
1979 
3031 
1630 
1602 
972 
VIC 
194 
483 
548 
170 
661 
1144 
177 
170 
196 
272 
232 
229 
242 
154 
557 
10 
QLD 
157 
1504 
956 
781 
1116 
417 
350 
224 
212 
208 
1401 
154 
1899 
222 
104 
95 
SA 
158 
165 
418 
200 
765 
558 
302 
302 
170 
160 
132 
255 
745 
330 
57 
274 
W A 
80 
1213 
387 
640 
1333 
4300 
1635 
105 
519 
855 
449 
74 
415 
298 
106 
58 
TAS 
243 
108 
447 
0 
436 
461 
51 
103 
51 
77 
51 
231 
205 
128 
132 
79 
AUST 
760 
1566 
1567 
499 
1370 
1330 
1387 
969 
628 
1249 
1428 
905 
1594 
758 
817 
418 
247 
YEAR 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
NSW 
456 
398 
298 
674 
593 
880 
1400 
1883 
2130 
2387 
2896 
1980 
3291 
2832 
3348 
2669 
3226 
2515 
2073 
3057 
2856 
3350 
3038 
2107 
2511 
2031 
2314 
VIC 
116 
164 
184 
200 
182 
140 
81 
213 
44 
160 
342 
211 
344 
245 
529 
4278 
123 
625 
318 
1028 
358 
826 
913 
576 
439 
462 
111 
QLD 
329 
125 
194 
155 
103 
60 
50 
124 
18 
133 
164 
17 
386 
649 
646 
890 
408 
693 
822 
799 
1594 
1175 
2652 
2338 
2343 
3069 
1262 
SA 
19 
9 
9 
0 
25 
8 
101 
7 
14 
185 
230 
214 
515 
1335 
239 
583 
303 
352 
290 
645 
559 
1150 
839 
313 
1004 
740 
254 
W A 
448 
303 
433 
376 
375 
474 
167 
343 
119 
270 
26 
173 
238 
1018 
342 
500 
129 
164 
380 
125 
247 
1129 
213 
302 
530 
600 
297 
TAS 
53 
316 
26 
0 
24 
93 
89 
468 
20 
39 
0 
19 
38 
91 
286 
270 
206 
69 
467 
397 
1284 
1256 
622 
718 
1540 
1798 
809 
AUST 
290 
249 
226 
366 
326 
399 
606 
869 
883 
1058 
1299 
891 
1550 
1447 
1654 
1659 
1441 
1336 
4089 
1695 
1530 
1924 
1905 
1366 
1588 
1499 
1176 
Sources: As for Table 2. 
* Number of working days lost per 10,000 workers. Figures for wage and salary eamers as for 
Table 2. 
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